it was steadily becoming less difficult to intercept them at British stations;
要想在英国的工作站截获它们，仍然存在很大难度。
yet even in 1939, for lack of sets and operators, by no means all German Service communications were being intercepted.
1939年，我们缺少设备和人员，无法截获德国所有的通信，
Nor was all intercepted traffic being studied.
截获的通信也无法进行彻底研究。
Until 1937-38 no addition was made to the civilian staff as opposed to the service personnel at GC and CS;
一直到1937年和1938年，政府编码与密码学院没有增加任何人员，
and because of the continuing shortage of German intercepts, the eight graduates then recruited were largely absorbed by the same growing burden of Japanese and Italian work that had led to expansion of the Service sections.
而且因为在截获德国情报方面始终处于劣势，所以我们招募的8个研究生，也都改去应对同样增长的日本和意大利的通信量了。
It was not simply a question of numbers and budgets, however.
然而，问题还不仅仅是人员和预算。
This elderly department was failing to rise to the mechanical challenge of the late 1930s.
这个老部门在30年代末的机械化革命中并不成功。
The years after the First World War had been 'the golden age of modern diplomatic codebreaking'.
第一次世界大战之后，现代密码破译技术进入了黄金发展时期。
But now the German communications presented GC and CS with a problem beyond their powers – the Enigma machine:
现在德国已经把一个超出他们想象的困难，摆在了他们面前——谜机。