6. 证券公司(brokerage firm)

　　主要内容

　　第一段：美国以前的一些大型证券公司都是垄断业务，后来法规发生变化，允许其他人也来从事这一行业。于是一些经纪人(broker)给私人投资者(private investor)提供经济服务。

　　第二段：大型证券公司从前是不收取客户的交易手续费的，实际上他们把这些费率都含在了成本当中(fixed costs)，这个费用实际是比较高的。新兴的经纪人不仅给客户提供各种服务，丰富了产品(除了股票，还增加了bond之类的)，并且服务的费用也比大型证券公司要低

　　第三段：很多人预测大型证券公司会模仿经纪人，丰富产品种类，对产品分类定价，不再捆绑(de-bundle)所有服务，但是他们没有这么去做，还一直坚持老派的做法

　　第四段：但是经过一段时间，大型公司必须改变，于是做了一些调整

　　第五段：总结新型经纪人出现对于投资人是好事情，最终降低了客户费用，对整个行业产生影响。

　　参考文章

　　Wall Street brokerage firms have been enjoying a robust business climate in recent years. Braced by a seemingly inexhaustible bull market and heavy trading volumes, full-service firms -- the traditional Wall Street powerhouses -- are, by and large, consistently reporting increased profits. Assets in mutual funds have soared as well, as more baby boomers have become concerned about the financial needs of retirement.

　　But these heady market conditions, while seemingly a recipe for continued success, mask looming problems for the full-service firms. That is because they are losing a significant portion of their business to discount brokers, mutual fund companies and other specialized providers, a group that has already captured 25 percent of the retail market with its generally lower prices and more enterprising use of technology. In particular, new entrants have been quick to capitalize on the growth of direct channels, e.g., discounters now moving to the Internet.

　　All of which has left the full-service firms with a bottom line that is bigger but is also under siege. To fight back, the firms need to play to their strengths and shore up their weaknesses. On the strength side, they need to aggressively market their product breadth, personalized service and "one-stop shopping" convenience. As for their weaknesses, they need to focus on costs and operating efficiency, and pass on as much of the savings as possible to their customers. And they need to proactively manage their key client relationships through superior service and attractive customer loyalty programs.

　　These firms unbundled the offerings of the full-service providers and concentrated on specific sources of value to investors. (See Exhibit I.) They also developed direct channels to circumvent the physical footprint advantage of the established players at a time when consumer adoption of electronic and other forms of direct access was increasingly replacing the need for face-to-face dealings. Paced by technological advances that made "self-service" a reality, as well as by a rising level of investor sophistication, the trend toward specialization gained momentum.

　　At the same time, the ranks of individual investors swelled, sparking tremendous growth in mutual funds and employer-sponsored 401(k) plans. Recognizing that growth, the specialized firms focused more and more on specific sources of value to address targeted customer needs, fostering the perception that their services are "cheaper" (although, given fair comparison, that is not always the case).

　　These specialized providers have enjoyed significant growth at the expense of the full-service firms. In the 10 years since 1985, the discounters' share of retail equity trading commissions nearly tripled. Clearly, investors perceive significant value from the discounters' price and convenience advantages.

　　The competitive environment has changed dramatically for full-service brokerage firms. Until the mid-1980's, these firms dominated the landscape. Their product offerings were primarily stocks and bonds, and their customers were usually affluent. Securities regulations mandated a level playing field that gave firms little beyond their image and reputation to differentiate themselves. As a result, customer turnover was typically low.

　　But price deregulation and technological advances dramatically changed that paradigm. A new breed of specialized firms and discount brokers appeared on the scene, offering services at vastly lower costs. by sawayisa