When Churchill and Roosevelt had conferred at Casablanca, they had good reason to suppose that, with Atlantic U-boat Enigma restored, the sinkings could be kept down to the level of late 1941.
丘吉尔和罗斯福在卡萨布兰卡商谈之后，他们有充分的理由相信，在大西洋潜艇谜机的破译工作恢复之后，击沉数量将会降低到1941年末的水平。
In January they were. But in February they had doubled, nearly back to 1942 levels.
一月，这个目标确实实现了，但是到了二月，击沉数又增长了一倍，几乎回到了1942年的水平。
And then in March they were the worst of the war: ninety-five ships, amounting to three-quarters of a million tons.
接下来的三月，是最糟糕的月份，有95艘船被击沉，总共损失了75万吨运力。
Massed U-boats had been able to sink twenty-two out of the 125 ships that had set out in convoy on the eastbound Atlantic passage that month.
大西洋东部的护航队，有五分之一的舰船被大批德国潜艇摧毁。
There was a reason for the deteriorating Allied control of events, one scarcely credible.
同盟国失去了对事态的控制，其中有着令人难以置信的原因。
It was not just that the convoys had sailed during the nine days' blackout caused by the change to the U-boat weather report system.
首先是护航队的启航时间，正好是德国改变气象报告系统而引起的九天中断期，
It was that all the time, and to an ever-increasing degree, the convoy routeing cipher, among others, was being broken by the B. Dienst.
还有更严重的是，护航队的路线被德国情报部门破译了。
Convoy SC. 122 had started out on 5 March, HX.229 on 8 March, and the smaller and more fortunate HX.229A the next day.
护航运输队SC122于3月5日发，HX229于3月8日出发，相对比较幸运的HX229A于3月9日出发。
On 12 March, SC. 122 was re-routed to the north to avoid what was thought to be the position of a U-boat line, the Raubgraf.
3月12日，SC122改变航线，避开他们认为是劳格拉夫U艇群所处的位置。
This signal was intercepted and deciphered.
这项信息被德国拦截并破译了。
On 13 March the Raubgraf attacked a westward-bound convoy, thus openly betraying its position; SC.122 and HX.229 were both diverted again.
3月13日，劳格拉夫艇群攻击了一队向西行驶的护航队，因此暴露了真实位置，SC122和HX229再次转向，
Both diversion signals were intercepted and deciphered within four hours.
但这两个转向信号在四个小时之内又被拦截并破译了。