All the time, while minds and technology were being pushed to the limit at Bletchley in the attack on German signals, the most elementary blunders were being made in the defence of their own.
他们在破解德国通信时，把思想和技术发挥到了极致，然而在自己防守时，却总是犯下最低级的错误。
The result was that since late 1941, the German successes had been owed not only to the growing numerical strength of the U-boat fleet, but to their knowledge of Allied convoy routes;
这导致的结果是，自从1941末以来，德国的成功不仅是因为U艇数量的增长，还因为对盟军护航路线了如指掌。
and during 1942 the effect of the Enigma blackout was only half the story.
在1942年期间，谜机破译工作中断所造成的影响，只是故事一半。
Unlike the German authorities, the British were capable of recognising a mistake.
但与德国当局不同，英国能够立即认识到错误。
The error was not that of the Admiralty alone, for GC and CS had exercised that part of its remit which called it to advise upon cipher security.
错误不只在于海军，因为有一部分密码安全工作已经移交给了政密学校，
But it was a part of GC and CS which had been left untouched by the revolutions elsewhere, and whose timescale still ran in terms of years.
但政密学校并没有像重视破译德军密码那样，来重视这些防守性工作，因此这方面的进展很迟缓。
In 1941 it had devised a new system, which in 1942 the Admiralty had agreed to introduce in June 1943.
他们到1941年才设计出新的通信系统，而海军直到1942年才批准他们于1943年6月引入使用。
Even allowing for the fact that it took six months simply to equip the Navy with new tables, this was a story of delays normal in peacetime, but bearing no connection with the new standards applied to anything considered essential for the war.
他们甚至连批准更换新的密码手册都需要花上六个月。这种拖延，在和平时期还算有情可原，但在战争的生死关头，就显得很没道理。
If it were the decipherment of exciting messages, or airborne radar to make German cities visible for night raids, or the atomic bomb, then new industries could be conjured up in months.
信息破译战、使德国夜如白昼的空中雷达，还有原子弹，这些工作很刺激，它们可以通过新型的工业技术，在几个月内像变魔术一样拿出来。
The less glamorous work of convoy protection called forth no such effort.
但是护航保卫工作却不怎么刺激，无法激起这样的劲头。