A thrifty Asian powerhouse saves and invests its way to economic stardom, inspiring admiration and paranoia in the rich world. The powerhouse begins to lose momentum, driving its corporations to switch their investment appetites towards assets abroad. But, lacking worldly experience, the corporations bungle. Billions in hard-earned national savings disappear down a black hole.

一个节俭的亚洲大国依靠储蓄和投资，一步步成长为世界经济明星，让发达世界既羡慕，又心生疑惧。当这个大国开始失去增长动力时，国内大公司便将投资兴趣转向海外资产。但缺乏经验令这些公司举步维艰。辛苦挣得的巨额国民储蓄就这样消失于黑洞之中。

Such was the experience of Japan from the late 1980s, when it snapped up trophy assets from New York’s Rockefeller Center to the Hotel Bel-Air in Los Angeles, for which a Japanese acquirer paid the equivalent of $2.3m in 2016 dollars — per room. Now, a quarter of a century later, China may be following the same script, to judge from today’s merger wars at least.

这就是日本在上世纪80年代末的经历。那时，日本企业在美国大肆收购“炫耀性资产”——从纽约的洛克菲勒中心(Rockefeller Center)到洛杉矶贝尔艾尔酒店(Hotel Bel-Air)。为了收购贝尔艾尔酒店，日本买家为每间客房支付的价格相当于2016年的230万美元。四分之一世纪后的今天，至少从目前的并购战中可以判断，中国或许已经踏上了日本当年走过的道路。

Exhibit A, until recently, was the commodity sector. State-owned companies bought up mines and oil reserves at the peak of the market, and have now lost their shirts. The theory of the purchases was that China, a commodity importer, should protect itself from rising global prices. But these same prices reflected the country’s unsustainable expansion. Far from hedging prudently, it was taking a leveraged bet on its own growth.

证据一：直至最近，中国的海外收购大多集中在大宗商品领域。国有企业在市场价格高峰时期收购矿山和石油资源，但如今已经蒙受巨大损失。海外收购的理由是，作为大宗商品进口国，中国应该保护自己免受全球价格上涨的影响。但这些价格同样也反映了中国海外扩张的不可持续。中国非但没有谨慎地进行避险操作，反而对本国的增长进行了杠杆式的押注。

Now comes exhibit B: Anbang Insurance Group. Founded 12 years ago as a provincial car and property underwriter, Anbang has recently barged into wealth management, selling precariously high-yielding life insurance contracts and more than doubling its assets in a little over a year.

证据二：安邦保险集团(Anbang Insurance Group)。作为一家成立于12年前的地方汽车与财产保险商，安邦近来已经进军财富管理领域，销售收益率偏高的寿险合约，并使公司资产在一年多的时间里翻了一番。

Laden with its clients’ savings, it has embarked on a wild shopping spree, spending nearly $2bn on New York’s Waldorf Astoria, promising $6.5bn for hotels owned by private equity group Blackstone and offering $14bn in a high-profile contest to acquire Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, owner of the W, Westin and Sheraton brands.

凭借客户的储蓄，安邦走上了疯狂的海外收购之路——斥资近20亿美元买下了纽约华尔道夫酒店(Waldorf Astoria)，承诺以65亿美元收购私人股本集团黑石(Blackstone)旗下酒店，并以140亿美元高调竞购喜达屋酒店及度假村国际集团(Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide)，后者拥有W酒店、威斯汀(Westin)、喜来登(Sheraton)等品牌。

Nor are Anbang’s ambitions merely American. The company is said to

（编者按：根据最新的消息，安邦已经在喜达屋竞购战中输给了万豪国际(Marriott International)。）

have its sights on trophy assets in 30 countries.

安邦的雄心并不局限于美国。据称，该公司看上的炫耀性资产遍及30个国家。

Anbang rationalises its empire building by invoking Warren Buffett, the American investor who parlayed an insurance business into a conglomerate with a market capitalisation of $351bn. But the comparison is as outlandish as Anbang’s expansion rate. Mr Buffett’s success is rooted in the discipline of “value” investing, seeking companies that are cheap relative to book value or cash flow. He focuses on his home turf and stalks his prospects patiently. He does not brag that “we must win the first battle and every battle thereafter”, as Wu Xiaohui, Anbang’s Napoleonic founder, has proclaimed.

安邦引用沃伦•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)的例子，来解释自己打造商业帝国的行动。巴菲特成功地将一家保险公司发展成了市值3510亿美元的企业集团。但这种比较如同安邦的扩张速度一样怪异。巴菲特的成功根植于“价值”投资的原则，寻求那些相对于账面价值或现金流较便宜的公司进行投资。他只专注自己擅长的领域，耐心地一步步实现自己的愿景。安邦创始人吴小晖有着堪比拿破仑的气势，他曾经宣告“我们不但首战必胜，而且每战必胜”，巴菲特没这样吹嘘过。

Anbang is only the most extreme example of a recent shift. This year Chinese companies have bid more than $100bn for foreign assets, a sum approaching the $106bn recorded in the whole of 2015.

安邦只是中国最近对外投资热潮中一个最极端的例子。今年以来，中国企业参与竞购的海外资产规模已超过1000亿美元，接近整个2015年实现的1060亿美元的收购额。

Inevitably, copious bidding is foolish bidding: the median Chinese bid last year valued the target company at 33 times earnings, implying a yield of 3 per cent. Given that investors could secure a higher yield with less risk by buying investment-grade corporate bonds, the Chinese were offering what fee-happy dealmakers call strategic acquisition premiums or, mockingly, “saps”.

不可避免的是，大量的竞购只能是愚蠢的竞购：去年，按照中国企业收购出价的中值来计算，它们对目标公司的估值为33倍的市盈率，这意味着收益率为3%。鉴于投资者可以通过购买投资级公司债券，以较低的风险获得更高的收益，中国企业提供了见钱眼开的交易撮合者所称的“战略性收购溢价”(strategic acquisition premiums)，简称saps，意为“傻瓜”。

Of course, some Chinese deals have proved successful. Lenovo’s 2005 acquisition of IBM’s PC business, derided at the time as a snake swallowing an elephant, turned out better than predicted. And there is a logic in Chinese companies marching up the value chain by buying western technologies and learning how to manage western brands.

当然，有些中国企业的并购已经证明获得了成功。2005年，联想(Lenovo)收购了IBM的PC业务，这在当时被揶揄为一场“蛇吞象”的交易，但现在看来，结果比预计的要好。中国企业相信，通过购入西方技术并学习如何管理西方品牌，可以让他们走向价值链的高端，这有其道理。

But much of the Chinese cash now chasing global assets is driven by political imperatives. In late 2014, in what looks like an unfortunate decision given the direction of today’s markets, China’s leadership decided to cool the appreciation of the exchange rate, to benefit domestic exporters, by encouraging its corporations to take money out of the country. Since these companies were still prohibited by capital controls from buying dollar bonds, they instructed a global army of intermediaries to snap up income-yielding property.

但如今，中国大部分追逐全球资产的资金都是受政治需要的驱动。2014年末，中国领导层决定通过鼓励国内企业投资境外，为升值的人民币降降温，让国内出口企业受益——从如今的市场走向来看，这似乎是一个令人遗憾的决定。当时由于资本管制，这些企业无法购买美元债券，于是他们指示一支全球中间商大军，抢购可产生收入的地产。

The risks in this strategy are evident. China’s executives are accustomed to economic growth of 9 or 10 per cent; they are inexperienced in countries where 2-3 per cent is good. The country’s high-flying businesses are mostly built on political connections — invaluable in China but of precious little relevance when buying US hotels. And, if they are venturing abroad for political reasons, Chinese buyers may not even care that they lack commercial ones.

这种策略带有很明显的风险。中国企业高管习惯了9%或10%的经济增速；他们缺乏在2%-3%的增速就算不错的国家经营的经验。中国这些雄心勃勃的企业大多凭借政治关系发展壮大，政治关系虽然在中国用处极大，但在收购美国酒店时并无作用。而且，如果他们的海外投资活动是出于政治原因，那么，中国买家或许甚至不会关心是否有商业价值。

Within a few years of the Rockefeller and Bel Air purchases, the Japanese acquirers offloaded them for less than 60 cents on the dollar. In all, Japan is thought to have lost $400bn on US property during this period. Perhaps, knowing this history, the Chinese will prove more prudent. Then again, perhaps not.

买下洛克菲勒中心和贝尔艾尔酒店没几年，日本买家就被迫将它们亏本出售。总的算来，在这段时期，日本据信在美国地产市场损失了4000亿美元。如果了解这段历史，中国企业也许会更为谨慎。当然，也许不会。