The case for the prosecution: George Soros, who is considerably richer than you, says China’s debts remind him eerily of the US pre-2008. The defence: people often say this sort of thing, and China always shrugs it off.

控方的理由是：比你富有得多的乔治•索罗斯(George Soros)说，中国的债务诡异地让他联想起美国在2008年前的情形。辩方的理由是：人们经常这么说，而中国总能安然无恙。

Sure, its borrowing generates remarkably scary numbers. With every flavour included — households, local and central government, corporate — HSBC puts debt at 249 per cent of GDP. Annual credit growth is 15 per cent, twice that of nominal GDP. Central government is obscurely entwined in much of it, backing state-owned enterprises and local municipalities.

没错，中国的借贷数据极为可怕。汇丰(HSBC)表示，若计入各类债务（家庭、地方和中央政府、企业），中国的债务与国内生产总值(GDP)之比达到249%。年度信贷增速达到15%，是名义GDP增速的两倍。为国有企业和地方政府提供担保的中央政府，隐晦地与很大一部分债务扯在一起。

But the defence has some strong points. Being much poorer, China has much more potential to grow than pre-crisis America. It finances its own debts, more or less: households lend to banks, who lend to corporates — the reverse of the subprime wheeze.

但辩方的理由也很有力。由于比危机前的美国穷得多，中国的增长潜力也要大得多。中国或多或少为本国的债务提供资金：家庭向银行放贷，银行向企业放贷——这与美国次贷危机的模式相反。

In contrast to the US, years of trade surpluses have left China with ample foreign reserves. Its capital markets are volatile, but nothing like the Wild West of runaway securitisation seen in the US circa 2008. Debt is still largely held on banks’ balance sheets. And those banks look safe enough. At 12.9 per cent, Industrial and Commercial Bank has a common equity tier one capital ratio in the same ballpark as JPMorgan.

与美国形成反差的是，多年的贸易顺差让中国拥有充足的外汇储备。中国的资本市场并不平稳，但不像2008年前后美国失控的资产证券化那么疯狂。债务基本上仍在银行的资产负债表上。而那些银行看起来足够安全。中国工商银行(ICBC)的普通股一级资本充足率为12.9%，与摩根大通(JPMorgan)差不多。

The defence wins. China is not pre-crisis America. Those who hear history rhyme too well are usually not listening closely. Although a country cannot indefinitely increase its debts twice as fast as GDP, predicting the nature and timing of the end is a mug’s game.

辩方赢了。中国不是危机前的美国。那些对历史回声听力太好的人通常听得不够仔细。尽管一个国家的债务不可能无止境地以两倍于GDP增速的速度增长，但预测其终点的性质和时机是毫无把握的。

A more pertinent worry is that China’s debt spigot sends credit flowing to unproductive places: inefficient SOEs, sectors struggling with overcapacity, property. This slows down reform, and the more debt, the harder the eventual move towards freer capital markets.

更值得担忧的是，中国的债务阀门让信贷流向徒劳无益的领域：效率低下的国有企业，艰难应对产能过剩的行业，以及房地产。这减缓了改革步伐，债务越多，就越难最终转向更自由的资本市场。

Don’t worry, HSBC says. The latest credit upsurge has gone into infrastructure, and property in areas where people want houses. Since 2014, Beijing has chivvied local authorities into swapping opaque shadow finance for more transparent municipal bonds. A heretical thought: China’s debt binge does not have to end in catastrophe.

汇丰说，别担心。最近激增的信贷流入了基础设施，以及那些仍有住房需求的地区的房地产。自2014年以来，北京方面敦促地方政府将不透明的影子金融转化为更为透明的市政债券。一种异端思想是，中国的债务盛宴不一定以灾难告终。