George Washington carried a musket. Franklin Roosevelt sent in heavy bombers. But for President Barack Obama, who must reconcile a weary American public with the demands of an increasingly unstable world, the armament of choice has been a weaponised form of finance.
乔治•华盛顿(George Washington)操着一支火枪。富兰克林•罗斯福(Franklin Roosevelt)下令出动重型轰炸机。但对美国现任总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)来说，在必须调和美国公众的厌战情绪与日益不稳定的世界的要求之际，首选装备是一种武器化的金融。
To hear enthusiasts describe them, economic sanctions are trusty swords. By excluding hostile governments and their senior officials from western financial markets, America and its allies can pursue diplomacy with a streak of coercion. The number of US sanctions programmes has doubled in recent years, and they now target the personal assets of a rogue state’s political and economic elite.
在支持者口中，经济制裁是值得信赖的利剑。通过把敌对政府及其高级官员挡在西方金融市场门外，美国及其盟国能够在付诸外交努力的同时带有一丝胁迫。美国制裁计划的数量在近年翻倍，如今它们的矛头指向流氓国家政商两界精英的个人资产。
Jack Lew, US Treasury secretary, has called this “a new battlefield for the United States, one that enables us to go after those who wish us harm without putting our troops in harm’s way”. Yet sanctions cannot solve as many problems as their champions appear to believe, and overusing them is risky.
美国财政部长杰克•卢(Jack Lew)形容这是“美国的一个新战场，它让我们打击那些企图损害我方的人，却不用让我们的部队冒生命危险”。然而，与倡导者似乎抱有的信念相比，制裁解决不了那么多问题，而且过度使用这个手段是有风险的。
While economic penalties deliver punishment, there is little evidence that they do much to change behaviour. Since Iranian banks were excluded from critical areas of the global financial infrastructure the ayatollahs have despatched negotiators to the nuclear bargaining table — but Iran has not accepted a deal. A defiant Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to enjoy popular support, and has become even more aggressive in Ukraine in recent weeks. The lesson is that these measures tend to be used against states that care less than most about access to US markets because they prioritise other issues over any jolt of economic pain.
尽管经济处罚可以有效惩罚打击对象，但几乎没有什么证据表明，它们对于改变行为有很大作用。伊朗的银行被踢出全球金融基础设施的关键领域之后，该国的精神领袖派出谈判代表坐上了核谈判桌，但伊朗迄今仍未接受任何协议。对制裁不买账的俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)继续深得民心，甚至在近几周在乌克兰变得更加咄咄逼人。这里的教训是，制裁对象往往是那些相对而言不怎么关心进不进美国市场的国家，因为它们更加注重其它问题，而不那么在乎任何短期经济痛苦。
Furthermore, there have been excruciating consequences for western companies based in countries that are US allies. Last year, the US fined BNP Paribas nearly $9bn for failing to comply with US sanctions on Sudan, Iran and Cuba — a penalty that provoked outrage in France. American authorities are investigating whether Commerzbank violated US sanctions against Sudan, Iran and Cuba, as well as North Korea and Myanmar. If sanctions are imposed, they must be enforced. But this stokes anger in Europe, and could make it easier for Mr Putin to drive a wedge between America and the EU.
此外，对于总部设在美国盟国的西方企业，制裁带来了极其痛苦的后果。去年美国政府对法国巴黎银行(BNP Paribas)罚款近90亿美元，因为该行未能遵守美国对苏丹、伊朗和古巴的制裁——这一处罚在法国引起公愤。美国有关部门正在调查德国商业银行(Commerzbank)是否违反了美国对苏丹、伊朗和古巴，以及朝鲜和缅甸的制裁。如果实施制裁，就必须执行。但这在欧洲引发愤怒，并可能让普京更容易离间美国和欧盟的关系。
America’s first foreign policy priority is to manage relations with China. Here, the weaponisation of finance will never be a useful tool. The size of China’s economy makes it impossible to isolate, and Beijing has the means to fight back. China is also more than happy to expand trade and investment ties with partners seeking to protect themselves against punitive US action.
美国的首要外交政策目标是处理与中国的关系。在这里，武器化金融永远不会成为一件有用工具。中国的经济规模使其不可能被孤立，而且北京方面拥有反击手段。中国也完全乐意与那些寻求保护自己不受美国惩罚行动影响的合作伙伴扩大经贸往来。
Finally, Washington’s ability to deny others full access to the financial system is valuable mainly because there is no alternative to it. Exclude too many people from it, and you give your rivals an incentive to create one.
最后，美方让别人无法完全进入金融体系的能力之所以有价值，主要原因是目前不存在替代金融体系。如果把太多人挡在门外，就会给竞争对手带来动力，鼓励他们创建一个替代金融体系。
Then there is the dollar, which is used in about four-fifths of international trade finance. (The US economy, by contrast, accounts for less than a quarter of world economic output.) This enables America to settle its accounts in a currency it can produce at will. It also allows Washington to tie access to payment systems to compliance with US geopolitical goals. China would dearly like to strip Washington of its ability to use the dollar to impose its will. Many Europeans would like an end to dollar dominance, too. And rogue states such as Russia might respond to the American weaponisation of finance with newly aggressive cyber attacks on US financial institutions.
还有就是美元，目前美元用于大约五分之四的国际贸易融资（相比之下，美国经济只占世界经济产出的不到四分之一）。这使得美国能够用自己可以随意生成的货币来结算账目，也让华盛顿方面将支付系统的准入与服从美国地缘政治目标挂钩。中国将非常乐意剥夺美方利用美元强加美国意志的能力。很多欧洲人也希望终结美元的霸主地位。同时，针对美国的武器化金融手段，俄罗斯之类的流氓国家可能以针对美国金融机构的网络攻击作为回应。近来这些攻击变得更加咄咄逼人了。
In short, Washington has good reason to use financial as well as political and military muscle. But there is a clear limit to what it can accomplish, and the cost of using it will only increase.
简言之，华盛顿方面有很好的理由在使用政治和军事实力的同时，也运用金融“肌肉”。但金融武器的效力是存在明确局限的，而且使用这种武器的成本只会增加。
The writer is president of Eurasia Group and global research professor at New York University
本文作者是欧亚集团(Eurasia Group)总裁、纽约大学(New York University)全球研究教授