The Movements Section of the NID (consisting of a single part-time officer) 'did not even subscribe to Lloyd's list,
海军情报部的行动组（只有一个兼职的官员），甚至没有订阅洛伊德的列表，
which would at least have provided a daily and highly accurate record of all the world's merchant ships.
这份列表至少提供了一个非常可靠的、关于世界上所有商船的每日日志。
Reports of the movement of warships from the Secret Service were virtually non-existent…
情报机关报告的关于战舰行动的报告，实际上都是不可靠的，
The possibility of locating ships at sea was … even more remote than that of obtaining up-to-date information about them when they were in port.'
因为要在海中确定船只的位置，比获取它们什么时候靠港的信息要困难多了。
The admirals did not really want to know.
但海军上将却并不是真的想知道这些。
By September 1939 a new man, Norman Denning, had somewhat improved the position.
直到1939年9月，一位名叫诺曼·唐宁的新人使这种情况有了改观。
There was a card-index instead of ledgers, a direct telephone link to Lloyds, and a Tracking Room on which a plot of merchant ships positions could be up-dated.
终于有了卡片索引而不是大堆卷纸，与洛伊德之间也有了电话专线，另外还有了一个跟踪室，里面有及时更新的商船位置信息。
Links with GC and CS were not so successful.
与政密学校的联系则没有这么成功，
Indeed, the cryptanalytic organisation, captured by the Foreign Office after the First World War, tended to be treated as the enemy.
事实上，这个一战后由外交部接手的密码分析组织，一直被海军当作敌人对待。
Denning continued to plot its reconquest by the Admiralty until February 1941.
直到1941年2月，唐宁还打算要由海军重新控制它。