(单词翻译:单击)
听力文本
Welcome to THE MAKING OF A NATION – American history in VOA Special English. On a cold and cloudy day in March of eighteen sixty-one, Abraham Lincoln became the sixteenth president of the United States. In his inaugural speech, the new president announced the policy that he would follow toward the southern states that had left the Union. Lincoln said no state had a legal right to secede -- the Union could not be broken. He said he would enforce federal laws in every state. And he promised not to surrender any federal property in the states that seceded. Lincoln said if force was necessary to protect the Union, then force would be used. His policy was soon tested. This week in our series, Jack Weitzel and Jack Moyles discuss the dispute over the federal base that was being built at Fort Sumter.
On his second day as president, Lincoln received some bad news from Fort Sumter at Charleston, South Carolina. Major Robert Anderson, the commander of the small United States force at Sumter, wrote that his food supplies were low. At most, said Anderson, there was enough food for forty days. Unless he and his men received more supplies, they would have to leave the fort. Lincoln wanted to keep Fort Sumter. It was one of the few United States forts in the south still held by federal forces. And he had promised not to give up any federal property in the states that seceded. But getting food to Fort Sumter would be a very difficult job. The fort was built on an island in Charleston Harbor. It was surrounded by southern artillery. Southern gunboats guarded the port. To get supplies to Anderson and his men, a ship would have to fight its way to Sumter. Such a battle was sure to begin a bitter civil war. There also was the danger that fighting would cause slave states still in the Union to secede and join the southern Confederacy. The Army chief, General [Winfield] Scott, warned Lincoln that it was too late to get supplies to Fort Sumter. He said southern defenses around the fort were so strong that a major military effort would be necessary. He said it would take months to prepare the warships and soldiers for such an effort. Major Anderson and his men at Sumter, he said, could not wait that long.
There was another plan, however, that might work. It was proposed to Lincoln by Captain Gustavus Fox of the Navy Department. Captain Fox said soldiers and supplies could be sent down to Charleston in ships. Outside the entrance to the harbor, on a dark night, they could be put into small boats and pulled by tugs to the fort. Fox said a few warships could be sent to prevent southern gunboats from interfering. Lincoln liked this plan. He asked his cabinet for advice. If it were possible to send supplies to Sumter, he asked, would it be wise to do so? Postmaster General Montgomery Blair was the only member of the cabinet to answer 'yes'. Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase was for the plan only if Lincoln was sure it would not mean war. Secretary of State William Seward and the others opposed it. They said it would be better to withdraw Major Anderson and his men. They felt that now was not the time to start a civil war.
This opposition in the cabinet caused Lincoln to postpone action on the Fox plan. But he sent two men separately to Charleston to get him information on the situation there. One was Captain Fox. The other was a close friend, Ward Lamon. In Charleston, Fox met with Governor Francis Pickens. He explained that he wished to talk with Major Anderson, not to give him orders, but to find out what the situation really was. Governor Pickens agreed. A Confederate boat carried Fox to Sumter. Anderson told Fox that the last of the food would be gone on April fifteenth. Ward Lamon went to Charleston after Fox returned to Washington. He, too, met with Governor Pickens and Major Anderson. The South Carolina Governor asked Lamon to give Lincoln this message: "Nothing can prevent war except a decision by the President of the United States to accept the secession of the South. If an attempt is made to put more men in Fort Sumter, a war cry will be sounded from every hilltop and valley in the South." Lamon reported to Lincoln that the arrival of even a boat load of food at Sumter would lead to fighting. At the end of March, Lincoln held another cabinet meeting and again asked what should be done about Fort Sumter. Should an attempt be made to get supplies to Major Anderson? This time, three members of the cabinet voted 'yes' and three voted 'no'.
When the meeting ended, Lincoln wrote an order for the Secretary of War. He told him to prepare to move men and supplies by sea to Fort Sumter. He said they should be ready to sail as early as April sixth -- only one week away. On April fourth, Lincoln called Captain Fox to the White House. He told him that the government was ready to take supplies to Fort Sumter. He said Fox would lead the attempt. Lincoln showed Fox a message he was sending to Governor Pickens in South Carolina. It read: "This is to inform you that an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with food only. If this attempt is not opposed, no effort will be made to throw in men, arms or ammunition." Governor Pickens received the message on April Eight. He immediately sent it by telegraph to Confederate President Jefferson Davis at Montgomery, Alabama. Davis called a meeting of his cabinet to discuss what should be done. He asked if Fort Sumter should be seized before supplies could arrive. Former United States Senator Robert Toombs of Georgia was the Confederate secretary of state. He told Davis, "Firing upon that fort will begin a civil war greater than any the world has ever seen. I cannot advise you." Later in the meeting, Toombs urged Davis not to attack the fort.
"Mr. President," he said, "at this time it is suicide -- murder -- and will lose us every friend in the North. You will strike a hornets' nest which extends from mountains to oceans. Millions now quiet will swarm out and sting us to death. It is not necessary. It puts us in the wrong. It will kill us!" On April tenth, Jefferson Davis sent his decision to the Confederate commander at Charleston, General Pierre Beauregard. He told Beauregard to demand the surrender of Fort Sumter. If Major Anderson refused, then the general was to destroy the fort. The surrender demand was carried to Sumter the next day by a group of Confederate officers. They said Anderson and his men must leave the fort. But they could take with them their weapons and property. And they were offered transportation to any United States port they named. Anderson rejected the demand. As he walked with the Confederate officers back to their boat, he asked if General Beauregard would open fire on Sumter immediately. No, they said, he would be told later when the shooting would start. Anderson then told the southerners, "If you do not shell us to pieces, hunger will force us out in a few days."
General Beauregard informed the Confederate government in Montgomery that Anderson refused to surrender. He also reported the major's statement that Sumter had only enough food for a few more days. New orders were sent to Beauregard. Jefferson Davis said there was no need to attack the fort if hunger would soon force the United States soldiers to leave. But he said Anderson must say exactly when he and his men would leave. And he said Anderson must promise not to fire on Confederate forces. If Anderson agreed to this, then Confederate guns would remain silent. This offer was carried to Fort Sumter a few minutes before midnight, April eleventh. Anderson discussed the offer with his officers and then wrote his answer. He would leave the fort on April fifteenth if the Confederates made no hostile act against Fort Sumter or against the United States flag. He would not leave, however, if before then he received new orders or supplies. This did not satisfy the three Confederate officers who brought Beauregard's message. They handed Anderson a short note. It said: "We have the honor to inform you that General Beauregard will open fire on Fort Sumter in one hour -- at twenty minutes after four on the morning of April twelfth, eighteen sixty-one." The major shook hands with Beauregard's representatives, and they left the fort. Anderson and his officers woke their men and told them to prepare for battle. At Fort Johnson, across the harbor, Confederate gunners also were getting ready. These men would fire the first shot at Sumter. That explosion would signal the other guns surrounding the fort to open fire.
重点解析
1.promise to 许诺做；承诺
We can't promise to publish a reply as space is limited.
由于版面有限，我们不能保证把回复登载出来。
2.be necessary to 对...有必要；为...所必要
It may be necessary to thin the sauce slightly.
可能有必要将酱汁稍稍稀释一下。
3.at most 至多；最多
There were at most twenty people in the classroom.
教室里最多不过20人。
4.only if 只要；除非
I'll go only if you go with me.
除非你跟我去，我才去。
参考译文
欢迎收听VOA慢速英语之建国史话节目。在1861年3月一个寒冷多云的日子，亚伯拉罕·林肯成为美国第十六任总统。在就职演说中，新总统宣布了他将对脱离联邦的南方各州采取的政策。林肯说，没有一个州具有脱离联邦的合法权利——联邦不能破裂。他说他将在每个州执行联邦法律。他还承诺不会让脱离联邦的州交出任何联邦财产。林肯说，如果有必要使用武力来保护联邦，就动武。他的政策很快受到考验。本周，在我们的系列节目中，杰克·威策尔和杰克·莫伊尔斯将讨论在萨姆特堡建立联邦基地的争议。
在林肯担任总统的第二天，他从南卡罗来纳州查尔斯顿的萨姆特堡收到一些坏消息。罗伯特·安德森少校是萨姆特堡美国小分队的指挥官，他写道军队食物供应不足。安德森说，最多有四十天的食物。除非他和他的人得到更多补给，否则他们不得不离开堡垒。林肯想保住萨姆特堡，它是美国南部少数几个仍由联邦部队控制的堡垒之一。他还承诺不会放弃那些脱离联邦的州的任何联邦财产。但是，把食物送到萨姆特堡是一项非常困难的工作。这座堡垒建在查尔斯顿港的一个岛上，它被南方炮兵包围，南方炮艇守卫着港口。要想给安德森和他的士兵们提供补给，就得有一艘船设法到达萨姆特堡。这样的战斗肯定会引发一场激烈的内战。还有一种危险，那就是战斗会导致仍在联邦中的奴隶制各州脱离联邦，加入南方同盟。陆军总司令温菲尔德·斯科特将军警告林肯，现在向萨姆特堡提供补给为时已晚。他说，要塞周围的南方防御力量非常强大，需要进行大规模的军事行动。他说，要让军舰和士兵做好需要作战数月的准备。安德森少校和他在萨姆特堡的手下，等不了那么久。
然而，还有另一个计划可能奏效。这是海军部的古斯塔夫斯·福克斯上尉向林肯提出的。福克斯上尉说士兵和补给可以用船送到查尔斯顿。他们可以在一个漆黑的夜晚，把士兵和物资放进小船，用拖船从港口的入口外运到堡垒。福克斯说，可以派几艘军舰来阻止南方炮艇的干扰。林肯喜欢这个计划，他向内阁征求意见。他问道，如果有可能把补给送到萨姆特堡，这样做明智吗？邮政部长蒙哥马利·布莱尔是唯一一位回答“是”的内阁成员。财政部长萨蒙·蔡斯赞成这项计划，但前提是林肯要确信这样做并不意味着开战。国务卿威廉·苏厄德和其他人则表示反对。他们说，让安德森少校及其部下撤退会更好，他们觉得现在不是发动内战的时候。内阁中的反对意见让林肯推迟了实施福克斯计划，但是他分别派了两个人到查尔斯顿去了解那里的情况。一位是福克斯船长，另一位是一个亲密的朋友，沃德·拉蒙。
在查尔斯顿，福克斯会见了州长弗朗西斯·皮肯斯。他解释说，他想和安德森少校谈谈，不是要给他下达命令，而是要弄清楚目前的情况。皮肯斯州长同意了。南方同盟的一艘船把福克斯带到萨姆特堡。安德森告诉福克斯，最后一批食物将在4月15日用尽。福克斯回到华盛顿后，沃德·拉蒙去了查尔斯顿。他也会见了皮肯斯州长和安德森少校。南卡罗来纳州州长要求拉蒙向林肯传话：“无法阻止战争的发生，除非美国总统决定接受南方的分裂。如果企图在萨姆特堡增派更多兵员，南方每座山顶上和山谷中都会响起战争的呐喊声。”拉蒙向林肯报告说，即使是一船食物抵达萨姆特堡，也会导致战斗爆发。三月底，林肯又举行了一次内阁会议，再次询问如何解决萨姆特堡一事。是否应该尝试为安德森少校提供补给？这次，三名内阁成员投赞成票，三名内阁成员投反对票。
会议结束后，林肯给战争部长写了一份命令书，让他准备把人和补给从海上运到萨姆特堡。他说他们应该尽早在4月6日就准备启航——只剩一周时间了。4月4日，林肯把福克斯上尉叫到白宫，告诉他，政府已准备好向萨姆特堡提供补给。他说福克斯负责此次行动。林肯给福克斯看了一条，他正在给南卡罗来纳州的皮肯斯州长发送的消息，上面写着：“旨为通知你，我们将尝试向萨姆特堡提供食物。如果不反对这么做，将不会投入人员、武器或弹药。”皮肯斯州长于4月8日收到这条消息，他立即发电报给阿拉巴马州蒙哥马利市的南方同盟总统杰斐逊·戴维斯。戴维斯召集了内阁会议，讨论应该采取的措施，他问是否应该在补给到达之前占领萨姆特堡。前乔治亚州参议员罗伯特·托姆斯是南方同盟的国务卿，他告诉戴维斯：“向那座堡垒开火，将引发一场前所未有的内战。我不建议你那么做。”后来在会议上，托姆斯敦促戴维斯不要攻打堡垒。
“总统先生，”他说，“现在这样做是自杀——谋杀——将会失去北方的所有朋友。就像捅了一个大马蜂窝，马蜂窝大到从山边蔓延到海边。数以百万计的人将蜂拥而出，把我们折磨至死。这样做是不必要的，是错误的，会让我们都丧命！”4月10日，杰斐逊·戴维斯将他的决定发送给查尔斯顿的南方同盟的指挥官皮埃尔·博瑞德将军。他告诉博瑞德要求萨姆特堡投降，如果安德森少校拒绝，那么就要摧毁堡垒。第二天，一批南方同盟的军官向萨姆特堡提出劝降的要求。他们说安德森和他的人必须离开堡垒，但他们可以带走武器和财产，他们可以指定将其运往美国的任一港口。安德森拒绝了这个要求，当他和南方同盟官员一起走回船上时，他问博瑞德将军是否立即向萨姆特堡开火。不，他们说，稍后将告知枪击何时开始。安德森接着对南方人说：“如果你不把我们撕成碎片，饥饿会在几天内迫使我们离开堡垒。”
博瑞德将军通知蒙哥马利市的邦联政府，安德森拒绝投降。他还报告了少校的话，说萨姆特堡所剩的食物只能熬几天了。博瑞德接到了新的命令，杰斐逊·戴维斯说，如果饥饿很快将迫使美国士兵离开堡垒，就没有必要攻打它。但他说，安德森必须准确说明他们何时离开。他还表示，安德森必须保证不会向南方同盟开火。如果安德森同意的话，那么同盟军将不再开炮。4月11日午夜前几分钟，这个提议被送到了萨姆特堡。安德森和官员们讨论了这个提议，随后书写回复函。如果南方同盟没有对萨姆特堡或美国国旗采取敌对行动，他将于4月15日离开堡垒。但是，如果在那之前他收到新命令或物资，就不会离开。这样的答复并不能让为博瑞德传话的三名南方同盟军官满意，他们递给安德森一张小便条，说：“我们很荣幸地通知您，博瑞德将军将在一小时内向萨姆特堡开火，即1861年4月12日上午4点20分。”少校与博瑞德的代表握手，他们离开了堡垒。安德森和军官叫醒士兵，告诉他们准备作战。在港口对面的约翰逊堡，同盟军的炮手也准备就绪。他们最先向萨姆特堡开炮，这声爆炸向堡垒周围的其他火炮发出了开火的信号。
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