For many months, as dark clouds have gathered over the Chinese economy, it has seemed obvious that the authorities might be tempted to press an escape button that has been used by all the other major economies since 2008. That button is labelled “devaluation”. Yet, until Tuesday, this temptation was stoutly resisted. Premier Li Keqiang has never seemed particularly attracted to a traditional Asian devaluation strategy. Indeed, export-led growth is the reverse of the economic rebalancing that he has always championed.

一段时期以来，随着中国经济上空的乌云不断积聚，有一点看起来已经很明显，那就是中国当局可能会禁不住诱惑、按下那个自2008年以来所有其他主要经济体都使用过的逃跑按钮。这个按钮叫做“货币贬值”。然而，直至本周二之前，这种诱惑一直被坚决抵制。中国总理李克强对亚洲传统的货币贬值策略似乎从来都不是特别感冒。事实上，出口拉动型增长与他一直倡导的经济再平衡目标背道而驰。

China has now clearly blinked, and the renminbi has fallen by 4 per cent in two days. However, as so often in China, it is impossible to tell from official statements whether a major regime shift has actually taken place.

而今，中国显然犹豫了，人民币也在周二和周三两天内下跌3.5%（注：本周四人民币汇率中间价再跌1.1%）。然而，跟中国通常的情况一样，我们不可能从官方陈述中看出，一个重大制度性转变是否已事实上发生。

The PBOC is trying to describe the devaluation as nothing more than a tactical shift to allow market forces to work more actively, thus allowing the currency to enter the SDR fairly soon. But the PBOC has also warned that the short term market moves might be quite large. They may be seeking to dress up a deliberate devaluation in the clothes of a “market friendly” reform.

中国央行正试图将此轮贬值描述为不过是一种战术转变，其目的是让市场发挥更积极的作用，从而使人民币能够在较短时间内被纳入特别提款权(SDR)货币篮子。但中国央行也警告称，短期的市场波动可能会非常大。他们或许在谋求为一场蓄意的贬值披上“有利于市场”的改革的外衣。

If China really has pressed its own escape button, the consequences for everyone else will be far reaching.

如果中国真的已经按下自己的逃跑按钮，将对所有其他人都产生广泛影响。

Since 2005, when China first abandoned its fixed exchange rate regime, the renminbi’s real effective exchange rate has risen by more than 50 per cent, with almost a third of that rise coming in the past year. Initially, the rise was driven by a large trade surplus, along with controls over capital outflows. More recently, the rise in the dollar has dragged the renminbi upwards.

自2005年中国首次放弃固定汇率机制以来，人民币实际有效汇率已上升逾50%，其中近三分之一的升幅发生在过去一年。起初，人民币升值受巨额贸易顺差以及控制资本外流的驱动。最近的美元升值拉升了人民币币值。

But the impact of these market forces has been severely dampened by the operation of a daily “fix” for the exchange rate, that has generally limited the speed of appreciation. The permitted 2 per cent trading band around the “fix” has been enforced by currency intervention, buying dollars against the renminbi. The resulting huge increase in foreign exchange reserves has been the subject of bitter complaints about “currency manipulation”, especially from some in the US Congress.

但是，这些市场因素的影响一直被人民币汇率每日中间价机制严重削弱，后者总体上限制了人民币升值的速度。货币干预利用允许的交易区间（中间价上下浮动2%），买入美元，抛出人民币。由此造成的外汇储备大增，一直引发外国人（尤其是一些美国国会议员）极大的不满，他们指责中国“操纵汇率”。

This year, the direction of these market forces has changed completely. Large capital outflows have been triggered as confidence in the health of the Chinese financial system eroded, and the authorities have actually been forced to sell reserves in order to prevent the currency from weakening sharply.

今年，这些市场因素的作用方向发生了彻底转变。对中国金融系统的健康状况失去信心已经引发了大规模资本外流，中国当局实际上已被迫出售外汇储备以避免人民币急剧贬值。

Reserves have fallen by about $340bn since the peak in early 2014. This has resulted in an unintended tightening in the domestic money markets, which has been offset by reductions in reserve ratio requirements on the domestic banks. More cuts in the RRR are likely soon. But the PBOC has found it increasingly difficult to ease monetary policy as inflation has fallen and the economy has slowed.

自2014年初达到峰值以来，中国外汇储备已经下降了约3400亿美元。这导致国内货币市场出现了意想不到的紧缩，而下调国内银行存款准备金率缓解了这种紧缩。当局可能很快就会进一步下调存款准备金率。但随着通胀率的下降以及经济增长放缓，中国央行发现，要放松货币政策越来越困难。

With the IMF now saying that the long-standing under-valuation of the RMB has been broadly eliminated, it is hard to see why the Chinese government has been so resistant to breaking the link with the dollar. Indeed, any other major economy, facing the same circumstances, would probably have acted much sooner.

考虑到国际货币基金组织(IMF)如今宣布人民币币值长期以来被低估的状况已不复存在，很难看出中国政府为何一直如此抵制将人民币与美元脱钩。事实上，其他任何主要经济体如果面对同样的情况，都很可能早就采取行动了。

Of course, there are considerations pointing in the other direction. China wishes to avoid any hint of “currency manipulation”. It sees no advantage in starting a genuine currency war. But it no longer has to manipulate the currency market in order to achieve a devaluation. All it has to do is to stop manipulating the free market, and capital outflows will probably take the exchange rate much lower. There will be complaints from the Republicans in Congress, but their case does not seem as compelling as it once was.

当然，还有相反方向的考虑。中国希望与“操纵汇率”撇清关系。中国并不认为发动一场真正的货币战争对自己有利。但它已不再需要通过操纵外汇市场来实现人民币贬值了。它所要做的就是停止操纵自由市场，而资本外流很可能会使人民币汇率降到低得多的水平。美国国会的共和党人将会抱怨，但他们的理由看上去不像以前那样令人信服了。

Nor does China want to lose control over a depreciating renminbi, in case that causes a crisis in the weakening financial system at home. But it is hard to see that happening: the reserves still provide almost unlimited ammunition for intervention if needed. China should be able to manage an orderly downward float if that is what it chooses to do.

中国也不希望失去对贬值中的人民币的控制，以防贬值导致国内日益脆弱的金融体系出现危机。但很难看出会发生这种情形：如果需要，外汇储备仍可为干预提供几乎无限量的弹药。中国应该有能力实现人民币有序贬值，如果这就是它的选择的话。

The new regime seems to offer that possibility. A crawling downward peg could develop, as the daily fix takes into account market forces, and the behaviour of the dollar against other currencies, which the previous regime largely ignored. But we have little idea how far, or how fast, China wants the peg to “crawl” downwards. The authorities are denying that this is a major change, but they would, wouldn’t they?

这种新机制似乎提供了这种可能性。由于人民币汇率中间价设定考虑了市场因素、以及美元对其他货币的升值行为（之前的机制对此基本上予以忽略），可能会形成一种缓慢向下的挂钩机制。但是我们并不清楚中国想让挂钩汇率水平向下“爬行”多远，抑或以多快的速度向下“爬行”。中国当局否认这是一次重大变化，但是他们肯定会这么说的，不是吗？

At one extreme, this could prove to be a very modest change, a bit like earlier episodes where the trading bands have been widened. Economic fundamentals, however, seem to point to the need for a larger adjustment. Last week’s exports figures were somewhat alarming, and Tuesday’s activity data for July clearly suggest a renewed slowdown after the recent bounce.

在一种极端情况下，这会被证实是一次非常温和的改变，有点像之前扩大人民币交易区间。然而，经济基本面似乎显示存在进行更大幅度调整的需求。上周的出口数据在某种程度上令人担忧，周二公布的7月经济活动数据清晰表明，在最近一次反弹后经济再次出现放缓。

If devaluation were to bring with it a higher inflation rate, that may be no bad thing for an economy mired in deflation. Other countries have found that the exchange rate is the most effective way of easing monetary conditions, and China is now signalling that the era in which it was the sole major exception to this general rule is over.

如果人民币贬值将带来更高的通胀率，这对陷入通缩的经济来说或许并非坏事。其他国家已经发现，通过汇率放松银根是最有效的方式，而如今中国正在表明，其作为这条普遍规律唯一例外的时代已经结束。

China will now probably want to eliminate a significant part of the 10 per cent rise that still remains from its real effective exchange rate increase since mid 2014. A catch-up of this type should not be described as a competitive devaluation, given the circumstances, but others might use the term. Only if China goes much further, driving the currency deep into undervalued territory, would that seem justified.

尽管有所下跌，但自2014年中期以来人民币实际有效汇率仍然上涨了10%，现在中国可能会希望大举消除这部分升值。鉴于这些情况，这种跟风贬值不应该被形容为竞争性贬值，但是另一些人可能会使用这个词。除非中国大幅加大贬值力度、使人民币币值进入被大幅低估的区间，竞争性贬值的说法似乎才成立。

Even so, any change in China’s exchange rate regime is bound to have important consequences. China’s willingness to allow its currency to rise alongside the dollar means that it has been a “sink” for global deflation, mopping up some of the deflation that would otherwise have been seen elsewhere. Other countries will now see their currencies tending to rise, not fall, against the renminbi, and that will add to declining price pressures in the US and Europe.

即便如此，人民币汇率机制的任何变动必定会带来重要影响。中国愿意允许人民币与美元一道升值意味着，它一直是全球紧缩的“蓄水池”，吸收了原本会出现在其他地方的部分通缩。现在其他国家将看到本国货币对人民币趋向于升值、而非贬值，这将增加美国和欧洲物价下滑的压力。

Markets have so far reacted to all this fairly rationally, pushing commodity prices and bond yields lower. A fairly large further devaluation in most Asian currencies seems highly likely.

市场对这一切的反应迄今一直相当理智，推动大宗商品价格和债券收益率下滑。接下来多数亚洲国家货币似乎很可能会进一步大幅贬值。

But the great unknown is the direction of equities in the developed world. On the one hand, the disappearance of the Chinese safety valve in the fight against global deflation is clearly a bad thing. But, against this, the US Federal Reserve might now delay its intended monetary tightening until December at least.

但是，真正存在巨大不确定性的是发达国家股市的走向。一方面，中国不再充当抵御全球通缩的安全阀，明显是件坏事。但是，针对这种情况，美联储(Fed)眼下或许会将计划中的货币收紧行动推迟到至少12月份。

In equity markets, it is the Fed that normally wins the debate.

在股市方面，赢得辩论的通常是美联储。