(单词翻译:单击)
For a mature tech company, the trick of the trade is to choose what to exit, and when. Qualcomm, founded 30 years ago, has made some smart exits, such as selling its handset business in 1999 and its infrastructure business that same year. Is it now time for the company to bow out of its chipset business, too?
对于一家成熟的高科技企业来说,交易中的难点往往在于放弃什么以及什么时候放弃。30年前成立的高通(Qualcomm)曾做出一些明智的放弃决定。比如,1999年该公司出售了手机业务,并在同一年出售了基建业务。那么,该公司现在退出芯片业务是否正当其时呢?
Qualcomm has openly considered this idea in the past, and recently investors have started clamouring for it as well. The most valuable part of Qualcomm is considered by analysts to be its licensing business, which supplies most of the IP for 3G and 4G wireless in smartphones. These licensing royalties account for just a quarter of revenue, but two-thirds of profits. Meanwhile Qualcomm’s chipset business brings in the bulk of revenue but less than half of profits. The businesses can complement each other when a new wireless communication standard is being introduced: for example Qualcomm can develop the IP behind a new standard like LTE (Long Term Evolution), and then simultaneously develop chipsets that incorporate LTE to prove how the technology works. But this synergy matters less at a time like the present, when Qualcomm already licenses a large majority of global handset, Credit Suisse points out.
高通过去曾公开表示考虑过这一想法,而最近投资者同样也开始大声呼吁这么做。分析师认为,高通最有价值的业务是其许可证业务,智能手机的3G和4G无线技术使用的大多数知识产权都是由该部门提供的。这些许可证带来的版权费只占高通营收的四分之一,却占了其利润的三分之二。与此同时,高通的芯片业务为其带来了大部分营收,带来的盈利却不到一半。在引入新的无线通信标准时,这两种业务之间是能够相互补充的。比如,对于长期演进(Long Term Evolution,简称LTE)这样的新技术标准,高通可以研发其幕后的种种专利技术,并同步开发植入LTE技术的芯片,以证明这种技术的有效性。然而,瑞士信贷(Credit Suisse)指出,在如今这样的时代,高通已经在为全球绝大部分手机发放许可证,这种协同效应已不那么重要了。
Breaking up a company can make sense if one part of the company is weighing the other down, or if different segments have different growth trajectories. But in this case, both of Qualcomm’s business are facing similar headwinds, which has helped drive its share price down 17 per cent in the past 12 months. The licensing business has suffered declining revenues and profits, due to falling prices for smartphones (royalties are paid on the price of the phone) and to smaller royalty rates (such as the recent settlement in China). The chipset business has also seen growth slow, and is under pressure from increased competition from companies like MediaTek. Nevertheless chipsets are Qualcomm’s only source of profit growth.
拆分一家企业的合理原因,要么是由于该企业的某一业务限制了其他业务的发展,要么是由于不同业务拥有不同的增长轨迹。但就高通而言,芯片业务和许可证业务都面临着类似的不利局面。在过去12个月里,这种不利局面令其股价下跌了17%。高通的许可证业务遭遇了营收及利润的下滑,原因一方面是由于智能手机的价格正在下跌(高通的版权费是以手机价格的一定比例收取的),另一方面则是由于版权费的抽成比例降低(比如中国最近的和解案)。与此同时,高通芯片业务也出现了增长放缓的现象,而且来自联发科技(Mediatek)等企业的竞争,使其面临越来越大的压力。不过,芯片业务目前仍是高通唯一的盈利增长来源。
Sure, the company might want to consider selling if a willing buyer for the chipset business came along at the right price (CS puts the enterprise value of the chipset business at $43bn). And Qualcomm’s shares do look cheap right now; its enterprise value is 15 times 2014 free cash flow, near five-year lows. But splitting up would not help fix the challenges, or the valuation, of either the chipset or the licensing business. In times of trial, Qualcomm’s businesses may in fact be better together.
当然,如果出现愿以合理价格收购芯片业务的买家(瑞士信贷估计该业务的企业价值为430亿美元),高通也许会想要考虑卖掉该业务。高通股价目前看起来确实很便宜,其企业价值只有2014年自由现金流的15倍,接近5年来的最低点。不过,拆分高通不会帮助芯片业务或许可证业务解决所面临的挑战,也无助于修复它们的估值。在面临考验的时期,事实上高通各业务部门在一起可能更好一些。