Most investors have been able to muster only two cheers for the year that has just ended.

多数投资者可以为刚刚过去的一年勉强叫两声好。

In 2015, the performance of the main asset classes just about managed to maintain the broad pattern that has been seen since the equity bull market started in March 2009 but there are now definite signs of market fatigue. And although some major trends were obvious in retrospect — weak oil prices, falling euro, rising dollar, tumbling emerging currencies – they recorded sharp reversals that many macro investors failed to navigate in real time.

2015年，主要资产类别差不多保持了自2009年3月股票牛市开始以来的总体趋势，但现在明确出现了市场疲软的迹象。尽管回过头去看，一些主要趋势很明显：油价疲软、欧元贬值、美元升值、新兴市场货币大幅贬值——但对于这些趋势中所表现出的急剧逆转，许多宏观投资者未能很好地即时把握住。

Global equities returned about 2 per cent in local currency terms [1], less than in recent years. In dollar terms, returns were slightly negative and market peaks in May 2015 have not yet been re-attained. A top may be forming, but as yet there is little sign that a major bear market trend has started.

全球股票回报率（以本币计算）约为2%[1]，低于最近几年。以美元计算，回报率略呈负值。2015年5月达到的市场峰值未能再度企及。顶部可能正在形成，但目前几乎没有迹象表明，大规模熊市趋势已经开始。

Government bonds returned about 1 per cent, defying widespread predictions of a trend reversal, and yields were almost exactly flat during the year. Commodity prices plummeted by 33 per cent, continuing the crash that started in mid 2014, and they eventually took credit markets down with them. US high yield securities, for example, returned -9 per cent in 2015. Emerging markets (with the perplexing exception of Chinese equities, the best performing of the major markets) were also hit by the commodity melt-down and generally continued to under-perform developed market assets, in equities, credit and currencies.

政府债券回报率为1%左右，打破了趋势逆转的普遍预测，去年全年，收益率几乎完全持平。大宗商品价格下挫33%，延续了2014年中期开始的暴跌行情，并最终带动信贷市场随之下跌。例如，美国高收益证券2015年的回报率为-9%。新兴市场（令人困惑的是，中国股市成为例外，为主要股市中表现最佳的）还受到大宗商品暴跌的影响，新兴市场股票、信贷和外汇资产的表现总体上继续逊于发达市场。

Overall, then, the magic mix of moderate gross domestic product growth combined with extremely easy monetary conditions has continued to work in the developed markets. However, overall global asset market returns (bonds plus equities in local currencies, equally weighted) were only about 1.5 per cent, suggesting that some of the magic is wearing thin.

总体而言，温和的国内生产总值(GDP)增长和极为宽松的货币状况的魔力组合继续在发达市场发挥效力。然而，全球资产市场总体回报率（债券和股票，以本币计算，权重相等）只有约1.5%，这表明其中一些魔力正在逐渐消失。

Looking ahead, it seems likely that 2016 will, at best, see similarly low asset returns. That, anyway, is overwhelmingly the consensus central view among mainstream forecasters. But as the bull market matures, it seems inevitable that one year soon we will experience a major setback to asset prices. Will 2016 be that year?

展望未来，2016年的资产回报率充其量会与去年的低水平相当。至少这是主流预测机构压倒性的核心共识。但随着牛市成熟，我们很快将在某一年经历资产价格的大幅下跌，这似乎是不可避免的。2016年会是那一年吗？

The macro themes for 2016 identified by some of the major forecasting houses are summarised here. With a few outliers (notably, Citigroup, which expects a global recession in 2016), the themes are widely shared and increasingly familiar. This is not a new phenomenon: many themes work over time, even though they are well telegraphed in advance.

一些主要预测机构确认的2016年宏观主题总结如下。除了个别例外（特别是花旗集团(Citigroup)，该银行预计2016年会出现全球衰退），这些主题得到了普遍认同而且变得越来越为人熟知。这并非一个新现象：尽管很多主题被提前清楚的透露了出来，但它们会随着时间的流逝发挥作用。

Global GDP growth is expected to rise a little from the dip seen in mid 2015, but investors have now recognised the large decline in underlying productivity growth since the financial crash, and no longer expect any significant acceleration in the recovery.

预计全球GDP增速将从2015年年中的低点略微上扬，但投资者现在意识到了自金融危机以来潜在生产率增速的大幅下滑，他们不再指望复苏步伐会大幅加快。

The level of global output will remain just below trend in both the developed and emerging worlds, so there should be no immediate rise in underlying inflation. However, because commodity prices are expected to stabilise, forecasters confidently expect headline inflation rates to rise, taking bond yields up with them.

全球产出水平仍将低于趋势水平，发达市场和新兴市场都是如此，因此潜在通胀应不会很快上升。然而，由于大宗商品价格预计将企稳，预测机构相信整体通胀率将上升，这将带动债券收益率上行。

On the central banks, two main themes are identified by almost everyone. Global monetary conditions are expected to remain highly accommodative in aggregate. But there is expected to be further divergence between central banks at the “leading edge” (the Federal Reserve and possibly the Bank of England) and the rest. The resulting rise in the dollar is an old and successful theme, but one that is still much loved.

至于央行，有两大主题得到了几乎所有人的认同。总体而言，预计全球货币状况仍将极为宽松。但预计处于最前沿地位的央行（美联储(Fed)，可能还包括英国央行(Bank of England)）与其他央行的政策将出现进一步分化。由此带来的美元升值是一个古老且成功的主题，但仍备受喜爱。

Another widely anticipated theme is that growth in the emerging economies will continue to struggle, despite the fact that almost no one now expects a hard landing in China. Many point to the likelihood of credit deleveraging in the emerging world, but very few expect this to be powerful enough to cause a severe global downturn.

另一个人们普遍预期的主题是新兴市场增长步伐仍将较为艰难，尽管目前几乎无人预测中国将遭遇硬着陆。很多人提到新兴市场可能会出现信贷去杠杆化，但很少有人预测这种影响会强大到引发全球严重低迷。

These themes sketch an economic backdrop that would be moderately favourable to asset returns, a little like 2015 has been. But there are downside risks that could produce a much worse year. Three risks seem to be particularly worrying:

这些主题勾勒出的经济背景将对资产回报率略微有利，与2015年有些类似。但下行风险可能会令今年的表现糟糕得多。有3种风险似乎尤为令人担忧：

1. A more hostile Fed

1.更不友好的美联储

Investors seem supremely unconcerned about this risk, believing that secular stagnation (still a widely held theme) will stop the Fed in its tracks. But is the balance of risk correctly priced in this respect? The Federal Open Market Committee repeatedly informs us that it expects to announce four 0.25 per cent rate rises in 2016, while the market expects only two. If the Fed announces its next move in March (having skipped the January meeting), the market may suddenly wake up and pay attention to the likely speed of tightening.

投资者似乎非常不在意这种风险，他们相信，长期化停滞（这一主题仍被普遍认可）将阻碍美联储的加息脚步。但相关的风险平衡是否被正确反映到了市场价格上？联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)多次提醒我们，预计2016年将宣布4次25个基点的加息举措，而市场预测只有两次。如果美联储在今年3月宣布下一次加息举措（跳过1月会议），市场可能会突然清醒过来，关注可能的加息步伐。

The basic issue here is that the FOMC is far more sceptical than the markets about the secular stagnation hypothesis. The committee is more confident that economic headwinds will slacken in the next year or two, allowing them to shift interest rates upwards towards the rising equilibrium interest rate. If, as they expect, core inflation rises in coming months, they will be emboldened in this view. That would mean a bumpier ride for both bonds and equities.

根本问题是FOMC远比市场怀疑长期停滞假设。该委员会更相信，未来一两年，经济不利因素将减弱，使他们能够将利率上调到与逐渐上升的均衡利率一致的水平。如果就像他们所预测的那样，核心通胀在未来几个月上升，那么他们就会更加相信这种观点。这将意味着债券和股票市场都将经历更多起伏。

2. A Chinese devaluation

2.人民币贬值

This was the risk that really spooked markets in August 2015, especially when combined with the onset of Fed tightening. The fear that China would decide to export its deflation by devaluing the renminbi at precisely the same moment that US monetary policy was changing direction was enough to cause severe tremors. As the new year starts, investors have become more confident that they understand China’s new exchange rate strategy. This seems to involve greater flexibility for the renminbi against the (likely) rising dollar, but broad stability for China’s effective rate against a basket of currencies. In retrospect, it seems that this policy has been followed throughout 2015.

这种风险曾在2015年8月引起市场恐慌，特别是当时美联储启动了加息周期。投资者担心，在美国货币政策转向的同时，中国决心通过人民币贬值来输出通缩。这种担忧足以引发强震。新年伊始，投资者更加相信，他们理解中国的新汇率战略。这似乎表现为人民币在参考（可能）日益升值的美元方面保持更大灵活性，但人民币兑一篮子货币的有效汇率水平基本稳定。回过头来看，整个2015年，中国似乎一直在遵循这种政策。

The People’s Bank of China has now persuaded markets that it has no intention of devaluing the effective rate very far from the stable range that operated last year. But deflation remains rampant in the Chinese manufacturing sector, and over capacity is far from eradicated. A large renminbi devaluation would only be be used as an option of the last resort. But it represents a huge tail risk that would be the final nail in the coffin of the equity bull market.

中国央行现在让市场相信，其无意将人民币有效汇率下调到远离去年运行的稳定区间的水平。但通缩仍然在中国制造业普遍存在，产能过剩远未消除。人民币大幅贬值只会作为最后的选择。但这代表着一种巨大的尾部风险，它将对股票牛市造成最后的致命一击。

3. A credit meltdown in the emerging economies

3. 新兴经济体信贷危机

Credit growth is now slowing throughout the emerging world, and the cold turkey phase of the credit cycle could be very prolonged. JPMorgan economists have estimated that credit deleveraging could reduce GDP growth in the emerging world by 2 to 3 percentage points over the next three years, or even more if there are severe crises of financial confidence. This would be enough to slow global GDP growth by 1 to 1.5 percentage points. At the lowest end of that range, a global recession would become likely.

整个新兴世界的信贷增速现在都在放缓，信贷周期的停止增长阶段可能会相当长。摩根大通(JPMorgan)经济学家估计，未来3年，信贷去杠杆化可能会令新兴市场的GDP增速下滑2到3个百分点，如果出现严重的金融信心危机，下滑幅度可能会更大。这足以将全球GDP增速放缓1到1.5个百分点。在最坏情况下，发生全球衰退也是有可能的。

After 2008, macro-economists were shocked by the severity and persistence of the contractionary effects from the bursting of the credit bubble in the developed world. The relatively comfortable assumptions that are now being made to drive central forecasts for economies and markets in 2016 could easily be blown out of the water by a similar debacle in the emerging world.

2008年以后，宏观经济学家对发达世界信贷泡沫破裂所产生收缩效应的严重性和持久性感到震惊。现在为形成2016年经济和市场核心预测而做出的让人相对安心的假设，可能会因为新兴市场爆发类似危机而轻易化为泡影。