If it’s been a tough time for commodity traders, it hasn’t been any easier for the exchanges on which they trade and hedge their exposures.

如果说大宗商品交易商近来经历了一段艰难的时期，那么他们进行交易和对冲风险敞口的交易所的境况也不轻松。

The London Metal Exchange was bought in 2012 by Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing for what seemed to many like an eye-watering sum of ￡1.4bn. Most of that went to its members, in direct proportion to the number of shares they held; the amounts received varied from around ￡30m-odd to approximately ￡100m for those who had the foresight to mop up the available shares as members quit the LME in prior years.

2012年，伦敦金属交易所(LME)被香港交易所(HKEx)以14亿英镑的貌似高价收购。大多数资金流向会员，直接按各自持有的股份比例分配；分得的资金从3000多万英镑到1亿英镑不等（前些年有会员退出LME时，一些有先见之明的会员接手了股份）。

These were big sums of money, particularly for the smaller brokers, but there was a price to pay.

这些是庞大金额，尤其是对于较小的经纪商来说，但是这是需要付出代价的。

For more than a century the LME effectively operated as a members’ collective — any profits generated were redistributed to its members who then elected their own to the board. The board in turn ran the business in the twin interests of the industrial metal industry and, specifically, the member firms.

在持续一个多世纪的时间里，LME实际上一直作为一个会员集合体运作——所有利润都要重新分配给会员，会员选出代表进入董事会。董事会进而从工业金属行业和会员公司的双重利益出发，开展经营。

That model disappeared after the sale to HKEx in 2012. The LME has become a commercial operation in its own right and one that needs to generate profits for its own shareholders as well as satisfy those previous members who are now its customers. That’s a big change in the relationship and the two sides have been feeling their way in the new world.

2012年当LME被HKEx收购后，这种模式消失了。LME本身成了一个商业化经营体，需要为股东创造利润，同时要满足如今是其客户的前会员。关系发生了重大转变，双方都在一个新世界摸索前进。

Tensions between the LME and the market first erupted over warehousing and the appearance of large queues of metal waiting to leave storage — which led to the LME aluminium price falling badly out of sync with the prevailing physical market. This matters because globally accepted reference prices are the jewel in the LME’s crown. Sensing an opportunity, New York’s CME Group launched its own physical premium contracts to try and capitalise on the uncertainty.

LME和市场之间的紧张冲突首次爆发，是因为仓储问题和金属交付排队时间过久——这导致LME铝价下跌，与当时的现货市场严重脱节。这事关重大，因为全球公认的参考价格是LME皇冠上的宝石。位于纽约的芝加哥商品交易所集团(CME Group)嗅到了机遇，推出了自己的现货溢价合约，试图获利于这种不确定性。

The LME since followed suit but tinkering around the edges of the tried and tested contract formula with regional premiums is highly unlikely to succeed.

随后LME如法炮制，但是在久经验证的区域溢价合约模式的边缘修修补补，是不太可能成功的。

The LME’s reforms to the warehouse system appear to be bringing the problem under control. But again there has been a price to pay. More and more of the warehoused metal is being is shifted to (cheaper) private non-LME storage where it is more difficult to track.

LME对仓储系统的改革似乎控制住了问题。但是，这也要付出代价。越来越多的库存金属被转移到（更便宜的）非LME的第三方仓库，加大了追踪难度。

The other issue to feature prominently, and one which goes to the heart of the relationship between broker/members and the LME, is fees. The deal struck in 2012 was a cash lump sum for members in exchange for an increase in the cost of doing business in the future, as the LME’s new owners looked to make a return for its shareholders. That was pretty clear to everyone, so it was hardly a surprise when the LME jacked up the trading fees at the end of the moratorium period.

另一个处于经纪商/会员与LME之间关系核心的突出问题是费用。2012年的收购交易让会员得到一笔现金，交换条件是未来交易成本增加，让LME的新东家为股东提供回报。各方对此都心知肚明，因此LME在冻结期结束时上调交易费不应令人意外。

Yet there was still much wailing and gnashing of teeth as well as criticism that the LME was becoming too expensive a venue to trade. Out there in the shadows are (at least) two groups investigating the prospect of setting up a competitor exchange — taking inspiration from the fragmentation of the US equity market, where these days you are just as likely to find liquidity in a black box in the corner of a warehouse in New Jersey as you are on the New York Stock Exchange.

然而仍然有人痛苦哀号、咬牙切齿，批评LME作为交易场所的成本变得太过昂贵。在交易所外的阴影中，（至少）两家集团在研究建立与之竞争的交易所的可能性，它们的灵感来自美国股市的碎片化。如今你既有可能在纽约证交所(NYSE)找到流动性，也同样有可能在新泽西某个仓库角落的黑盒中找到流动性。

The LME has cut some of the fees, particularly in short-dated trades — essential to its particular date-trading system — and that has quieted some of the dissatisfaction. Will it be enough? That is difficult to say but one thing looks certain — there will be competition. Indeed a purely physical rival has recently announced itself ready to launch in September.

LME削减了部分费用——特别是短期交易（这对其独有的交易日系统至关重要），这平息了部分不满。这项措施足够吗？很难说，但是有一件事看起来是肯定的——LME将迎来竞争。实际上，最近已经有一家纯粹面向现货交易的竞争对手宣布准备在9月成立。

The next challenge for the LME will be to find more liquidity and volume and for that it will probably have to look to the speculative world of its parent’s homeland. That may upset some traditionalists; but then, we all have a time of our lives that we see as the ideal and look at with rose-tinted spectacles. In reality business does not stand still; change will happen.

LME的下一个挑战将是找到更多流动性和扩大交易量，为此它可能不得不把目光投向其母公司本土的投机市场。这或许会令部分传统主义者不安；但是，我们都有一段自己视为幸福的人生时光，如今会戴着玫瑰色的眼镜回眸。在现实中，商业不会静止；变化将会出现。