How should we respond to the next recession? That was the topic of an event hosted by the Brooking’s Hamilton Project where I spoke on Monday in Washington with OMB director Sean Donovan. I argued a number of points that address issues of current concern.

我们应该如何应对下一场衰退？这是布鲁金斯学会(Brookings Institution)的汉密尔顿项目(Hamilton Project)周一在华盛顿举办的一场活动的主题。我在会上与白宫行政管理和预算局(OMB)的局长肖恩•多诺万(Sean Donovan)进行了交谈。我就解决当前担忧的问题提出了一些看法。

First, I argued that the possible election of “Demagogue Donald” dwarfs congressional dysfunction as a threat to American prosperity. I argued that beyond lunatic and incoherent budget and trade policies, Trump would, for the first time, make political risk of the kind usually discussed in the context of Argentina, China or Russia relevant to the USA. How else to interpret threats to renegotiate debt, prosecute insubordinate publications, and rip up treaties? Creeping fascism as an issue dwarfs macroeconomic policy.

首先，我认为，就对美国繁荣的威胁而言，唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)可能当选为美国总统的问题让国会功能失调相形见绌。我认为，除了极端和反复无常的预算和贸易政策以外，特朗普还将让那种通常在讨论阿根廷、中国或俄罗斯的时候提到的政治风险与美国相关，这在历史上将是首次。对于重新谈判债务、起诉不听话的出版物以及撕毁条约的威胁，还能怎么解读？作为一个问题，法西斯主义悄悄抬头让宏观经济政策相形见绌。

Second, I cautioned that while 2009 could have been seen a repeat of 1929-1933 — it was not — there are no grounds for complacency. As the picture below illustrates, on current forecasts the economy will have performed as badly over the 2007-2018 period as it did over the 1929-1940 depression period. The single most important issue for containing government debt burdens, increasing US national security, encouraging more generosity towards the poor and raising middle class standards of living is accelerating economic growth.

其次，我告诫称，尽管我们在2009年避免重演1929年至1933年间的大萧条，但没有理由自满。正如下图所显示的那样，基于当前预测，美国经济在2007年至2018年间的表现将和1929年至1940年的萧条期间一样糟糕。要想遏制政府债务负担、增进美国国家安全、鼓励对穷人更为慷慨并提高中产阶级生活水平，最为重要的问题是加速经济增长。

Third, I argued — following my secular stagnation thesis — that fiscal policy is now important as a stabilization policy tool in a way that has not been the case since the depression. Historical evidence suggests a better than even chance of an officially declared recession in the next three years.

第三，我在论述长期经济停滞的命题后提出，财政政策如今非常重要，它将以一种自大萧条以来未见的方式被用作稳定政策工具。历史证据似乎表明，美国有超过一半的几率在今后3年正式陷入衰退。

When recessions come, the Federal Reserve normally reduces real rates by four to five percentage points.

当衰退来临的时候，美联储(Fed)通常会降息4到5个百分点。

But there will in all likelihood be nothing like this amount of room when the next recession comes.

但是当下一场衰退来临的时候，美联储多半不会有这么大的降息空间。

I say this with full awareness that the Fed has unconventional tools at its disposal in addition to simply lowering rates.

我在这么说的时候充分意识到美联储除了降息之外，还有非传统工具可以动用。

But I think it very unlikely that more than 150bps of Fed funds equivalent additional stimulus is feasible. After all rates below minus 50 or 75 bps are impracticable in a society with cash and might actually hurt financial intermediation. Forward guidance is fine in principle but when the next recession comes expected forward rates will be very low far into the future. And QE is surely already hitting diminishing returns with the yield curve flattening and markets functioning without the illiquidity premia of the early recovery period. “Helicopter money” is basically a form of fiscal policy as I shall argue in a subsequent post and cannot be carried out autonomously by the central bank.

但我不认为美联储出台相当于降息超过150个基点的额外刺激是可行的。毕竟，在一个存在现金的社会，利率低于-0.5%或-0.75%是不现实的，它实际上会伤害金融中介。前瞻性指引原则上是好的，但是当下一场衰退来临的时候，未来很长一段时期的预期远期利率将会非常低。量化宽松肯定已经进入了回报递减的阶段：收益率曲线扁平化，市场在没有复苏初期非流动性溢价的情况下运转。“直升机撒钱”从本质上来说是一种财政政策（我会在以后的文章中论述这一点），它不可能由美联储自动实施。

There is an additional case for fiscal policy. The economy as it now stands requires remarkably low interest rates to grow adequately. These rates are an invitation to leverage, to reaching for yield, to financial engineering and to bubbles. Raising rates significantly as many suggest without doing anything else risks recession. So the right strategy is to raise demand so as to make financially sustainable growth. This comes back to fiscal policy along with measures like tax, regulatory and immigration reform to spur private demand.

动用财政政策还有一个理由。就目前的情况来看，美国经济需要显著的低利率才能充分增长。这些利率促使人们增加杠杆，追求高收益率，鼓励金融工程和泡沫。如果像许多人建议的那样大幅提高利率而不采取其他措施，那可能导致美国陷入衰退。因此正确的战略是促进需求，从而实现财务上可持续的增长。这又回到了财政政策上，加上税收、监管和移民改革等措施以刺激私人需求。

Fourth, I suggested a number of areas for expansionary fiscal policy both to make recession less likely and to respond when the next one comes. The decline in US infrastructure investment is indefensible in light of recent declines in interest rates, employment opportunities and materials costs.

第四，我建议在诸多领域推行扩张性的财政政策，这样既可以降低衰退的可能性，又可以应对下一场衰退的来临。鉴于近年利率、就业机会和原材料成本下降，美国基础设施投资下降是无可辩解的。

Other areas in which fiscal support seems desirable include housing — where residential investment still lags badly — and support for social security. I referred to the economists argument going back to Paul Samuelson that pay as you go social security can help all generations in a world where growth rates exceed interest rates. Further it raises demand without enlarging government deficits.

其他似乎需要财政支持的领域包括住宅市场（住房投资仍严重滞后）和社保支持。我提到了可以追溯至保罗•萨缪尔森(Paul Samuelson)的经济学家们的观点，即在一个增长率超过利率的世界里，现收现付的社保体系可以帮助世世代代。此外，它还在没有加大政府赤字的情况下提升了需求。

As I hope to discuss in future posts, much of what economists thought they knew about macroeconomic policy needs to be reassessed in light of recent events. Just as the events of the 1970s and emergence of stagflation throughout the industrial world led to new policy paradigms, I believe that recent events will force us to develop new approaches to thinking about economic fluctuations and inflation which will, in turn, drive major changes in thinking about fiscal and monetary policy.

正如我希望在未来文章中讨论的那样，鉴于最近的事件，经济学家们需要重新评估他们自以为已经了解的宏观经济政策。正如上世纪70年代的事件和整个工业化世界的滞涨带来新的政策范式一样，我相信，最近的事件将迫使我们开发新的方法来思考经济波动和通胀，这进而将推动人们对财政和货币政策的思考方式发生重大变化。