Throughout the U.S. recovery we've seen economic data bounce in peaked highs and lows. Real GDP growth since the financial crisis has been as high as nearly 5% year over year and as low as 0%. I expect the sluggish and volatile recovery to continue for years to come. Why? In one word: deleveraging.
美国经济的整个复苏过程中，我们看着经济数据不断地创下新高或者新低。全球金融危机以来，美国实际GDP同比增长率最高接近5%，最低为零。我认为，今后几年美国经济仍将缓慢复苏，震荡前行。原因何在？四个字：去杠杆化。
The U.S. economy has been going through a deleveraging not seen since the Great Depression. Back then, total debt reached 300% of GDP. It continued to drop over the next two decades to 150% of GDP before rising again in the early 1950s.
目前美国经济中的去杠杆化规模为大萧条以来所未见。大萧条期间，美国的总债务是GDP的300%。在接下来的20年里，这个数字曾一路下探到150%，随后在20世纪50年代初才开始再次上升。
The deleveraging of the Great Depression was accomplished thanks to a combination of household austerity, inflation, and government stimulus. Household austerity occurred thanks to elevated savings rates along with pay-downs and defaults on debt during the 1930s while rationing to support the war effort had similar effects in the 1940s. Additionally, breaking away from the gold standard helped raise prices and therefore reduced the real value of America's debt. Lastly, the government spending from various New Deal schemes to the vast mobilization during WWII contributed to keeping total GDP growth positive.
大萧条期间，和去杠杆化相伴的是居民压缩开支，通货膨胀和政府的刺激措施。居民支出下降的原因是储蓄率上升以及20世纪30年代人们只能部分偿还债务或者逃债，战时配给制则在20世纪40年产生了同样的影响。此外，废除金本位制有助于提高物价，进而降低了美国债务的实际价值。最后，罗斯福新政的各项措施和二战期间的大规模动员带来了政府支出，为保持GDP总量正增长做出了贡献。
The deleveraging that we are going through today is much improved from the volatile economic outcomes experienced during the Depression. Most of the deleveraging since the Great Recession has occurred in households, mostly in the form of mortgages (which fell from 73% of GDP in 2008 to 55% of GDP today), and across the U.S. financial (where debtfell from 118% of GDP in 2008 to 82% of GDP today).
现在我们所经历的去杠杆化远好于大萧条时期经济的剧烈波动。大萧条以来，大多数去杠杆化都发生在个人领域，而且以按揭贷款（它占美国GDP的比例从2008年的73%降到了目前的55%）为主；整个美国金融业也在去杠杆化（金融业债务占美国GDP 的比例从2008年的118%降到了现在的82%）。
Conversely, the federal government leveraged up (with debts rising from 72% of GDP in 2008 to 102% of GDP today) to offset this decline in borrowing from households and the financial sector. The other major sources of debt (non-financial corporate, state & local government, consumer credit, and foreign borrowing) have remained largely unchanged from crisis levels. So overall, the decline in debt-to-GDP has been relatively muted so far, falling from 409% of GDP in 2008 to 392% of GDP today.
与之相反，美国联邦政府通过提高负债率（其债务占美国GDP的比例从2008年的72%升至目前的102%）来抵消居民和金融业借贷的萎缩。和全球金融危机时的水平相比，其他主要债务来源（非金融公司、州政府和其他地方政府、消费信贷以及对外借款）基本上都保持不变。所以，整体而言美国债务/GDP比例到目前为止的降幅一直比较小，只是从2008年的409%降到了现在的392%。
Nonetheless, the U.S. has experienced better outcomes, especially when compared to Europe and Japan because it is keeping the combination of austerity, inflation, and defaults as balanced as possible, while keeping nominal GDP growth above the general interest rates in the economy. The fact that nominal GDP growth is greater than average interest rates is a prerequisite for a well-handled deleveraging, and it is one reason why U.S. economic performance, while choppy, has outperformed many of its industrialized peers.
不过，美国经济形势越来越好，特别是和欧洲以及日本相比，原因是美国一直尽可能地让紧缩、通胀和违约处于平衡状态，同时一直让名义GDP增长率高于经济中的普通利率。名义GDP增速高于平均利率是把握好去杠杆化进程的前提条件，也是美国经济虽起伏不定但一直好于许多同类工业化国家的原因之一。举例来说，近年来欧洲GDP增长率不断下降，但在许多时候，欧洲的基准贷款利率都处于上升状态。这就造成2008年以来，欧洲许多地区的债务/GDP比例实际上一直在持续攀升。20世纪90年代初至今，尽管日本的利率在发达国家里处于最低水平，但它的债务/GDP比例依然在不断上扬。出现这种局面的原因是，通缩造成日本的名义GDP增长率甚至赶不上已经极低的利率。
Europe, for example, has seen its GDP growth contract in recent years while in many cases the benchmark lending rates exploded higher. This has resulted in debt-to-GDP ratios actually continuing to climb since 2008 in much of the Euro area. Japan has also seen its debt-to-GDP ratios climb consistently since the early 1990s despite having the lowest interest rates in the developed world. This has occurred because deflation has kept nominal GDP growth below even their extremely low interest rates.
欧洲经济表现低迷的部分原因是货币政策和财政政策脱节。马斯特里赫特条约（Maastricht Treaty）限制了欧洲的联邦预算赤字；财政部门未能实现一体化则造成货币政策（特别是量化宽松政策）难以管理。最近欧洲方面表示，如有必要，将采取更为宽松的政策。为欧洲（和美国）的利益着想，但愿他们能言出必行。
Europe's poor economic results have occurred thanks in part to a disjointed relationship between monetary and fiscal policy. The Maastricht Treaty puts limits on federal budget deficits in Europe while the absence of a unified treasury makes monetary policy (QE policies in particular) difficult to administer. Let's hope for their sake (and ours) that they follow through with their recent statements about being more accommodative if necessary.
金融危机爆发以来，债台高筑的日本也一直在采取错误的应对政策。虽然日本拥有和美国一样（但跟欧洲不同）的货币和财政政策工具，但在20世纪90年代初，也就是日本陷入危机后的最初几年，总的来说日本政府在予以应对时缺乏紧迫感。他们采取的政策就好像日本经济是在经历一场普通的周期性衰退，其实真是大错特错。多年来，日本经济增长率一直低于平均水平。随后，“安倍经济学”——首相安倍晋三为激活日本经济而采取三管齐下的措施——可能成为日本经济的转折点。时间会告诉我们，这些大胆的政策能否让日本经济重新实现持续增长，并最终让日本的经济增速超过利率。
Japan has also gotten its policy responses incorrect following their debt build-up and financial crisis. While Japan had the same monetary and fiscal policy tools as the U.S. government (but not the Europeans), they generally lacked a sense of urgency to their policy responses in the early years after their crisis in the early 1990s. Japan's government, in error, delivered policies as if its economy was in a typical business cycle slump. After years of languishing with sub-par growth, "Abenomics," Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's three-pronged approach to jump-starting the economy, could represent a turning point for Japan's economy. Time will tell if these bold policies will restore consistent growth and ultimately push nominal GDP growth above their interest rates.
那么，我们是不是就可以完全无视经济数据呢？当然不能。我们只需要做好准备来继续迎接那些看起来不是那么糟糕或者不是那么强劲的经济数据。不要因为某个月或者某个季度经济表现较差而坐立不安。我们中的大多数人在自己的职业生涯中都越来越熟悉经济周期，但当前我们所处的环境和前者不同。虽然短期内不太可能实现高增长，但我们确信，政策也不太可能造成经济衰退。只要不出现某些外部冲击，今后几年我们就有可能继续蹒跚前行。感谢我们的决策者，特别是美联储（Federal Reserve），他们准确地找到了美国经济的毛病，而且正在尽自己的最大努力来适应当前这个去杠杆化阶段。