Time is up for non-executive directors. Through successive corporate crises and systemic catastrophes, despite — and in part because of — layers of codes and regulations, independent board members have failed to do the impossible job handed to them by complacent fund managers.

非执行董事的时间已经到头了。在一次又一次的企业危机和系统性灾难中，尽管（在一定程度上也是因为）有层层监管法律法规，但独立董事并未能实现那些自满的基金经理们交给他们的不可能完成的任务。

Here is the charge sheet. Executive recklessness: still untamed. Executive enterprise: often smothered. Executive pay: unchecked. Scandals and failures: recurrent. Sickly corporate cultures: unaltered. Complex operations: unmonitored. Trust in business: fragile.

对非执行董事的“控诉清单”如下：管理层的鲁莽行为仍然未被驯服；管理层的进取心则常常受到压制；管理层的薪酬依旧不受控制；丑闻与失败层出不穷；病态的企业文化没有改观；复杂的业务操作无人监控；外界对企业的信任非常脆弱。

This list is long. Directors will argue that they are not responsible for all of it. That is precisely the problem. Tighter governance has become the catch-all solution to all corporate, and some systemic, crises, with directors as useful scapegoats if things go wrong. Nobody will weep for people who sometimes earn multiples of average workers’ salaries. But non-executives are under immense pressure as part-time outsiders, overseeing driven full-time experts, who are themselves trying to control companies that are often bafflingly complex.

这是一个很长的清单。董事们将会辩解称，他们并不对所有这些问题负责。而这正是问题的症结所在。更严格的治理俨然已经成了所有企业危机（甚至某些系统性灾难）的万金油式解决方案，而如果进展不顺，董事们可以被方便地当作替罪羊。没有人会为薪酬有时高达普通员工数倍的人流泪。但非执行董事作为非全职外部人士承受着巨大的压力，他们要监督那些野心十足的全职专家，而这些专家自身也在摸索着控制常常复杂得令人困惑的企业。

A recent US study, “Are Boards Designed to Fail?”, detected many obstacles to proper oversight. They include excessive deference to the chief executive, who often decides when, or even whether, non-executives can visit operations and quiz managers. Then there is the sheer lack of time: here, former executives who boast of “going plural” — taking multiple directorships —should reflect that a singular focus would be more effective, if less lucrative. A new report from Tomorrow’s Company (“UK Business: What’s Wrong? What’s Next?”) suggests the build-up of codes and rules, plus the public’s knee-jerk attacks on directors after a corporate catastrophe, have made boards too risk averse. Separately, the think-tank lists 17 topics, from audit to strategy, on which directors are expected to act in the 30 days a year that is all they usually devote to the job.

美国近期一项名为“董事会的制度设计是否注定会失败？”的研究，发现了有效控管面临的多项障碍。这其中包括对首席执行官的过度服从，首席执行官常常决定了非执行董事何时可以、甚至是否可以走访企业的运营部门并对经理们提问。此外还有严重不足的履职时间：在这个问题上，那些夸耀自己“身兼数职”的前任高管——即同时在数家企业担任董事——应该认识到集中精力将更加有效，如果对应的报酬会有所减少的话。智库Tomorrow’s Company新发表的报告《英国企业：哪里出了问题？接下来会怎样？》指出，各种规章制度的不断累积，加上公众在企业灾难发生后对董事们发起的条件反射般的攻击，导致董事会过于惧怕风险。这家智库机构另外列出17个领域，从审计到企业战略，董事们被期待每年花30天时间处理这些领域的事务，这是他们每年通常用于履行职务的时间。

Governance flaws are usually addressed piecemeal. I have written recently about the need to give more weight to remuneration committees, the importance of separating chair and chief executive, the role of independent voices in improving and safeguarding culture. But the moment has come to address the root of the problem.

公司治理方面的缺陷通常是以零打碎敲的方式应对的。近期我曾撰文阐述提高薪酬委员会地位的必要性，由不同人出任公司董事长和首席执行官的重要性，以及独立声音在改进和维护公司文化方面所扮演的角色。但现在是时候讨论问题根源了。

One former chair and director of a number of small UK companies emailed me to suggest scrapping non-executive directors. “Doing away with most NEDs would make investors face up to their responsibilities,” he wrote.

一位曾在数家英国小型公司担任董事长和董事的人发电子邮件给我，建议在企业中取消非执行董事。他写道，“取消绝大多数的非执行董事职位，将迫使投资者直面自己的责任”。

This remedy would appal many (including parts of the FT group) who train, advise, and recruit directors. But investors need the kick. Dodging active ownership responsibility for their cluttered portfolios, “they looked to NEDs to do it for them (at a fraction of [what] they paid themselves)”, the same director writes. Largely, that is still the case.

这副药方会让很多培训、咨询和招聘董事的人感到惊骇（包括英国《金融时报》的一些部门）。但投资者需要这种刺激。给我邮件的这位董事写道，投资者逃避对自己凌乱投资组合的积极所有权责任，“他们寄希望于非执行董事代替他们履行这些职责”（而聘请非执行董事的费用只占了投资者给自己报酬的一小部分）。总的来说，目前的情况仍然如此。

There are exceptions. Norway’s sovereign oil fund is attacking high executive pay, the focus of increasing investor protest worldwide, and plans to sue Volkswagen over its emissions scandal. Shareholders have more regulatory weapons and are using them. A few are putting their own professional representatives on boards to influence strategy.

也有例外的情况。例如挪威的主权石油基金正在杯葛管理层高薪，世界各地聚焦于加强投资者保护，以及投资者在大众汽车(Volkswagen)尾气排放丑闻曝光后计划向该公司提起诉讼。股东现在拥有了更多监管武器，并已开始使用它们。一些股东提名自己的专业代表进入董事会，以影响公司战略。

Stripping out non-executives could tempt executives to revisit the bad habits some showed when their power was untrammelled. Even private equity firms — hardly fans of extraneous bureaucracy — like to appoint directors to oversee companies they own. Executives say they prefer private equity’s hands-on approach to the stifling governance cotton-wool applied by some listed companies.

取消非执行董事或许会导致管理层故态复萌，一些高管在他们的权力不受束缚时显露过那些坏毛病。即便是私募股权投资公司——这类公司并不喜欢多余的官僚安排——也喜欢指派董事去控管他们拥有的企业。企业管理层表示，他们更喜欢私募投资公司亲自上手参与的方式，而不是某些上市公司采取的像棉絮一样令人窒息的治理机制。

The US researchers suggest ending the blame game and assembling boards of specialists with relevant expertise to help and challenge chief executives. Tomorrow’s Company proposes that directors engage more closely with shareholders who, in turn, should behave more like stewards of long-term growth, rather than traders.

美国研究人员提出的建议是，终止互相指责的游戏，组建拥有相关专业技能的专家委员会，由其辅佐和挑战首席执行官。智库Tomorrow’s Company建议，董事们应与股东保持更加密切的互动，反过来，股东应该更像长期增长的领路人，而非像交易员。

Another director I know strongly supports non-executives and suggests they are the best guarantors of long-termism. She may be right, in theory. Yet in practice, the merry-go-round of board service, well lubricated at the top level with fees and prestige, leaves few satisfied. Making executives, regulators and investors start from scratch — without the ragged safety net that non-executive directors struggle to provide — would force them to think harder about how to do their own jobs better.

我所认识的另一位董事则强烈支持非执行董事制度，并指出非执行董事是确保长远眼光的最佳保障。从理论上来说，她或许是对的。但在实践中，走马灯一样不停轮换的董事服务（高层享受优厚的待遇、名利双收），很少能让人感到满意。让公司管理层、监管当局以及投资者们从零开始——离开非执行董事难以提供的并不牢靠的安全网——将迫使他们更加努力地思考如何把自己的工作做得更好。