US penalties handed down on ZTE, the Chinese telecoms giant, are a reminder that despite January’s partial lifting of sanctions on Iran after UN nuclear inspections, they can still bite.

美国对中国电信巨头中兴通讯(ZTE)的处罚提醒人们，尽管在联合国(UN)核视察之后，对伊朗的制裁在1月已经部分解除，但制裁依然具有杀伤力。

Previously, the Bank of Kunlun, set up to handle oil for loans and infrastructure deals between Beijing and Tehran during the embargo, had been cited for violations. Chinese commercial and policy banks nonetheless were gearing up last year for legal business, supported by a flurry of official initiatives. China’s “One-Belt One-Road” outward investment campaign envisions a tenfold increase in Sino-Iranian economic engagement over the next decade to $500bn; Iran took a tiny 2 per cent founding share in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; and the countries discussed bilateral currency swap lines. However, the early optimism has evaporated as terms are worked out for handling contract arrears for $20bn in unblocked Iranian funds in Chinese accounts, and mainland banks, with their own worsening bad loan problems, come to grips with the severity of Iran’s financial system crisis flagged both by President Hassan Rouhani and newly elected reformist parliamentarians.

此前，昆仑银行(Bank of Kunlun)被列入违反禁运规定者名单。该银行的成立是为了处理伊朗遭禁运期间，伊朗和中国之间的石油换贷款和基础设施协议。尽管如此，在一系列官方倡议的支持下，中国的商业银行和政策性银行去年就在为两国间的合法业务往来做准备了。按照中国“一带一路”(One Belt, One Road)对外投资计划的构想，中伊经济往来在接下来10年将增加至5000亿美元，是现在的10倍；伊朗认缴了亚投行(AIIB)不到2%的初始股本；中伊两国还商讨了设立双边货币互换额度。然而，随着双方就如何处理伊朗资金解禁后，中方账户中的200亿美元合同欠款商议条款，以及随着自身坏账问题日益恶化的中国内地银行，逐渐理解了伊朗金融体系危机的严重性，最初的乐观烟消云散。伊朗总统哈桑•鲁哈尼(Hassan Rouhani)和新当选的改革派议员，都曾提醒人们注意伊朗金融体系危机的严重性。

Beijing faces new banking and trade competition post-sanctions from Europe, and from Asian rivals India, Japan and Korea, which have mobilised their own state and export-import lenders.

对伊朗的制裁解除后，中国在银行业务和贸易上面临着新的竞争，有来自欧洲的竞争，还有来自印度、日本和韩国等亚洲竞争对手（这些国家都出动了各自的国有银行和进出口银行）的竞争。

Iranian banks were reconnected to the SWIFT international payments network in February, and China’s ICBC has applied for both local and Kish Island free trade zone licenses. Iranian government-owned counterparts are reactivating their Chinese presence, and smaller private sector players like Bank Pasargad have announced plans for mainland establishment. Chinese fund managers have been regular visitors to the Tehran Stock Exchange, where the index gained over 20 per cent through February on doubled daily $100m trading volume and an average six times price-earnings ratio.

2月，伊朗的银行重新连入环球银行金融电信协会(SWIFT)支付网络，中国的工商银行(ICBC)申请了伊朗本土和基什岛(Kish Island)自由贸易区的经营牌照。伊朗政府下属的银行正在重启它们在中国的业务，Bank Pasargad等较小型的私有银行也宣布了在中国内地设立分支的计划。中国的基金管理公司近来是德黑兰证交所(Tehran Stock Exchange)的常客，在整个2月份，德黑兰证交所的指数上涨逾20%，日交易额增加了一倍，至1亿美元，平均市盈率为6倍。

However, Iran’s economy and banking system remain in a vice after sanctions relaxation, and their predicament has been underscored by lower oil prices and higher analytical scrutiny despite a paucity of current, reliable official statistics.

然而在制裁放松后，伊朗的经济和银行体系依然不景气。油价走低、以及更密切的分析性检视（尽管缺乏实时可靠的官方统计数据），更凸显出伊朗的困境。

GDP growth may barely register for the fiscal year ending in March, and a future rebound will not offset consecutive years of recession. Inflation remains in low double digits, an improvement from former 40-50 per cent levels, partially due to exchange rate stabilisation. The formal and parallel markets, respectively at 30,000 rial and 35,000 rial to the dollar, are scheduled to be unified in September according to the IMF, but the timetable has routinely slipped. Fiscal and monetary policies, which had narrowed the budget deficit with subsidy cuts and squeezed inflation with 25 per cent interest rates, were again loosened in an October “emergency” stimulus package. It earmarked $2.5bn for small business projects and lowered bank reserve requirements to 10 per cent, while offering discounted consumer credit lines for autos and housing.

截至3月的这一财年里，伊朗的国内生产总值(GDP)增长可能几乎为零，未来的反弹也无法抵消持续数年的衰退。通胀之前处于40%-50%的水平，部分由于汇率企稳，通胀如今有所改善，但依然处于较低的双位数。正式市场和平行市场的汇率分别处于1美元兑3万里亚尔和3万5里亚尔的水平，根据国际货币基金组织(IMF)的说法，两个市场将在9月实现统一，但这一时间表一再推后。伊朗的财政政策和货币政策在去年10月份的一项“紧急”刺激方案中再次放松，此前这些政策通过削减补贴减少了财政赤字，并通过实行25%的利率压低了通胀率。伊朗还为小企业项目划拨了25亿美元，将银行存款准备金率下调至10%，同时为汽车和房产提供优惠消费信贷额度。

Iranian banks, particularly the lumbering state-run giants that dominate, urgently need balance sheet repair in the view of the IMF’s December Article IV report. They are supposed to follow dated Basel I prudential standards, but the central bank lacks oversight and resolution powers and proper accounting and classification norms. Reported capital adequacy at around 5 per cent of assets is less than half of Iran’s Middle East neighbours, and the 15 per cent rate of non-performing loans is widely believed to be understated by as much as half.

根据IMF去年12月份发布的年度“第四条款磋商”(Article IV Consultations)报告，伊朗的银行，尤其是那些占主导地位、笨重的大型国有银行，迫切需要修复资产负债表。伊朗的银行须遵循过时的《巴塞尔协议I》(Basel I)中的审慎标准，但伊朗央行缺乏监督和决议能力，也欠缺完善的会计和分类规范。伊朗报告的资本充足率约为5%，这不到伊朗的中东邻国的一半，其报告的15%的不良贷款率被广泛认为低估程度高达一半。

Banks must pay off previous long-term deposits of 20 per cent plus and thus widely try to evade loan rate caps by punitive charges on business borrowers. The value of their non-credit portfolios, mainly in property, has also slumped and they are to divest these holdings over the next three years under new rules. The preliminary cleanup cost for the $450bn industry is likely in the $50bn-plus range. Basic banking law amendments, designed to update guidelines and bring unsupervised intermediaries into the fold, will be debated in the next parliamentary session. The lawmakers will also consider setting up a central bad asset disposal agency, and further debt market development after pilot issuance of sukuk Treasury bills in 2015.

伊朗的银行必须偿还此前超过20%的长期存款，因此普遍尝试通过对商业借款人收取极高的费用以规避贷款利率上限。银行的非信贷资产组合主要在房地产领域，这些资产组合的价值也大幅下滑，根据新规要求，伊朗的银行要在接下来3年剥离这些资产。对总值4500亿美元的伊朗银行业而言，初步的清理成本可能在500亿美元以上。基本银行业法律修正案将在下一次议会会议上进行辩论，这些修正案旨在更新指导方针，并将不受监督的中介机构纳入监督。立法者还在考虑设立一家不良资产集中处置机构，并继2015年试发行伊斯兰国债后加大债券市场开发。

The Chinese are closely monitoring these developments and have been cautious about deeper banking and securities ties since the Geneva agreement opening. They know local financial institutions are in trouble, and the absence of anti-money laundering and terror funding frameworks poses residual global penalty risks. Stock exchange-listed banks continue to lag the rally with earnings declines, and international fund launches have come exclusively from Europe despite a parade of mainland investors surveying potential.

中国正密切关注着这些动向。自关于伊朗问题的日内瓦协议达成以来，中国就一直对与伊朗加深银行业和证券方面的联系保持谨慎态度。中国明白伊朗本土金融机构深陷困境，而且反洗钱和反资助恐怖主义框架的缺失导致遭到国际处罚的风险仍然残留。伊朗的银行盈利下滑，银行股的表现仍然落后于大盘的反弹。虽然有大量中国内地的投资者对伊朗的潜力进行调查研究，但是国际基金的发行完全来自于欧洲。

Chinese ratings agencies have expressed interest in an initial sovereign assessment but demurred so far, like their big three international counterparts. Even with different creditworthiness approaches, quasi-sovereign banking liabilities alone will dictate low junk status until Iranian authorities sanction a wind-up programme on that sensitive issue.

和三大国际同行一样，中国的评级机构已经表达了对伊朗进行初步主权评估的兴趣，但迄今还在犹豫。就算使用不同的信用评估方法，仅准主权银行债务一点就能将伊朗划入垃圾级，除非伊朗当局针对这一敏感问题批准一项处置计划，否则情况无法改变。