The outbreak of the first world war was, we are told, greeted with confidence and jubilation by the peoples of Europe. Something similar seems to be happening after years of economic crisis and political turmoil in Greece. A growing number of people feel that enough is now enough. The strident views expressed in these pages by the Italian economist, Francesco Giavazzi, **are shared by many in high office. Meanwhile, Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, accuses Greece’s creditors of “pillaging” his country.
据说，一战爆发时，欧洲各国民众自信而喜悦地欢呼这个消息。在经过多年的希腊经济危机和政治动荡之后，现在似乎在发生类似的事情。越来越多的人觉得，情况已忍无可忍。意大利经济学家弗朗西斯科•贾瓦齐(Francesco Giavazzi)在本报表达的尖锐观点，在高层引发了很多同感。与此同时，希腊总理亚历克西斯•齐普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)指责希腊债权人“掠夺”他的国家。

Olivier Blanchard, the International Monetary Fund’s sober chief economist, indicates that a deal might still be reached. But many are beginning to long to see the knot cut. Whatever game the Greeks thought they were playing, their government may now just desire an end to the humiliation. Similarly, whatever game the eurogroup may have been playing, it may now just want an end to the frustration. If so, Greek default, exit and devaluation could be fairly close.
国际货币基金组织(IMF)一向头脑清醒的首席经济学家奥利维尔•布兰查德(Olivier Blanchard)暗示，仍有可能达成协议。但许多人开始渴望看到割断这段“孽缘”。无论希腊人之前认为他们在玩什么游戏，希腊政府也许现在只想结束这种羞辱。同样，无论欧元集团此前在玩何种游戏，它也许现在只想结束这种挫败感。若果真如此，希腊违约、退出欧元区和货币贬值可能就为时不远了。
Would euphoria then last? I fear not. The assumption of some in the eurozone is not only that the Greek case is unique, but that the disaster those sinners so deserve would improve the behaviour of everybody else. But the currency union would also no longer be irrevocable. New crises will occur. When they do, confidence in the union would be less than complete after a Greek exit. The programme of Outright Monetary Transactions, announced by the European Central Bank in 2012, might need to be implemented, to calm nerves. But it could fail. Self-fulfilling speculation could force even more divorces.
那么各方的爽快感将会持续吗？恐怕不会。欧元区的一些人不仅假设希腊的情况是独特的，而且还假设，让那些罪人尝一尝他们应得的苦难，将会改进其他人的行为。但欧洲货币联盟也将不再是不可逆转的。新的危机将会爆发。希腊退出后，危机爆发时人们对货币联盟的信心将打折扣。欧洲央行(ECB)可能需要实施其2012年宣布的“直接货币交易”(Outright Monetary Transactions, OMT)计划以安抚紧张情绪。自我实现的猜测可能迫使更多国家退出欧元区。
Some argue that Greece at least would be far better off after a default and exit. It is indeed theoretically possible that a default to its public creditors, combined with introduction of a new currency, a big devaluation (accompanied by sound monetary and fiscal policies), maintenance of an open economy, structural reforms and institutional improvements would mark a turn for the better. Far more likely is a period of chaos and, at worst, emergence of a failed state. A Greece that could manage exit well would have also avoided today’s plight.
一些人辩称，在违约和退出欧元区之后，至少希腊本身的日子会好过得多。的确，从理论上说，对公共债权人违约，再加上发行新货币，货币大幅贬值（伴随稳健的货币和财政政策）、保持经济开放、结构性改革和制度改进，将有可能带来局面好转，但更有可能出现的情形是一段时期的混乱，最糟糕的情况是希腊沦为一个失败国家。如果希腊能够管理好退欧，那么它根本就不至于陷入今日的困境。
Neither side should underestimate the risks. It is also crucial to avoid the contempt so characteristic of the frayed nerves caused by failing negotiations.
双方都不应低估风险。同样关键的是，要避免谈判失败往往导致的蔑视情绪。
Fecklessness may be a grievous fault, but grievously have the Greeks answered it. As the Irish economist, Karl Whelan, points out in a blistering response to Mr Giavazzi, the Greek economy has suffered a staggering collapse. From peak to trough, aggregate real gross domestic product fell by 27 per cent, while real spending in the economy fell by a third. The cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance improved by 20 per cent of GDP between 2009 and 2014 and the current account balance improved by 16 per cent of GDP between 2008 and 2014.?? The unemployment rate reached 28 per cent in 2013, while government employment fell by 30 per cent between 2009 and 2014. Such a brutal adjustment would have shredded the politics of any country. (See charts.)
无能也许是一个严重的过错，但希腊人已经做出了惨烈的应对。爱尔兰经济学家卡尔•惠兰(Karl Whelan)在犀利回应贾瓦齐的观点时指出，希腊经济遭受了令人愕然的崩盘。从峰值到谷底，总体实际GDP下降27%，而经济中的实际支出下降三分之一。从2009年到2014年，经周期调整的财政平衡改善幅度相当于GDP的20%，从2008年到2014年，经常账户平衡改善幅度相当于GDP的16%。失业率在2013年达到28%，而从2009年到2014年政府雇员人数下降30%。如此无情的调整会撕裂任何一个国家的政治。（见图表）
Europeans are now dealing with Syriza because of this calamity. But they are also dealing with Syriza because of the refusal to write down more of the debt in 2010. This was a huge error, made far worse by the subsequent collapse of the Greek economy. Indeed, the vast bulk of the official loans to Greece were not made for its benefit at all, but for that of its feckless private creditors. Creditors, too, have a duty to take care. If they are careless, they risk big losses. If governments want to save them, their own taxpayers should be told to pay up.
欧洲现在与齐普拉斯打交道，原因之一就是这场灾难。但另一个原因是，债权人在2010年拒绝减记更多债务。那是一个巨大的错误，希腊经济随后的崩塌让这个错误更为糟糕。实际上，很大一部分发放给希腊的官方贷款根本不是为了希腊的利益，而是为了让无能的私营部门债权人全身而退。债权人也有注意义务。如果他们不小心，就可能面临巨额亏损。如果政府想挽救他们，这些国家的纳税人应当被告知要买单。
Greece has also already made significant reforms, including to its pension arrangements and business environment. But backtracking on such reforms would indeed be a huge mistake, as the eurogroup and IMF argue.
希腊也已实施了重大改革，包括对养老金安排和商业环境的改革。但就像欧元集团和IMF所主张的那样，逆转此类改革将是一个巨大错误。
Given all this, it is tragic that the breakdown might occur now, after so much pain has already been suffered. It is not too late to reach agreements aimed at promoting reform, minimising additional austerity and making debt manageable. That would also be in everybody’s long-term interest. The parameters of such a deal are also clear: a small primary surplus in the short run, a decision by the eurozone to pay off the IMF and the ECB, accompanied by long-term debt relief, and a strong commitment to bold structural reforms by the Greek government.
考虑到这一切，希腊在已经经受了这么多痛苦之后，现在退出欧元区是可悲的。现在达成协议（旨在推动改革，最小化额外紧缩措施，以及让债务变得可控）还不算太晚。这也符合各方的长远利益。这种协议的大框架也相当明晰：短期内实现小额基本预算盈余、欧元区决定偿还IMF和欧洲央行的贷款（伴随长期债务减免），以及希腊政府坚定承诺推行大胆结构性改革。
Whether it likes it or not (understandably, it does not) the European Central Bank is a central player. It will have to decide when it can no longer treat the credit of the Greek government as collateral against emergency liquidity assistance to Greek banks. If Greece cannot reach a deal on the release of funds, the ECB seems likely to cut the banks off. That would then trigger controls on withdrawals. This might be accompanied by a scheme for circulation of deposit receipts, or ultimately by messy introduction of a new currency.
不管喜欢与否（可以理解的是，它不喜欢），欧洲央行都扮演着中心角色。它将必须决定，何时不再将希腊政府的债券视为向该国银行提供紧急流动性援助的抵押品。如果希腊无法就纾困资金的发放达成协议，欧洲央行似乎可能会切断希腊银行的资金。这进而会触发对储户提款的限制。伴随而来的可能是一个存单流通机制，或者最终在混乱之中引入一种新货币。
Right now, however, the aim must still be to cool down and secure a deal. Yet, in the current mood of anger and recrimination, reaching one now seems ever more unlikely. That would not be the end of the story, however. Europeans will be unable to walk away. Whether Greece stays inside the euro or leaves, much the same challenges will arise. The Europeans would still have to admit that they would not get much of their money back; and they would still have to help avoid a Greek collapse.
然而，当前的目标必须仍是冷静下来，达成协议。然而，在目前愤怒和相互指责的气氛下，达成协议似乎越来越难。然而这并非故事的结局。欧洲将无法转身离开。不管希腊是否留在欧元区，同样的挑战仍会出现。欧洲人仍不得不承认，他们提供的很大一部分资金将收不回来；而且他们仍不得不帮助希腊避免崩溃。
It might be a relief to divorce a difficult partner. But the partner will still exist, even after this monetary marriage is over. Greece will remain strategically located and even inside the EU. Neither the Greeks nor their partners should imagine a clean break. The relationship will continue. It will just be poisonous. If, tragically, that fate cannot be avoided, it will have to be managed for a very long time.
与一位很难相处的伴侣离婚可能会让人解脱。但这位“伴侣”仍将存在，甚至在货币联姻结束以后也是如此。希腊的地理位置仍将具有战略意义，即使在欧盟内部都是如此。希腊及其伙伴们都不应指望干净利落的一刀两断。他们的关系仍将继续，只是这种关系将是有毒的。如果不幸无法避免这种命运，他们就不得不长期把握这种关系。