TOKYO -- Six months after Thomas Piketty's book "Capital in the Twenty-First Century" generated so much buzz in the United States and Europe, it has become a bestseller in Japan. But vast differences between Japan and its developed counterparts in the West, mean that, like so many other Western exports, Piketty's argument has taken on unique characteristics.
东京——在美国和欧洲引起了巨大的反响6个月后，汤玛斯·皮克提的著作《21世纪的资本论》成为了日本的畅销书。但是，像很多西方出口产品一样，日本与其他西方发达国家的巨大差异使得汤玛斯·皮克提的观点具备了独特的特点。

Piketty's main assertion is that the leading driver of increased inequality in the developed world is the accumulation of wealth by those who are already wealthy, driven by a rate of return on capital that consistently exceeds the rate of GDP growth. Japan, however, has lower levels of inequality than almost every other developed country. Indeed, though it has long been an industrial powerhouse, Japan is frequently called the world's most successful communist country.
皮克提的主要观点是，发达国家贫富不均加剧主要是由富人的财富积累导致的，这受资本的投资回报率要长期高于GDP增长率所驱动。而日本的贫富不均水平要低于大部分其他发达国家。虽然日本已经成为一个工业强国很久了，但它常被称为世界上最成功的共产主义国家。
Japan has a high income-tax rate for the rich (45 percent), and the inheritance tax rate recently was raised to 55 percent. This makes it difficult to accumulate capital over generations -- a trend that Piketty cites as a significant driver of inequality.
日本对于富人征收的个人所得税税率很高(达到45%),而遗产税税率最近也上调到了55%.这就使得在家族中进行数代的资本积累很困难——在Piketty 看来(这种资本积累方式) 正是造成不平等的重要因素.
As a result, Japan's richest families typically lose their wealth within three generations. This is driving a growing number of wealthy Japanese to move to Singapore or Australia, where inheritance taxes are lower. The familiarity of Japan, it seems, is no longer sufficient to compel the wealthy to endure the high taxes imposed upon them.
所以日本最富有一部分家庭通常在三代以内就会失去他们的资产,这也使得移民到新加坡或者澳大利亚的日本富商越来越多，因为这些国家的遗产税税率比较低。虽然日本是他们的故土，但这好像并不能足以使他们留下来。
In this context, it is not surprising that Japan's "super-rich" remain a lot less wealthy than their counterparts in other countries. In the U.S., for example, the average income of the top one percent of households was $1,264,065 in 2012, according to the investment firm Sadoff Investment Research. In Japan, the top 1 percent of households earned about $240,000, on average (at 2012 exchange rates).
这样看来,日本的"超级富人"与其它国家的相比资产要少得多是很正常的。以美国为例，根据投资公司萨多夫投资研究所的数据，2012年美国最富有的1%的家庭平均收入是1264065美元，而日本最富有的1%的家庭的平均收入为240000美元（以2012年汇率计算）。
Yet Japanese remain sensitive to inequality, driving even the richest to avoid ostentatious displays of wealth. One simply does not see the profusion of mansions, yachts, and private jets typical of, say, Beverly Hills and Palm Beach.
并且日本对不平等现象很敏感，这使得富豪们并不喜欢炫富。你很难在日本看到像贝弗利山庄和澳大利亚棕榈滩(两个地方都是富豪云集的地方,生活奢侈)云集的豪宅，游艇以及私人飞机等。
For example, Haruka Nishimatsu, former president and CEO of Japan Airlines, attracted international attention a few years ago for his modest lifestyle. He relied on public transportation and ate lunch with employees in the company's cafeteria. By contrast, in China, the heads of national companies are well known for maintaining grandiose lifestyles.
例如，日本航空公司前任CEO兼社长Haruka Nishimatsu就因其朴素的生活方式而吸引了全球的关注。他乘坐公共交通工具并且与职员们一起在公司餐吃午餐。与此形成鮮明对比的是,中国国企的领导们却因为他们奢侈的生活方式而闻名。
We Japanese have a deeply ingrained stoicism, reflecting the Confucian notion that people do not lament poverty when others lament it equally. This willingness to accept a situation, however bad, as long as it affects everyone equally is what enabled Japan to endure two decades of deflation, without a public outcry over the authorities' repeated failure to redress it.
我们日本人脑子里有种根深蒂固的斯多亚主义（强调克己，自足，平静，接受现实），这也符合孔子的一句话"君子不患寡而患不均"。无论现状多么恶劣，但是只要大家都是一样的处境，我们就能坦然接受现实而不是去抗议政府的无能，这也是我们能够忍受长达二十年的通货紧缩的原因。
This national characteristic is not limited to individuals. The government, the central bank, the media and companies wasted far too much time simply enduring deflation -- time that they should have spent working actively to address it.
这种民族特性并不仅限于个人。日本政府，央行，媒体和公司就是因为乐于接受现实而浪费了太多时间——他们本应该用来解决通货紧缩问题的时间。
Japan finally has a government, led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, that is committed to ending deflation and reinvigorating economic growth, using a combination of expansionary monetary policy, active fiscal policy, and deregulation. Now in its third year, so-called "Abenomics" is showing some positive results. Share prices have risen by 220 percent since Abe came to power in December 2012. And corporate performance has improved -- primarily in the export industries, which have benefited from a depreciated yen -- with many companies posting their highest profits on record.
最终日本选举出了新一届的以安倍晋三为首的政府，这届政府承诺结局通货紧缩问题并且重振日本经济雄风，政府决定采用扩张性的经济政策，积极地财政政策以及放松政府管制三位一体的措施。现在已经是这政策实施的第三个年头，所谓的"安倍经济学"显示出了一些积极的作用。自从2012年安倍上任以来，股价已经上涨了220%并且公司收益大大改善（得益于日元的贬值，出口业改善尤为明显），许多企业都取得了有史以来的最高收益。
But Abenomics has yet to benefit everyone. In fact, there is a sense that Abe's policies are contributing to rising inequality. That is why Piketty's book appeals to so many Japanese.
但是"安倍经济学"还没有使每个人都收益。实际上有人觉得这种政策正在加剧社会不平等，这也是Piketty的书在日本很受欢迎的原因。
For example, though the recent reduction in the corporate-tax rate was necessary to encourage economic growth and attract investment, it seems to many Japanese to be a questionable move at a time when the consumption-tax rate has been increased and measures to address deflation are pushing up prices. To address this problem, the companies that enjoy tax cuts should increase their employees' wages to keep pace with rising prices, instead of waiting for market forces to drive them up.
例如，尽管政府下调了企业所得税，这有助于经济增长和吸引投资，但是当政府上调消费税并且国内的物价上涨时，许多日本人对政府的举措提出了质疑。要想解决这个问题，那些得益于企业所得税下调的企业应该主动增加员工的工资来帮助他们应对上涨的物价，而不是等待市场力量来提高薪水。
Herein lies the unique twist that Piketty's theory takes on in Japan: the disparity is not so much between the super-rich and everyone else, but between large corporations, which can retain earnings and accumulate capital, and the individuals who are being squeezed in the process.
Piketty的理论在日本的特别之处在于：日本的"超级富人"与其他人之间的贫富差距并不是太大，贫富差距悬殊在于大企业（可保有收入和积累资本）和被压榨的个体之间。