(单词翻译:单击)
On average, however, labour markets across the rich world are clearly getting tighter. America’s is plainly overheating.
然而，平均而言，发达国家的劳动力市场显然正变得越来越紧张。美国的经济明显过热。
In March average hourly earnings were 5.6% higher than a year earlier, on the headline measure. Another gauge suggests that the lowest-paid are seeing bigger rises.
根据总体指标，3月份的平均时薪比去年同期增长了5.6%。另一项指标显示，收入最低的人群的工资涨幅更大。
Goldman Sachs, a bank, produces a wage tracker that corrects for various pandemic-related distortions. It is more than 5% higher than a year ago, the fastest rate of increase since the data began in the 1980s.
高盛银行推出了一项工资跟踪指标，修正了与疫情相关的各种异常数据。这比一年前高出5%以上，是自上世纪80年代开始有数据记录以来的最快增速。
Almost all wage measures in America show unusually rapid growth (by comparison, manufacturing wages rose by an annual average of 4.1% in 1960-2019).
美国几乎所有的工资指标都出现了异乎寻常的快速增长(相比之下，1960年至2019年，制造业的工资平均每年增长4.1%)。
Before the pandemic, underlying French wage growth was in the region of 1-2% a year. Now it is close to 3%. Italy looks similar.
在新冠疫情之前，法国工资的基本增长率为每年1-2%。现在它接近3%。意大利的情况也差不多。
On March 23rd Norway’s central bank noted that “wage inflation has been higher than projected, and wage expectations have risen.” Britain is particularly striking.
3月23日，挪威央行指出，“工资通胀高于预期，人们对工资的预期也有所上升。”英国尤其引人注目。
On Goldman’s measure, underlying pay there is rising at an annual rate of about 5%. Surveys of businesses suggest that even faster growth over the coming year cannot be ruled out.
按照高盛的标准，英国的基本工资正以每年5%左右的速度增长。对企业的调查表明，不能排除未来一年经济会出现更快增长的可能性。
Across the g10 large economies as a whole wages are rising by at least 4% a year.
在十国集团(g10)这个大型经济体中，工资每年至少上涨4%。
Is this sustainable? To most people wage growth of 4% hardly sounds malign. But the arithmetic is inescapable.
这种情况会持续下去吗？对大多数人来说，4%的工资增福听起来并不是什么坏事。但我们总是免不了要算一算。
At 4% wage growth, labour productivity (ie, the value of what workers produce per hour) must grow by at least 2% a year in order to be consistent with an inflation target of 2%.
在工资增长4%的情况下，劳动生产率(即工人每小时生产的价值)必须每年至少增长2%，才能与2%的通胀目标保持一致。
Businesses would pass on half their extra hourly wage costs to customers in the form of higher prices, but would absorb the other half since they would be selling more goods and services, or producing them more efficiently.
时薪成本增长中剩下的2%，企业会将其中一半以更高的价格转嫁给消费者，另一半自行吸收，因为它们会卖出更多的商品和服务，或生产效率有所提高。
Productivity growth of 2% a year is not unachievable, but it would be a lot stronger than it was before the pandemic.
每年2%的生产率增长是可能实现的，但它会比新冠疫情前强得多。
Although productivity growth does seem faster than normal, our analysis of data from oecd countries suggests that it falls short of 2%.
尽管生产率增长看起来确实比正常速度快，但我们对经合组织国家数据的分析表明，生产率增长实际还没有达到2%。
It may yet rise as companies reap the gains from their large investments in remote-working technologies and digitisation.
不过，随着企业从对远程办公技术和数字化的大规模投资中获益，这一比例可能还会上升。
Hopes of higher productivity, however, must be weighed against fears of still-higher wage growth.
然而，期待生产率提高的同时，还必须考虑人们对工资继续增长的担忧。
If heady wage growth cannot be sustained, how might it fall? One long-floated possibility in those countries with lagging overall employment rates is that people who have left the workforce return, boosting the supply of labour.
如果工资的快速增长无法持续，那它会如何下降呢？在这些总体就业率落后的国家，长期存在的一种可能性是，离开劳动力市场的人会回来，从而增加劳动力供应量。
Fear of covid-19 might eventually fade and child care might become easier to find, easing worker shortages and causing wage growth to fall.
对新冠疫情的恐惧可能最终会消退，儿童保育也许会更容易获得，从而缓解劳动力短缺，并导致工资增长下降。
This hope is receding, however. Although many Americans have returned to the workforce over the past six months, wage growth has not slowed—in fact, it has accelerated.
然而，这种希望正在消退。尽管许多美国人在过去的六个月里重新回到了工作岗位，但工资增长并没有放缓——事实上，它还在加速增长。
The Economist calculates that in September there were nearly 1.9m “missing” workers aged 25 to 54, based on participation rates in January 2020 and adjusting for population growth.
根据2020年1月的参与率以及对人口增长进行的调整，《经济学人》估计，去年9月，25岁至54岁的“失踪”工人有近190万人。
By March 2022 this had fallen by more than half to about 750,000—or less than two months’ worth of job growth at the recent pace.
到2022年3月，这一数字下降了一半以上，降至75万左右——按最近的速度，低于两个月的就业增长。
There are another 1.3m missing older workers, but most are over 65 and likely to have retired permanently (and the number of missing over-65s has been growing).
另外还有130万“失踪”的老年工人，但大多数都超过65岁，可能已经永久退休了(而且65岁以上“失踪”的人数还在增加)。
It is likely, therefore, that in America and elsewhere labour markets will have to be cooled the old-fashioned way: by central banks raising interest rates, making it a little more attractive to save than spend and choking off demand for labour.
因此，美国和其他地方的劳动力市场很可能会被迫用老办法降温：通过央行提高利率，让储蓄比消费更具吸引力，从而抑制市场对劳动力的需求。
The Fed has already increased rates by 0.25 percentage points, and is expected to do so by a total of 2.5 points this year.
美联储已经加息0.25个百分点，预计今年将总共加息2.5个百分点。
America may prove an example of what happens when policymakers respond to a labour market that has become dangerously hot.
当劳动力市场过热时，政策制定者们会作何反应，美国或许会提供一个这样的范例。
