There are not many wholly new areas to open up in economic policy. But in recent months there has been a wave of innovative proposals directed at improving economic performance in general, and middle-class incomes in particular — not through government actions but through mandates or incentives to change business decision-making. The goal is for companies and shareholders to operate with longer horizons and to more generously share the fruits of their corporate success with their workers, customers and other stakeholders.

在经济政策方面，没有多少全新的领域可供开辟。但最近几个月出现了一波创新的建议，以提升经济表现，尤其是中产阶级收入为宗旨——不是通过政府行为，而是通过指令或激励来改变企业决策。其目标是让企业和股东以更长远的眼光开展经营，并且更慷慨地与员工、客户和其他利益相关者分享企业成功的果实。

There are strong grounds for interest in such approaches. After the crises of recent years, the case for relying on speculative markets to drive the real economy — to whatever extent it had validity — is surely attenuated. Instances where successful companies with strong management teams and records of investment have been forced to curtail investment plans are a cause of concern. And we would all like to see middle-class incomes do a better job of keeping up with productivity than they have in recent years.

人们有很充分的理由对此类方法感兴趣。经过近年的危机后，依靠投机市场推动实体经济的理由（无论它曾经在多大程度上成立）无疑已被削弱。拥有强大管理团队和投资经验的成功企业被迫缩减投资计划的事例值得关注。同时，我们都希望看到未来中产阶级收入比起近几年更能跟上生产率的提升。

Such proposals for corporate reform are responding to legitimate policy imperatives, but they also tap into the zeitgeist in another way. At the same time as there is widespread unhappiness with market outcomes, confidence in government has reached a low ebb. So the idea of achieving reform through altered business behaviour, rather than government programmes, is appealing.

此类企业改革建议是对合理政策要求的回应，但它们也通过另一种方式挖掘了时代精神。在人们普遍对市场结果不满的同时，他们对政府的信心也跌到了低谷。所以，通过改变企业行为（而非政府计划）实现改革的想法具有吸引力。

The corporate behaviour debate recently taken up by investors, management consultants and even presidential candidates is a very valuable one, which speaks fundamentally to the way in which American capitalism functions. In many aspects it is an overdue recognition of basic market principles.

投资者、管理顾问甚至总统候选人最近都在参与的这场企业行为辩论非常有价值，它在根本上关系到美式资本主义的运转方式。在许多方面，这是早就应该确立的对基本市场原则的认可。

Businesses will raise wages to a point where the cost is just balanced by the reduced costs of recruiting and motivating workers. At that point, a further increase in wages does not appreciably change their total costs but higher wages certainly makes their workers better off. So there is a strong case for robust minimum wages.

企业将把工资提升至成本刚好被节省下来的招聘和激励员工的成本所抵消。在那一点上，进一步提高工资不会明显改变总成本，但提高工资肯定会让员工过得更好。因此，有充分的理由实行较高的最低工资。

There is also a strong reason for regulating aspects of pay. Usually competition drives desirable economic arrangements. But not always — especially when there is a risk of a race to the bottom. A company that tries to stand out by offering especially attractive family leave benefits , or job security, or egalitarian wage structures faces the prospect of attracting a disproportionately risk-averse work force. So there is an argument for using mandates to level the playing field.

还有很强大的理由监管薪资的某些方面。通常而言，竞争可以带来理想的经济安排。但情况并非总是如此，特别是当存在“逐底竞争”(race to the bottom)的风险时。试图通过提供格外有吸引力的家庭休假福利、就业保障、或者平等的工资结构而独树一帜的企业，可能吸引异常多厌恶风险的员工。因此，使用指令创造公平竞争环境是有依据的。

Profit sharing, too, is an area where there are demonstrable benefits in terms of increased productivity — but an individual company that stands out by offering it may encounter difficulties in recruitment because workers are too risk averse. So there is a strong case for tax incentives to spur profit sharing.

利润分享也是在提高生产率方面有明显好处的一个领域，但个别提供这种机制的公司或许会在招聘中遇到困难，因为工作者太厌恶风险。因此，有充分的理由利用税收激励来推动利润分享。

At the same time scepticism about whether all horizons should be lengthened is appropriate. A generation ago, the Japanese keiretsu system of cross ownership of corporate shares — which insulated corporate managements from share price pressure — was seen as a strength. Yet, Japan’s manifest macroeconomic difficulties aside, companies lacking market discipline have squandered leads in sectors from electronics to automobiles to IT.

同时，对于应该一刀切放远眼光的质疑是恰当的。一代人之前，日本企业交叉持股的经连体系(keiretsu system)——使企业管理层不受股价压力影响——被视为一种优势。然而，姑且不论日本的宏观经济困难，缺乏市场纪律的企业浪费了各自在电子产品、汽车行业以及信息技术等行业的领先地位。

Managements of companies that are dissipating the most value, such as General Motors before it was bailed out by the US government in 2009, have often been the most enthusiastic champions of long-termism. Market participants who are willingly placing high valuations on Silicon Valley start-ups that lack any profits and have little revenue may be putting too much, not too little, weight on the distant future. That, at least, is the implication of those who see the inflation of a “technology bubble”.

耗散最多价值的企业管理层——如2009年美国政府出手纾困之前的通用汽车(General Motors)——往往是长期主义最热心的拥护者。那些愿意给予没有任何利润、且几乎没什么收入的硅谷初创企业高估值的市场参与者，可能对遥远的未来押注太多了（而非太少了）。至少，这是那些看到“科技泡沫”膨胀的人给出的暗示。

Corporations hoarding cash that is earning zero in the bank or in Treasury bills would be cheered not jeered by the market if they could be convinced that the companies were putting it to productive use. Many corporations are in this situation of having cash piles but often do not have productive uses for the money. Either that or they cannot convince investors of their projects’ validity. Pushing corporations without good projects to invest is wasteful. Stopping or discouraging them from distributing funds to shareholders is dangerous if it encourages mindless takeovers as an alternative.

很多企业目前把现金囤积在银行账户或美国国债中，收入为零；如果这些企业能够让市场相信，他们正将资金投入生产性用途，那将受到市场欢呼（而不是讥讽）。许多企业处于这种情况：拥有现金储备，但往往找不到生产性用途支出资金。或者是无法说服投资者相信其项目的正当性。推动没有好项目的企业去投资是一种浪费。阻止或阻碍他们向股东返还资本是很危险的——如果这样做鼓励他们转而盲目收购。

The real need is for a cadre of trusted, tough-minded investors in any given company who can credibly commit to support strong management teams and to provide assurances to a broader investment community so that productive investments are made. Accomplishing that, while maintaining market discipline, is the crucial challenge.

真正需要的是，任何给定的公司都有一批受到信任、意志坚定的骨干投资者，他们能够可信地承诺支持强有力的管理团队，同时向更广泛的投资界提供保证，以便做出有效益的投资决定。实现这一点，同时又能维持市场纪律，是关键的挑战。