China is the world’s biggest economy in purchasing power terms but its secretive political system, unreliable statistics and restrictions on foreign investment make it one of the least-understood markets among global investors.

按购买力平价计算，中国是全球最大经济体，但中国隐秘的政治体制、不可靠的统计数据以及对外国投资的限制，使其成为全球投资者了解最少的市场之一。

This fact was on display over the summer as global sentiment on China swung from greed to fear in the space of just a few months. The bursting of an equity bubble was compounded by Beijing’s decision in early August to change the way it sets its exchange rate — a move many investors interpreted as a sign of panic and incompetence on the part of Chinese policymakers.

这一真相在今年夏天显露无遗，全球市场对中国的态度在仅仅几个月间就由贪婪转为恐惧。继股市泡沫破裂之后，北京方面又在8月决定改变本国汇率的形成方式，此举被许多投资者解读为一种信号——中国政策制定者既感到恐慌又无能为力。

The resulting global sell-off and currency market turmoil was largely based on a sudden realisation that the Chinese economy has slowed a lot, and is likely to slow even more in the future.

由此引发的全球抛售及外汇市场动荡在很大程度上是由于人们突然意识到，中国经济已经大幅放缓，而未来很可能进一步放缓。

For those who follow China, this is hardly news. Supercharged growth rates have been declining for several years, with annual real GDP sliding from 10.6 per cent in 2010 to 7.3 per cent last year. This year, the economy is projected to grow by a little under 7 per cent, its slowest pace in a quarter-century (although some question even that state figure).

对于那些关注中国的人士来说，这并非新闻。多年来，中国动力超强的经济增速一直在不断下降，国内生产总值(GDP)实际年增速从2010年的10.6%下滑至去年的7.3%。今年中国经济增速预计将略低于7%，为四分之一世纪以来的最低速（尽管有人甚至对这一官方数据都表示质疑）。

In simple terms, the Communist party is facing the consequences of the extraordinary measures it took in 2008 and 2009 to tackle the effects of the global financial crisis. At that time, China’s economy was reliant on the export sector, which not only provided external demand for its products but also drove domestic investment in new factories and infrastructure.

简言之，中国共产党正在面临其在2008及2009年采取非常措施应对全球金融危机影响而导致的后果。彼时，中国的经济依赖于出口部门，后者不仅为中国产品提供了外部需求，还推动了对新建工厂以及基础设施的国内投资。

When global demand collapsed following the Lehman Brothers crash, China’s leaders launched an enormous stimulus programme to pump up credit-fuelled infrastructure investment, particularly in real estate. That helped growth rates rebound quickly and propped up Chinese demand for a wide range of imports, from commodities to luxury goods — which in turn helped drive recovery in other countries.

当全球需求在雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)破产后大幅下滑时，中国领导人推出了一项庞大的刺激计划，以提振信贷推动的基础设施投资，尤其是在房地产领域。这帮助中国经济增速实现了快速回升，而且提升了中国对从大宗商品到奢侈品的各种进口品的需求，反过来也帮助推动了其他国家的经济复苏。

But the explosion in credit and the large number of unproductive investments resulting from the stimulus soon became apparent and forced the government to rein in the excess.

但信贷的爆炸式增长以及刺激计划导致的大量非生产性投资很快显现出来，并迫使政府遏制过度信贷。

For several years, Beijing’s stated objective has been to reduce the economy’s reliance on credit and investment and move to more sustainable growth, based on consumption and services.

多年来，北京方面公开宣称的目标一直是要减少经济对信贷和投资的依赖，转向基于消费和服务业的更加可持续的增长。

“We began the rebalancing process slowly around 2011-2012, and we are still in the early stages...Most of the issues, [for example] to get control of the growth in credit, haven’t really been resolved yet,” says Michael Pettis, professor of finance at Peking University.

北京大学金融学教授迈克尔椠艏斯(Michael Pettis)说：“我们在2011至2012年前后才缓慢开启再平衡进程，我们仍处于早期阶段……大多数问题——如控制信贷增长——还未得到真正解决。”

Mr Pettis says if China is serious about getting debt expansion under control, the maximum rate the economy will be able to grow in coming years is 3 or 4 per cent, far below Beijing’s target this year of “around” 7 per cent.

佩蒂斯称，如果中国真要控制住债务扩张的话，那么，未来几年中国经济能达到的最大增速将是3%或4%，远低于中国政府今年“7%左右”的目标。

“Every single country that has followed this growth model — without exception — has had an extremely difficult adjustment, with either very low or negative growth,” he says.

“每一个曾经遵循此种增长模式的国家无一例外都经历了极其困难的调整，增长率不是非常低就是为负，”他说。

“To me it’s absurd to assume China — which has taken imbalances deeper than any other country and had more rapid growth in debt than any other — will somehow be immune from this.”

“对我而言，假设中国能设法免遭这种境况是荒谬的——中国陷入不平衡的程度比任何其他国家都深，而且债务增速也比任何其他国家都快。”

Even those sanguine about prospects for the Chinese economy acknowledge that deep reforms, for instance overhauling the huge, inefficient state-owned enterprise sector (SOE), are necessary to keep growth from falling further.

就连那些对中国经济前景充满乐观的人士都承认，有必要通过深化改革——如彻底改革庞大、效率低下的国企部门——避免经济增速进一步放缓。

The government unveiled an SOE reform programme last month but critics argue it does not go far enough in breaking up state monopolies in sectors such as oil, aviation, telecommunications, electricity, health and education.

中国政府上月公布了一份国企改革计划，但批评者认为，该计划并未能打破国家在石油、航空、电信、电力、医疗及教育等部门的垄断。

In fact, some say the reforms announced so far are intended to tighten the state’s grip on many of these sectors and allow state companies to tap the private sector for more funding, without ceding any control.

实际上，有人认为，中国政府迄今所宣布的改革措施旨在收紧国家对上述许多领域的控制，让国企在不让出任何控制权的情况下利用私营部门获得更多资金。

“If we don’t reform, the Chinese economy may even slow to collapse. You could stimulate by printing more money but returns will get less and less,” says Tao Ran, a professor of economics at Renmin University in Beijing.

北京的中国人民大学(Renmin University of China)经济学教授陶然说：“如果不进行改革，中国经济甚至有可能放缓至崩溃。你可以通过印更多钞票来刺激经济，但收效将越来越少。”

Mr Tao does point out that, even in the absence of significant reforms, there is still a fair bit the government can do to stave off any collapse in the near future.

陶然还指出，即使在没有重大改革的情况下，中国政府仍可以采取许多措施避免在不久的将来出现任何崩溃。

Beijing has announced trillions of renminbi of new government investment projects across the country. Furthermore, in recent months credit restrictions and attempts to force deleveraging have quietly been rolled back, to help stimulate growth.

中国政府已经宣布了遍及全国、数万亿元人民币的政府投资新项目。此外，最近几个月，信贷控制以及强迫去杠杆化的努力已悄然放松，以帮助刺激经济增长。

As this feeds through into stronger activity numbers, the dismal sentiment among global investors will no doubt go into reverse in coming months as fear of China reverts back to greed.

随着这些刺激带来更强劲的经济活动数据，全球投资者的悲观情绪必将在未来数月发生逆转，对中国的恐惧又会重新变为贪婪。

But as long as the underlying problems of poor-quality investment and debt build-up are not addressed, any rebound is likely to be short lived.

但是，只要低质量投资与债务堆积的根本问题得不到解决，任何反弹都可能是短暂的。

“Perhaps we will see a Chinese version of quantitative easing and that will stimulate the economy a bit in the very short term,” says Mr Tao. “But I worry that if there is no reform, all we have achieved in the past 20 or 30 years will be lost.”

“也许我们将看到中国版的量化宽松，这将在很短时间内刺激经济增长，”陶然说，“但我担心，如果不进行改革，我们将失去在过去20或30年间所成就的一切。”