信息分享

　　【段落大意】：

　　第一段：

　　团队和个人绩效对公司信息共享的不同影响。员工information sharing 与公司的政策相关，传统理论认为奖励员工个人绩效表现是不利于信息分享的。调查了3个企业, 得出结论, 符合经济理论。 (1)如果公司主要看中individual performance，那么就会less information sharing。虽然员工很努力工作 但是公司整体的利润没有提高;(2) 如果以team业绩奖励, 信息分享就对一些;(3)如果公司规定个人福利与公司利润挂钩的话，就会有most information sharing。因为大家都想让自己的team脱颖而出，则会把自己的信息都说出来。

　　第二段：

　　奖金类型和信息分享的关系。研究了奖金类型与Information Sharing的关系，发现个人奖金使Information Sharing低，团队奖金好，全公司奖金更好，所以应该最大限度的提高个人和Information Sharing的威力. 一个研究证实传统理论的论点。奖励个人绩效会鼓励个人藏私，这样做对于整个组织来讲是不会受益的。唯有奖励团队合作与团队绩效表现，这样的结果才是对组织有好处的。

　　第三段：

　　举例证明团队绩效的好处。举了例子，说有一个律师事务所, 本来一直都是以个人业绩奖励的, 后来公司业务不行, 要关门了，来了一个新CEO改变了以往以个人为单位进行评估，实行以team为单位进行评估，使员工们和集体联系在一起，并将高阶主管的变动奖金(Incentive Scheme)与鼓励内部信息分享，结果公司有很大起色。

　　【题目】：

　　Q1：主旨题：Q2：信息题：哪项是经理人理性的活动?

　　Q3：信息题：为了使公司PROFIT多一点，EXECUTIVES应该?

　　Q4：信息题：为什么企业又让员工共享信息，又去保持竞争?

　　【背景资料】：

　　虽然大多数高管都知道激励措施应该有利于知识共享，但令人吃惊的是，许多企业仍然强调奖励个人的绩效而非团队或者公司的绩效。例如，在律师、会计、管理咨询等领域，大多数针对白领的“不升职就出局”的激励机制，都只根据少数几个指标(例如销售额)评定员工的绩效，然后奖励那些表现最好的人，结果把同事变成了竞争对手。

　　本文作者研究了3家猎头公司的知识共享与生产率问题，结果发现，按个人绩效获取报酬的人共享信息最少，按团队绩效获取报酬的人共享信息较多，而按整个公司绩效获取报酬的人共享信息最多。

　　作者以IBM公司的经历为例，说明了知识共享的重要性。在郭士纳(Lou Gerstner)到任之前，IBM公司3/4以上的奖金都是按个人绩效来确定的--结果整个公司因为各自为政而几乎瘫痪。但郭士纳上任之后明确指出，凡拒绝共享有价值信息的人都会受到斥责甚至被解雇。结果，信息的流动状况得到了明显改善，为IBM在20世纪90年代的巨大增长立下了汗马功劳。

　　Create Colleagues, Not CompetitorsIf managers want their employees to share information, why do they encourage them to hoard it by rewarding competition among them? My colleagues Erik Brynjolfsson at MIT and Nat Bulkley at the University of Michigan and I have been studying knowledge sharing and productivity in the executive recruiting industry. We asked 71 employees, from partners to IT staff, at three recruiting firms about their compensation structures and their attitudes toward sharing information with colleagues, and we tracked their individual contract revenues and the e-mail activity among them.

　　We found, as predicted by economic theory, that the people rewarded for individual performance shared information least; the people rewarded for team performance shared more; and the people rewarded for company performance shared most. In each case, the degree of sharing reflected the sharer’s self-interest. If compensation is linked to one’s performance relative to others, then employees are likely to hoard information to both maximize their own performance and undermine (or, at least, not benefit) others. But if rewards are tied to firm performance, then individuals stand to gain most from activities—like free knowledge sharing—that benefit the company.

　　This effect is demonstrated in the exhibit at right, which shows the network of e-mail traffic in a recruiting firm composed of two offices. Though this firm, overall, shared information to a moderate degree (as measured by the volume of e-mail among employees), the employees in office 1, on the left side of the network, were rewarded principally for organizational performance. The employees in office 2, on the right, were rewarded principally for individual performance. It’s clear which office shared more.

　　Though most executives intuitively grasp the relationship between incentives and knowledge sharing, it’s surprising how many companies—even those where knowledge sharing is critical—still emphasize rewards for individual performance rather than encourage team or firm performance. They turn colleagues into competitors. Most white-collar, up-or-out incentive schemes in law, accounting, management-consulting, and other fields rank employees on a few indicators such as sales volume or hours billed, and then reward those at the top.

　　Consider IBM’s experience over the past 15 years. Before Lou Gerstner arrived, more than three-quarters of IBM’s bonuses were based on individual performance—and the company was almost paralyzed by fiefdoms. But Gerstner made it clear he would reprimand or fire anyone who refused to share valuable information. Executive compensation became more team based, and management invoked Gerstner’s name and fearsome reputation to win compliance among recalcitrant employees. The result was improved information flow, which contributed significantly to IBM’s enormous growth during the 1990s.

　　Our research confirms that aligning incentives with team or firm performance effectively enhances information flow. But as IBM’s experience shows, if you want to maximize sharing, sometimes inducements to share are best coupled with deterrents to hoarding.