39、激励员工information share

　　V1

　　p1忘了

　　p2是一个研究表明，如果企业按照personal performance发奖励，那么员工就不会倾向于share information with 同事

　　p3举了个例子，某企业如何激励员工share information

　　V2

　　讲公司应该重新配置 team based compensation 和individual compensation的比例以促进团队内部information share的提议 (这篇感觉蛮简单的，单词很少，大概一屏)

　　【考古，未确认】

　　v1

　　3.企业管理政策 公司内雇员不同程度的分享各自的信息。如果是以个人效绩为奖惩标准的公司，员工们不太分享交流甚至隐藏信息. 以团队效绩为奖惩标准的公司，员工们会较好的分享交流信息。以整个公司效绩为奖惩标准的公司，员工间的信息交流程度最好。 举了一个国际大公司的例子，一开始以个人效绩为奖惩标准，公司运营状况差。后改以团队效绩为奖惩标准，运营好转。

　　V2

　　考了一篇说是manage lay off the employ, increase the economic for the company.原因啊，影响啊， 感觉作者是反对的。主旨题，说作者要表达什么，lay off 员工是manage为什么提出?

　　V3

　　4.就是公司鼓励员工分享信息的那一篇。这篇虽然有机经，但是当时看的时候也没看的太明白。不过有一道题是问下列哪一项是属于分享信息的行为?

　　V4

　　第一篇：Share information的阅读，最后一段讲的是一个大公司对compensation system进行了改造，并且惩罚和fire不share info的员工后，information sharing 有改善了。(compensation system就是奖励制度，base on individualperformance 还是firm那个)

　　主旨题有个干扰选项A. company can increase profit by 鼓励员工 work together. 我觉得偷换概念了，work together不是share info

　　我选了change compensation system 可以让员工更倾向于share info。

　　疑似原文

　　Create Colleagues, Not CompetitorsIfmanagers want their employees to share information, why do they encourage themto hoard it by rewarding competition among them? My colleagues ErikBrynjolfsson at MIT and Nat Bulkley at the University of Michigan and I havebeen studying knowledge sharing and productivity in the executive recruitingindustry. We asked 71 employees, from partners to IT staff, at three recruitingfirms about their compensation structures and their attitudes toward sharinginformation with colleagues, and we tracked their individual contract revenuesand the e-mail activity among them.

　　We found, as predicted by economic theory,that the people rewarded for individual performance shared information least;the people rewarded for team performance shared more; and the people rewardedfor company performance shared most. In each case, the degree of sharingreflected the sharer’s self-interest. Ifcompensation is linked to one’s performance relative toothers, then employees are likely to hoard information to both maximize theirown performance and undermine (or, at least, not benefit) others. But ifrewards are tied to firm performance, then individuals stand to gain most fromactivities—like free knowledge sharing—that benefit the company.

　　This effect is demonstrated in the exhibitat right, which shows the network of e-mail traffic in a recruiting firmcomposed of two offices. Though this firm, overall, shared information to amoderate degree (as measured by the volume of e-mail among employees), theemployees in office 1, on the left side of the network, were rewardedprincipally for organizational performance. The employees in office 2, on theright, were rewarded principally for individual performance. It’s clear which office shared more.

　　Though most executives intuitively graspthe relationship between incentives and knowledge sharing, it’s surprising how many companies—even those where knowledge sharing is critical—still emphasize rewards for individual performancerather than encourage team or firm performance. They turn colleagues intocompetitors. Most white-collar, up-or-out incentive schemes in law, accounting,management-consulting, and other fields rank employees on a few indicators suchas sales volume or hours billed, and then reward those at the top.

　　Lines of Communication

　　Consider IBM’s experience over the past 15 years. Before Lou Gerstner arrived,more than three-quarters of IBM’s bonuses were based onindividual performance—and the company was almostparalyzed by fiefdoms. But Gerstner made it clear he would reprimand or fireanyone who refused to share valuable information. Executive compensation becamemore team based, and management invoked Gerstner’s name and fearsome reputation to win compliance among recalcitrantemployees. The result was improved information flow, which contributedsignificantly to IBM’s enormous growth during the1990s.

　　Our research confirms that aligningincentives with team or firm performance effectively enhances information flow.But as IBM’s experience shows, if youwant to maximize sharing, sometimes inducements to share are best coupled withdeterrents to hoarding