The breakdown of negotiations on Greece has come as a shock. Berlin and other European capitals look in disbelief at the Greek government’s resolve to inflict huge economic and financial damage on its own country and its citizens.
希腊债务谈判破裂出人意料。德国以及欧洲其他国家目瞪口呆地看着希腊政府铁了心要让自己的国家及公民承受巨大的经济和金融损失。
But Greece will not be the only loser. The stakes for the German government are high, both domestically and internationally. Yet Berlin has a rare window to use the present Greek tragedy to push for the implementation of urgently needed reforms, thereby making the euro sustainable and giving European integration again a stronger legitimacy.
但是希腊不会是唯一的输家。这件事对德国政府也是利益攸关，无论是在国内还是国际上。不过，德国政府也拥有一次难得一见的机会——利用眼下的希腊悲剧来推动实施亟需的改革，从而使欧元可存续并再次赋予欧洲一体化更坚实的合法性。

Across Europe financial market risks are likely to be tremendous in the coming days and weeks. The most immediate challenge for eurozone governments is damage control. The risks from contagion have repeatedly been downplayed. But no one can reasonably predict whether and how the crisis will spill over from Greece.
在未来数天至数周内，欧洲各地金融市场的风险很可能攀升至惊人水平。欧元区各国政府面临的最直接的挑战是损害控制。危机蔓延的风险一再被低估。但是，没人能够有理有据地预测出这场危机是否会从希腊蔓延至其他国家，如果是的话以何种方式。
Many eurozone economies are still vulnerable. Italy’s economy has shrunk 10 per cent since 2008, while sovereign debt has increased to about 135 per cent of gross domestic product.
很多欧元区经济体目前仍然脆弱。2008年至今，意大利的经济已缩水10%，而其主权债务与国内生产总值(GDP)之比已上升至约135%。
The European Central Bank had to intervene in July 2012 to promise to do “whatever it takes” in order to protect the integrity of the eurozone and prevent a sovereign default of Italy and others. The most likely scenario for the immediate future is that Europe’s politicians will again hide behind the ECB, hoping that it will do the heavy lifting to prevent market turmoil and stabilise the eurozone economy.
2012年7月，欧洲央行(ECB)不得不出手干预，承诺将“不惜一切代价”保护欧元区完整性、防止意大利等国出现主权债务违约。在不久的将来最可能出现的局面是，欧洲政客再次躲在欧洲央行背后，希望该行挑起防止市场动荡和稳定欧元区经济的重担。
But what is at stake is not only economic and financial stability. The long-term political damage could be devastating, in particular for the German government. The blame game is heating up about not only who is responsible for the Greek tragedy but why the eurozone failed to get its act together over the past five years and end the crisis. This is a game Berlin and Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, can hardly win. As the strongest economic and political member of the eurozone, Europe and the world have been looking to Berlin to solve the crisis and to reform Europe.
但是，利益攸关的不仅仅是欧元区的经济和金融稳定。长远的政治损害可能是毁灭性的，特别是对德国政府而言。不仅就谁应对希腊悲剧负责，还有欧元区过去5年为何没能团结一心，各国的相互指责日益升温。在这里德国政府以及德国总理安格拉•默克尔(Angela Merkel)难逃其咎。德国是欧元区经济和政治上最为强的成员国，欧洲以及全世界一直寄望于德国政府，希望它能解决这场危机并给欧洲带来变革。
Sure, Ms Merkel may have done the right thing in the negotiations trying hard to broker a deal and making significant concessions to the Greek government. Short of capitulating, she had no chance of succeeding with this Greek government. But this will be no more than a footnote in history.
当然，默克尔在谈判中或许做得不错——极力促成协议、对希腊政府作出重大让步。在这届希腊政府面前，不举白旗的她没有成功的可能。但是，这将仅仅是历史中的一处脚注而已。
What is at stake for the German government is no less than its credibility, both at home and internationally. It promised its citizens a more stable Europe in exchange for financial help. It promised them to not accept any haircut on its loans, a promise it now has to renege on. Ms Merkel’s declaration that “Europe fails, if the euro fails” is correct, but it might come to haunt her and shape her legacy as chancellor. Germany’s many critics now feel vindicated. This feeling would be even stronger if Greece left the euro and returned to its national currency.
对德国政府而言，不夸张地说，这件事关乎其可信度，无论是在国内还是国际上。德国政府曾向其公民承诺，金融援助将换来一个更稳定的欧洲。它曾向公民承诺不会接受对其贷款进行任何减记，而如今它却不得不食言。默克尔宣称“欧元失败，就是欧洲失败”，这话没错，但这句话可能会一直困扰她并决定她作为德国总理的“遗产”。德国很多批评人士如今感觉“沉冤昭雪”了。如果希腊退出欧元区并改用回本国货币的话，这种感觉还会更加强烈。
Still Berlin has a chance to turn the tables and transform the Greek disaster into an instrument to push for much needed reforms of Europe, and hence a stronger eurozone. The most important policy decisions over the past decade were taken under duress and in times of crisis. Governments and central banks stabilised global markets through their joint declaration at the G20 meeting in New York in 2008. The decision to pursue the European banking union was made at the height of the European crisis in June 2012.
不过，柏林仍有机会扭转局面，把希腊灾难转化为一把利器，推动欧洲进行其所亟需的改革，从而让欧元区更强。过去10年中最为重要的政策决定都是在危机关头被迫做出的。2008年，多国政府和央行在纽约二十国集团(G20)峰会上发表的联合声明，稳定了全球市场。成立“欧洲银行业联盟”(European Banking Union)的决定则是在2012年6月，欧债危机最危急的时刻做出的。
The so-called five presidents’ report from the heads of the main European institutions, released last week, contains many of these elements. This includes a fiscal union, with credible and binding rules, and insolvency mechanism for states and a joint fiscal capacity. This would not only provide protection for individual countries, but also smooth economic fluctuations and allow countries to reap the full benefits of the common currency for euro area members and of the single market for all EU countries. Such reforms will require changes to the EU treaties. This would allow Germany to also look beyond the eurozone to the concerns of the UK, which are widely shared in Berlin.
上周公布的由欧洲五大主要机构领袖所作的所谓“五总管报告”(five presidents’ report)，包含了其中很多元素，比如在可信的约束性规则下建立财政联盟，推行国家破产机制，以及打造联合财政能力。这不仅将为单个国家提供保护，还将抹平经济波动，让欧元区成员国充分享受到使用共同货币的好处，让所有欧盟成员国充分享受单一市场的好处。这类改革将需要修改欧盟条约。这将让德国能够将目光投向欧元区以外，也关注英国担心的事情（有很多与德国的担忧重合）。
Berlin should think beyond short-term damage control and push its European partners to commit jointly to much-needed reforms of EU institutional architecture. This should include a stronger fiscal union, capital market union and treaty change also to avoid a British departure from the EU, the so-called Brexit, which would be an even greater tragedy for Europe than the Greek crisis.
德国政府应该不把思维局限于短期的损害控制问题，而应推动其欧洲伙伴国共同致力于对欧盟制度架构进行亟需的改革。其中应包括加强财政联盟、建立资本市场联盟、修改欧盟条约，这也是为了避免英国脱离欧盟，即发生所谓的“英国退欧”(Brexit)，这件事一旦发生，对欧洲来说将是一场甚至比希腊危机更加严重的悲剧。
This may be the only chance for the German government to protect both its credibility and legacy in Europe.
眼下或许是德国政府维护其在欧洲的可信度以及“遗产”的唯一机会。
The writer is president of DIW Berlin, a think-tank
本文作者为智库德国经济研究所(DIW Berlin)所长