This process could follow the normal teaching of a child. Things would be pointed out and named, etc.
这个过程可以参照人类儿童的教育过程，比如指着一样东西给它看，告诉它这个东西的名称。
Again I do not know what the right answer is, but I think both approaches should be tried.
我不知道哪种方案更好，我认为两种方案都值得一试。
But this was not where he placed his own bets.
但是很显然，他个人的赌注，并不押在后一种方案上。
Later he went as far as to say: I certainly hope and believe that no great efforts will be put into making machines with the most distinctively human, but non-intellectual characteristics, such as the shape of the human body.
他后来又说：我认为，并且我希望，不要费那么大的力气，让这种机器去模仿人类的一些没有智力特征的属性，比如说身体的外形。
It appears to me to be quite futile to make such attempts and their results would have something like the unpleasant quality of artificial flowers.
我认为这样的尝试是毫无意义的，其结果就像人工假花一样，不伦不类。
Attempts to produce a thinking machine seem to me to be in a different category.
在我看来，这些尝试与制造“思考机器”南辕北辙。
In the subjects proposed for automation in 1948, he had been careful to choose those which involved no 'contact with the outside world'.
1948年，机械自动化技术已经有了很大提高，但图灵小心翼翼地选择了一个“与物理世界无关”的课题。
Chess playing, pre-eminently, would involve no relevant fact but the state of the chessboard and the state of the players' brains.
在他眼中，下棋是与动作无关的，只与棋局的状态和棋手大脑的状态有关。
The same could certainly be claimed of mathematics, and indeed of any purely symbolic system, involving anything technical, any matter of technique. He himself had included cryptanalysis in this scope, but hesitated over language translation.
这一类的课题，显然还包括数学，纯符号系统，还有密码分析，但是，是否包括语言翻译，还值得商榷。
The Mind paper, however, boldly extended the range of 'intelligent machinery' to general conversation.
在图灵的论文中，他把智能机器的功能扩张到自然语言对话。
As such it was vulnerable to his own criticism, that it would require 'contact with the outside world' for this to be possible.
这使他的前提露出了软肋，因为对话是与物理世界有关的。
He did not meet the problem that to speak seriously is to act, and not only to issue a string of symbols.
图灵没有考虑到这一点：对话是一种交互，而不是在内部处理符号。