Is the era of corporate cash hoarding coming to an end? Certainly an end is devoutly to be hoped for. If US companies decided to run down cash to increase capital investment, thereby driving a more robust recovery, the benefit would be felt around the world. The global economy would likewise benefit if the corporate misers of Japan and China were to help reduce Asia’s mountain of excess savings.
企业囤积现金的时代正走向尾声？人们肯定衷心希望如此。如果美国企业决定减持现金，增加资本投资，从而推动更稳健的经济复苏，那么全球都将感受到这种好处。同样的，如果日本和中国那些不爱花钱的企业能帮助减少亚洲堆积如山的过剩储蓄，全球经济将受益。

If there is going to be movement in this direction the likely starting point is the US. According to a new survey of corporate treasurers by the Association for Financial Professionals, US companies are indeed starting to run down their cash balances for the first time since the recession. This squares with evidence in the national accounts. Federal Reserve data show that the US non-financial corporate sector has gone from being a net lender to the rest of the economy, to the tune of nearly $500bn at the peak in 2009, to being a modest net borrower in the first half of this year.
如果这方面将有什么动作的话，美国可能是第一个。根据美国财务管理专业人士协会（Association of Financial Professional，简称AFP）对企业财务管理人员的最新调查，美国企业确实正开始减少现金余额，这是自此次衰退以来的第一次。这与国民经济账户的数据一致。美联储(Fed)的数据显示，美国非金融企业已从对其他经济领域的净贷款者（2009年净贷款曾达到近5000亿美元的峰值水平），变成今年上半年的净借款者，但数额不大。
The snag is that this confidence is not being reflected in non-residential private fixed investment, which Fed economists reckon increased at an annual average rate of only about 4 per cent in 2012 and 2013. Net investment after depreciation as a percentage of the capital stock remains subdued, hovering near 1.5 per cent a year.
问题是，这种信心并没有反映在非居民私人固定投资上，美联储经济学家估计，2012年至2013年，非居民私人固定投资平均每年仅增长4%左右。折旧后的净投资与资本存量之比仍很低，徘徊在每年近1.5%的水平。
In effect, animal spirits in the corporate sector are being diverted into share buybacks. Such financial engineering cuts the number of shares in issue and artificially boosts earnings per share. For executives whose bonuses and incentive packages are related to EPS this works wonders on overall pay. For shareholders it may be another matter.
实际上，企业界的动物精神正将注意力转向股权回购。这种金融操作削减了已发行股票数量，并人为提高了每股收益。对于那些奖金和激励计划与每股收益挂钩的高管而言，这将对他们的总薪资带来惊人的效果。对于股东而言，则可能是另一回事。
With equity valuations historically high, this is unlikely to be an efficient allocation of capital. That reflects an ownership vacuum. In the next 12 months we will find out how damaging this might be for the real economy if quoted businesses continue to invest halfheartedly in equipment.
在股市市值处于历史高点之际，这不太可能有效配置资本。这反映出一种所有权真空。未来12个月，如果上市公司继续在设备投资方面三心二意，我们就会发现这可能会对实体经济造成何种破坏。
In Japan, too, poor corporate governance plays a part in corporate cash hoarding. With minimal accountability to shareholders, companies naturally hang on to cash. A deflationary environment has also acted as a deterrent to increasing what is already a high level of business investment relative to the US. To its credit, Shinzo Abe’s government has introduced governance reforms designed to encourage companies to raise payout ratios. Yet the macro side of Abenomics will far outweigh governance reform because of a misdiagnosis of Japan’s economic problems.
在日本，糟糕的公司治理也在企业囤积现金行为中发挥了一定作用。企业对股东的责任心很弱，它们自然会紧紧握住现金。通缩环境也阻碍了相对于美国已处于高位的企业投资的扩大。为此，安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)政府提出了旨在鼓励企业提高派息率的治理改革。然而，由于对日本经济问题的误判，“安倍经济学”(Abenomics)宏观层面的作用力将远远超过公司治理改革。
At root, the deflationary threat in Japan results from underconsumption. The corporate sector’s savings surplus – cash flow far exceeds investment – is part of that. Business is simply hogging too much of national income. Yet the effect of yen devaluation has been to transfer income from the household sector to the corporate sector. To prevent higher consumption tax weakening domestic demand, the government has also cut corporation tax and dished out investment incentives to business, while raising public spending. Again the flows are the wrong way round.
从根本上来说，日本的通缩威胁来自消费不足。企业的过剩储蓄（现金流远远超过投资）是一个原因。企业占据了太多的国民收入。然而，日元贬值的影响是收入从家庭转向企业。为了防止消费税上调打击内需，日本政府还降低了企业税并向企业提供投资激励，同时扩大公共支出。这再次搞错了方向。
The prospect of change in China may be better. In the effort to shift from an investment rate not far short of 50 per cent of gross domestic product to a more consumption-oriented economic model, Chinese state-owned companies will be encouraged to pay out more of their cash. Yet the interesting question here is whether the beneficial effect of less cash hoarding, in global terms, will be offset by excessive saving in the eurozone.
在中国，变革的前景可能更好一些。在努力使经济模式从投资占国内生产总值(GDP)的比重接近50%，转向更多由消费拉动的过程中，中国国有企业将被鼓励支出更多现金。然而，一个有趣的问题是，从全球的角度来说，减少现金囤积的有益影响是否会被欧元区的过度储蓄所抵消。
The eurozone’s positive current account balance is now running at 2.5 per cent of GDP. Since the surplus represents an excess of savings over investment, the eurozone is sucking demand out of the world economy. And as a result of German-led fiscal austerity the eurozone economy is on the brink of deflation.
欧元区的经常账户盈余现在占GDP的2.5%。由于盈余代表着储蓄高于投资，因此欧元区正从全球经济中抽走需求。以德国为首的财政紧缩导致欧元区经济正处于通缩边缘。
While the European Central Bank is buying assets in an attempt to loosen policy, it is not clear that it can do so on a scale and in a timely enough way to prevent deflationary psychology setting in.
尽管欧洲央行(ECB)正购买资产以放松货币政策，但目前还不清楚，此举是否足够有规模和及时，从而阻止通缩心理出现。
With fiscal tensions mounting and friction between creditor and debtor countries over any potential move by the ECB to quantitative easing building up, the eurozone appears to have reached a pivotal moment. Current policy has failed. A new approach needs to be thrashed out.
由于财政紧张状态加剧，同时债权国和债务国之间围绕欧洲央行可能采取的量化宽松政策的分歧增多，欧元区似乎已达到一个关键时刻。当前的政策已失灵。欧洲需要研究出一种新的战略。