经济学人:银行监管 死刑
日期:2014-11-26 16:36



Bank regulation
Capital punishment
The latest global capital rules to make banks safer are sensible. Much else that regulators are doing is not
GIVEN how many things went wrong at banks during the financial crisis, it is not surprising that regulators have come up with several new rules to set them to rights. On November 10th the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international body charged with avoiding future crises, unveiled yet another test banks will have to pass—the fifth so far. At the same time Mark Carney, the head of the FSB and governor of the Bank of England, declared that these measures, if taken together and implemented properly, would “substantially complete the job” of “fixing the faultlines” that led to the crash.

Broadly speaking, he is right. The alphabet soup of rules devised in recent years makes it much harder for banks to be run in the risky manner that was all too common before 2007. New liquidity requirements prevent them from borrowing money on fickle overnight markets while lending it on for 30 years, the practice that felled Northern Rock, the first British bank to fail during the crisis. New rules on capital, including the one unveiled by Mr Carney this week, will force banks to have a decent safety buffer so that tiny changes in the value of their assets do not cast them automatically into the arms of the state.
广泛意义来讲,他是正确的。近年来,逐条修改的规则使得银行更难以危险的方式运行,这些方式在2007年以前是非常常见的。新的现金储备防止银行向瞬息万变的隔夜市场借款,再向外贷出为期的30年贷款。 那个做法使得英国首家银行北岩银行在危机中倒闭了。现金方面的新规则包括坎尼本周推出的迫使银行拥有可靠的安全缓冲,这样其资产的微小变化将不会自动使他们处于备战状态。
Better yet, the latest measure ensures that if a bank's shareholders are wiped out there will in future be an additional tier of investors standing between failure and a taxpayer-funded bail-out. “Total loss-absorbing capacity”, in the regulatory argot, will soon include not just the money invested by shareholders, but also that lent by bondholders, most of whom avoided any losses during the crisis thanks to government bail-outs. It is the centrepiece of the FSB's efforts to make sure that no bank is “too big to fail” (see article).
This extra capital is all-important. Before 2007, some banks had such a thin loss-absorbing cushion that a 2% fall in the value of their assets put them out of business. Imposing losses on their creditors involved long and uncertain lawsuits, and so was seldom attempted during moments of crisis. Instead, to stop the panic spreading, governments resorted to bail-outs. Under the new dispensation, however, “systemically important” banks should be able to endure a 20% fall in the value of their assets before placing panicky calls to the central bank.
The need to hold more capital makes banks less profitable—but that is no bad thing: the mammoth profits they made in the boom years were predicated on the subsidy they were receiving in the form of implicit government backing. It may also make them shrink, since one way to raise capital relative to assets is to hold fewer assets. That, too, is for the best, as long as people and businesses can find other ways to borrow. Relying more on stock- and bond-issuance would enable the economy to be financed at much less risk to the taxpayer.
If they want to stay in business, banks will also have to ask shareholders and the bond markets for more money. Attracting the capital that will make banking safer will be hard, with profit forecasts so anaemic. However it will also be made unnecessarily difficult by capricious behaviour from the very watchdogs who are ordering banks to raise the funds.
One problem is the endless tinkering with the rules. For all Mr Carney's talk of finishing the job, global regulators have yet to set the minimum level for several of their new capital requirements. National regulators are just as bad. No bank can be certain how much capital it will need in a few years' time. Pension funds and insurance companies rightly fret that even a tiny tweak in any of the new regulatory tests is enough to send a bank's share price plummeting (or, less often, rocketing).
The dark side of banker-bashing
The other problem is the multi-billion-dollar fines levied by regulators in America and Europe, seemingly calibrated not to the scale of the alleged wrongdoing but to banks' ability to pay. This week six big international banks agreed to hand over billions for manipulating foreign-exchange markets, with little explanation of how the penalties were calculated. New edicts unrelated to capital, such as America's assaults on money-laundering and tax-dodging, add yet more obligations.
Banks can hardly be surprised that regulators have rewritten the rule-book and then thrown it at them. But, for the health of the system, the rules need to be predictable, transparent and consistent. Incredibly, the regulations emanating from America's Dodd-Frank financial reforms are still being written, more than four years after the law was passed. Europe is scarcely better. Impose demanding capital rules, but stop adding more red tape: that should be the mantra of bank regulators just about everywhere.

1.come up with 追赶上;提出;想出

Let's fingerprint the canoe, see if we come up with anything.

Howard Wilkinson has come up with an absolute corker of an idea.

2.prevent them 阻止, 防止

He tried to prevent union money from being sequestrated by the courts.

He said this would prevent companies from creating new jobs.

3.cast into 铸成;塑成

John had Maude and her son cast into a dungeon.

Bronze are now cast into coins.
4.make sure 确信;务必

They want to make sure the newcomers don't get a look-in.

Make sure the draining board, sink and plug hole are regularly disinfected.

  • stabilityn. 稳定性,居于修道院
  • preventv. 预防,防止
  • transparentadj. 透明的,明显的,清晰的
  • measuren. 措施,办法,量度,尺寸 v. 测量,量
  • insurancen. 保险,保险费,安全措施
  • profitableadj. 有益的,有用的
  • scalen. 鳞,刻度,衡量,数值范围 v. 依比例决定,攀登
  • additionaladj. 附加的,另外的
  • calculatedadj. 计算出的;适合的;有计划的 v. 计算;估计;
  • bondn. 债券,结合,粘结剂,粘合剂 vt. 使结合,为 .