Imagine the Greek government had insisted that EU institutions accept the same haircut as the country’s private creditors. The reaction in European capitals would have been frosty. Yet this is the position now taken by Kiev with respect to Ukraine’s $3bn eurobond held by Russia.

想象一下，如果希腊政府坚持要欧盟机构接受与该国私人部门债权人同样的“削发”(haircut)，欧洲各国政府将会反应冷淡。然而，基辅方面现在对其欠俄罗斯的30亿美元欧洲债券就是这种立场。

In late 2013, Ukraine had been in recession for more than a year, its current account deficit was becoming unsustainable, its international reserves were barely enough to cover three months’ imports, and no other creditor was prepared to lend on terms acceptable to Kiev. Yet Russia provided $3bn of much-needed funding at a 5 per cent interest rate, when Ukraine’s bonds were yielding nearly 12 per cent.

2013年年末，乌克兰已陷入衰退一年多时间，其经常账户赤字变得不可持续，国际储备仅能勉强覆盖3个月的进口需求，而且没有其他债权人准备以基辅能够接受的条款提供贷款。然而，就在那种情况下，俄罗斯以5%的利率为乌克兰提供了其亟需的30亿美元资金，而当时乌克兰债券的收益率接近12%。

Russia’s financing was not made for commercial gain. Just as America and Britain regularly do, it provided assistance to a country whose policies it supported. The US is now supporting the current Ukrainian government through its USAID guarantee programme.

俄罗斯并不是为了商业收益而提供资金的。就像美国和英国经常做的那样，俄罗斯向政策受到其支持的国家提供援助。美国现在通过其国际开发署(USAID)担保计划支持乌克兰现政府。

Because the loan came from our National Wealth Fund, which can only invest in securities, it was structured as a eurobond. It is nonetheless an official credit, as the management and staff of the International Monetary Fund are widely reported to have acknowledged.

由于贷款来自我们只能投资于证券的“国家财富基金”，因此它被设计为欧洲债券的结构。但它是一笔官方信贷，正如媒体普遍报道的那样，国际货币基金组织(IMF)的管理层和员工都承认这一点。

Longstanding international practice dictates that Russia’s official credit should have been afforded preferential treatment compared with private credits, and the same treatment as other official credits. Yet when Ukraine recently restructured its debt it treated Russia’s claim as a private credit, while excluding all other official credits (including USAID-guaranteed credits) from the 20 per cent haircut and four-year maturity extension agreed with private creditors.

长期的国际惯例要求，俄罗斯的官方信贷应该得到比私人信贷更优先的对待，也就是得到和其他官方信贷相同的待遇。然而，乌克兰最近在重组其债务时将俄罗斯的债权视为私人信贷，同时把其他所有官方信贷（包括USAID担保的信贷）排除在该国与私人部门债权人达成的重组（20%“削发”和4年期限延长）以外。

Russia has experience of accepted international practice. Following the August 1998 financial crisis, our private creditors wrote off more than one-third of their claims, while official creditors refused to accept any haircut. More recently, European authorities insisted that Greece’s private creditors accept an even larger haircut, but rejected Greece’s requests that its official creditors write-off a portion of their claims.

俄罗斯有过按照公认国际惯例行事的经历。在1998年8月金融危机之后，我们的私人部门债权人注销了逾三分之一的债权，同时官方债权人拒绝接受任何“削发”。近年，欧洲当局坚持要求希腊的私人部门债权人接受更大幅度的“削发”，但拒绝了希腊提出的官方债权人减记一部分债权的要求。

The IMF, which has long refused to lend to countries that are in arrears on payments to official creditors, earlier this week accelerated a change to this policy in advance of the December 2015 maturity date on our eurobond. Russia has no desire to see the IMF curtail its funding programme for Ukraine, but we are concerned that changing this policy in the context of Ukraine’s politically charged restructuring may raise questions as to the impartiality of an institution that plays a critical role in addressing international financial instability.

一直拒绝向拖欠官方债权人债务的国家提供贷款的IMF，偏偏在2015年12月我们的欧洲债券到期前夕加快了对该政策的修改。俄罗斯并不想看到IMF削减其对乌克兰的融资项目，但我们担心，在乌克兰从政治出发的债务重组的背景下改变该政策，可能让人怀疑一家在解决国际金融不稳定方面扮演关键角色的机构的公正性。

Official bilateral lending is an indispensable supplement to the IMF’s own funding efforts. If the IMF were to lend into arrears on Russia’s eurobond, official bilateral creditors are likely to be reluctant to lend to sovereign borrowers that cannot access private markets, for fear that their public policy-motivated financing may be restructured with the claims of the debtor’s private, profit-seeking lenders. This is why the IMF has long refused to lend into official arrears.

官方双边贷款是对IMF自身信贷努力不可或缺的补充。如果IMF向拖欠俄罗斯欧洲债券的国家提供贷款，那么官方双边债权人可能不愿向无法进入私人市场的主权借款人提供贷款，担心由公共政策驱动的融资可能与寻求谋利的私人机构债权人的债权一起被重组。这就是IMF一直拒绝向拖欠官方债务的债务人提供贷款的原因。

It must be a core principle of IMF lending that a borrower may receive funding only if it negotiates in good faith with official creditors. Ukraine has not. In addition to refusing to treat Russia’s claim as an official credit, Ukraine has contractually committed in its new private-sector bonds not to repay Russia’s claim in accordance with its terms, and not to offer Russia an alternative having a value even equal to the package offered to private sector creditors.

IMF放贷的核心原则必须包括这样一条：借款人只有在与官方债权人真诚谈判的情况下才会得到融资。乌克兰没有这么做。该国不仅拒绝将俄罗斯的债权视为官方信贷，还在其新的私人部门债券合同中承诺不按照原有条款偿还俄罗斯的债权，也没有为俄罗斯提供哪怕在价值上相当于私人部门债权人待遇的替代方案。

In contrast, Russia has exercised considerable restraint in not accelerating its eurobond — which could have seriously complicated Ukraine’s restructuring — even though Ukraine long ago breached its undertaking not to allow its debt to exceed 60 per cent of its GDP. Russia has also proposed to defer our eurobond, so that it would be repaid in three annual instalments of $1bn in 2016, 2017 and 2018, with interest and a suitable western guarantee. The IMF has publicly called our proposal a “positive step”.

相比之下，俄罗斯表现出了极大的克制，没有要求提前偿付欧洲债券——那可能让乌克兰的债务重组变得极为复杂——即便乌克兰早就违背了债务与GDP之比不超过60%的承诺。俄罗斯还提议对我们的欧洲债券展期，在2016年、2017年和2018年每年分期偿还10亿美元，外加利息并由西方提供适当担保。IMF公开表示，我们的提议是“积极的一步”。

The international framework that has guided debtors, creditors and others in dealing with sovereign financial distress over the past 50 years has been successful in large part due to the work of the IMF. Its well-founded principles should be changed only after due consideration, and not in response to the politics of the moment.

在过去50年里指引债务人、债权人以及其他方面处理主权金融危机的国际框架一直是非常成功的，这在很大程度上归功于IMF的工作。它的有理有据的原则应当在充分考虑之后才做出改变，而不应只是响应当下的政治。