Until Thursday afternoon, there had been a reassuring sense of restrained, tit-for-tat reciprocity in the trade skirmish between the United States and China.
截至周四下午，美国与中国的贸易冲突仍有一种令人放心的、有节制的以牙还牙的感觉。
But if this spirals into a bigger conflict between the world’s two biggest economies — something that seemed to become more likely Thursday evening with President Trump’s threat to add $100 billion more in tariffs — it’s worth keeping something in mind: In a trade war, the usual rules of commerce may not apply.
但如果情况失去控制，导致世界上两个最大经济体之间发生一场更大冲突的话，有件事情值得铭记于心：在一场贸易战中，通常的商业规则可能不再适用。随着周四晚上特朗普总统威胁要把征收关税的中国商品价值再扩大1000亿美元，冲突升级的可能性看来变得更大。
That is doubly true in a potential trade war with China, for several reasons.
在与中国潜在的贸易战中更是如此，原因有几个。
Because the country exports far more in goods to the United States than it imports, China simply doesn’t have as much room to keep up with escalating American tariffs, especially given the Chinese government’s desire to cushion its citizens from higher prices for food staples.
由于中国对美国出口的商品远多于进口的商品，中国没有足够多的进口商品可征税，以达到不断升级的美国征收的关税的水平，尤其是考虑到中国政府不想让国内的人受到食品价格上涨的影响。
Moreover, China has in the past proved willing to use a wide range of government powers to achieve commercial objectives — from campaigns against out-of-favor companies in state media to selective, stepped-up regulatory enforcement. And if things really get nasty, the United States and China are financially intertwined in ways that China could seek to exploit — though not without creating risks for a country holding $1.2 trillion in United States Treasury bonds.
此外，过去已有事实证明，中国愿意使用广泛的政府权力来实现商业目标——从使用官方媒体抨击失宠企业，到选择性地加强监管执法。如果情况真的变糟，中国可能会寻找美国与中国在经济上密切相关的方式加以利用，尽管对于一个持有1.2万亿美元美国国债的中国来说，这样做并非没有风险。
“One of the very important tools that the Chinese have is the ability to make life difficult for a large number of American businesses,” said Eswar Prasad, an economist at Cornell University who studies Chinese economic relations. “They have all of these unconventional weapons that are not covered by traditional trading rules that could be potent weapons in actually fighting a trade war.”
“中国拥有的非常重要的工具之一，是让大量的美国企业在中国的日子不好过，”康奈尔大学(Cornell University)研究中国经济关系的经济学家埃斯瓦尔·普拉萨德(Eswar Prasad)说。“他们有所有这些不受传统交易规则管辖的非常规性武器，这些武器在真打贸易战时可能会很有效。”
The details of what China might do are speculative. Thus far, China’s government has reacted to new tariff actions by the Trump administration with relatively restrained words and promises of proportional responses to the American government’s actions.
对于中国可能采取的措施的细节，目前只能进行推测。迄今为止，中国政府对特朗普政府征收新关税的宣布所做出的回应相对克制，只承诺要对美国政府的行动做出相应的回应。
The Americans put tariffs on steel and aluminum; China responds by taxing American pork. The Trump administration’s plans to tax $50 billion worth of Chinese imports is met with threats by the Chinese to subject $50 billion worth of American products to the same.
美国宣布对钢铁和铝征收关税；中国宣布对美国猪肉征收关税作为回应。特朗普政府要对价值500亿美元的中国进口商品征收关税的计划，得到了中国政府要对500亿美元的等值美国产品征收同样关税的威胁。
Those tariffs won’t even go into effect until after a comment period, setting up a potentially long period of lobbying and negotiation that could rein in their scope or even delay them indefinitely.
这些关税要在一个评论期过后才会生效，可能会引发一个长时间的游说和谈判的努力，让关税征收的范围缩小，甚至让一些关税被无限期推迟。
But just because matters have been calibrated thus far doesn’t mean they will stay that way. American financial markets have been swinging wildly in recent weeks as investors revise their predictions for what might come next.
但仅仅因为迄今为止的做法比较克制，并不意味着会永远这样下去。最近几周，随着投资者修正他们对未来可能发生情况的预测，美国金融市场一直在剧烈波动。
The Tough Math of Tit-for-Tat
以牙还牙的困难计算
As President Trump often notes, the United States does run a large trade deficit with China — especially if you look only at goods, and don’t count the value of services. That means that if China seeks to match tariffs on goods — a classic tit-for-tat approach — China runs out of “tats” pretty quickly.
正如特朗普总统经常指出的那样，美国确实对中国存在巨大的贸易逆差——尤其是如果只看商品，而不考虑服务的价值的话。这就意味着，如果中国试图对同等价值的商品征收关税的话——这是典型的以牙还牙的做法——中国的“牙”很快会不够用。
In 2017, the United States imported $506 billion in goods from China while exporting only $131 billion in goods to China, according to data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
美国经济分析局(Bureau of Economic Analysis)的数据显示，2017年，美国从中国进口了价值5060亿美元的商品，但只向中国出口了价值1310亿美元的商品。
“It mathematically means that China can’t match the U.S. dollar for dollar,” said Brad Setser, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
“这意味着在商品价值上，中国无法与美国针锋相对，”美国外交关系委员会(Council on Foreign Relations)高级研究员布拉德·塞策(Brad Setser)说。
So, for example, if the Trump administration follows through on the president’s suggestion to consider expanding the tariffs to cover $100 billion more of goods, it would strain the Chinese government to respond in a dollar-for-dollar manner.
因此，比方说如果特朗普政府按照总统的建议去做，考虑把征收关税商品的范围再扩大1000亿美元的话，将会让中国政府作出同等价值的回应变得很勉强。
And that’s before you account for the Chinese government’s reluctance to put tariffs on goods that might carry some political or strategic cost.
而且这是在考虑到中国政府不愿对可能带来政治或战略代价的商品征收关税之前。
For example, in its planned retaliatory tariffs, the Chinese government included narrow-body aircraft but not wide-body aircraft. This makes sense strategically, Mr. Setser argued, because only two companies in the world make wide-body planes: Boeing and Airbus. If China put a tariff on planes from the American Boeing but not the European Airbus, it would lose leverage with Airbus with which to extract favorable prices and access to cutting-edge technology.
举例来说，在征收报复性关税的计划中，中国政府把窄体飞机包括了进去，但没有包括宽体飞机。塞策认为，这在战略上有道理，因为世界上只有两家公司生产宽体飞机：波音(Boeing)和空客(Airbus)。如果中国对美国波音公司的飞机征收关税，但不对欧洲空客的飞机征收关税的话，中国将失去为得到优惠价格、获得尖端技术与空客谈判的筹码。
China has already imposed tariffs on the easy stuff: luxury goods like American wine and liquor, and agricultural goods that are considered luxuries within China, like almonds and pistachios. It is unlikely there will be uprisings in the streets of Shanghai if Kentucky bourbon gets more expensive.
中国已经对容易的商品征收关税：像美国葡萄酒和烈性酒这样的奢侈品，以及中国视为奢侈品的农产品，譬如杏仁和开心果。如果只是肯塔基波旁威士忌变得更贵的话，上海的大街上不太可能出现暴动。
But in the latest round, China has said it will raise tariffs on American soybeans. That is likely to cause President Trump political problems in farm states, but it also risks raising food costs within China. It’s a fair bet, then, that China views remaining options as even more problematic for the prices of staple goods or the country’s industrial strategy.
但是在最近一轮中，中国表示将提高对美国大豆的关税。这可能会让美国总统特朗普在农业州遇到政治问题，但这也可能提高中国国内的食品价格。因此可以合理地预测，中国认为剩下的选择会给主要商品的价格或国家产业战略带来更多的问题。
In other words, for China the low-hanging fruit is gone. If this trade battle continues to escalate, China will have to bear a greater cost.
换句话说，对于中国来说，容易摘的果子已经没了。如果这场贸易战继续升级，中国将不得不承担更大的代价。
Commercial Guerrilla Warfare
商业游击战争
That reality could push China to seek other buttons to press. And while there is no recent precedent of a trade war to draw from, the Chinese government’s actions in other types of disputes offer a potential road map.
这个现实可能迫使中国寻找其他的应对方式。虽然没有最近的贸易战可以作为先例，但中国政府在其它类型的争端中的做法为此提供了一个可能的路线图。
For one thing, American companies do significant business in China that doesn’t show up in trade data. When Apple assembles an iPhone in Zhengzhou and sells it in Shanghai, that doesn’t count as international trade, though the profits accrue to the benefit of a California-based company. The Chinese government has any number of tools to try to weaken that business if it wishes. It could decide that phones made by a foreign company are a national security threat, or shut down plants because of minor regulatory problems.
首先，美国公司在中国有相当部分的业务并没有在贸易数据中表现出来。苹果公司(Apple)的iPhone在郑州组装、在上海卖出，这并不算国际贸易，虽然利润被一家总部位于加州的公司所获得。如果中国政府愿意的话，它有很多可以试图用来削弱这种生意的工具。政府可以决定，外国公司生产的手机是对国家安全的威胁，或者可以因为小的监管问题而关闭工厂。
“That’s the kind of thing they could reduce dramatically if they wanted to,” said Nicholas Lardy, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “To their credit, they have not hinted that this is on their agenda, and they seem to be sticking to this idea that their response will be reciprocal and not escalatory. But they have plenty of other options.”
“如果他们想做的话，他们可以大大减少这类业务，”彼得森国际经济研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)高级研究员尼古拉斯·拉迪(Nicholas Lardy)说。“值得赞扬的是，他们没有暗示这在他们的计划之中，而且他们似乎坚持的观点是，他们的回应是一报还一报，而不是升级。不过，他们还有很多其他的选择。”
Making life difficult for American companies in China as retaliation in a trade war need not be formal and widely publicized. American automakers who make cars in China might find their local joint-venture partners squeezing them out. Regional governments might send safety inspectors to plants of American companies so often as to disrupt production.
让美国公司在中国的日子不好过，把这作为贸易战中的报复做法不需要正式宣布，也不需要广泛宣传。在中国制造汽车的美国汽车制造商可能会发现，他们在当地的合资伙伴要将他们挤出市场。地方政府可能会频繁派遣安全检查员到美国公司的工厂去检查，以致于生产被打乱。
There are more public options, too. For example, in 2013, Chinese state media accused Jaguar Land Rover and Audi of overcharging buyers for car parts, which analysts viewed as part of a campaign to pressure those automakers to locate more manufacturing in China.
还有更多的公开选择。比如，2013年，中国官方媒体指责捷豹路虎(Jaguar Land Rover)和奥迪(Audi)对汽车零部件的买家要价过高。分析师认为，那是在向这些汽车制造商施压，让它们把更多的制造工作搬到中国去。
Bruising in the Bond Market?
在债券市场上遇挫？
For years, American politicians have fretted about China’s role as the United States’ largest creditor; the nation has accumulated a huge stockpile of Treasury bonds over the last 20 years.
多年以来，美国政客一直担心中国作为美国最大债权国的角色；在过去的20年里，中国积累了大量的美国国债。
Could China use its role as No. 1 lender to exert pressure in a trade war?
中国是否会利用其第一债权人的角色，在一场贸易战中对美国施加压力呢？
It would be a risky maneuver, in which China itself would potentially have much to lose. But it can’t be ruled out.
这将是一个冒险的策略，这样做可能会给中国本身带来很大的损失。但不能排除这种可能性。
If China were to suddenly unload some of its holdings, or even signal an intention to buy fewer dollar assets in the future, that would probably cause long-term interest rates in the United States to rise, at least temporarily. And this would cause some pain in the United States, as borrowing costs — whether for the federal government or individual home buyers — would rise.
如果中国突然抛售所持的部分债券，或者只是暗示有意在未来购买更少的美元资产，可能会导致美国的长期利率上升，至少是暂时的上升。这将给美国带来一些痛苦，因为这会导致借贷成本上升，无论对联邦政府还是个人购房者来说。
But it would also drive down the value of China’s existing bond portfolio, meaning China could lose billions. And it would tend to push down the value of the dollar relative to other currencies, which would actually help the United States attain more advantageous trade terms.
但这也会让中国目前持有的债券投资组合的价值降低，这意味着中国可能要损失数十亿美元。而且，这会降低美元相对于其他货币的比价，实际上帮助美国获得更有利的贸易条件。

Even after all that, bond prices would most likely readjust over time as other buyers took advantage of the rise in interest rates. In the medium term, the performance of the United States economy and actions of the Federal Reserve do more to determine bond prices than the decisions of a single buyer or seller, even one as large as China.
即使在这之后，债券价格很可能会随着时间的推移而重新调整，因为其他买家会利用利率上升的有利条件。从中期来看，美国经济的表现和美联储的行动对决定债券价格所起的作用，比单个债权人的决定大得多，即使这个债权人有中国这么大。
That doesn’t mean there isn’t room to cause some near-term pain and disruption. “The Chinese have some leverage to rattle U.S. bond markets, even if the threat of substantive action is not very credible,” Mr. Prasad said.
这并不意味着短期内没有制造一些痛苦和混乱的余地。“即使采取实质性行动的威胁不太可信，中国也有一些能扰乱美国债券市场的筹码，”普拉萨德说。
Given that a trade war with such a major trading partner is without precedent in modern times, we don’t really know what it would look like. But it’s a safe bet that Chinese officials are already thinking through their options in case that is where the latest round of economic saber rattling ultimately leads.
考虑到与一个如此重要的贸易伙伴的贸易战在现代历史上没有先例，我们真的不知道它会是什么样。但可以肯定的是，中国官员已经在认真考虑他们的选项，以防最新这一轮经济上的相互威胁最终走到贸易战的地步。