What is going to happen with Greece? Nobody knows. That does not mean nobody cares. On the contrary people care passionately, in directly conflicting directions. On both sides are participants determined not to concede. This impasse illustrates the folly of creating a currency union among sovereign states that lack common political institutions, powerful emotional bonds or strong economic similarities. The marriage is ghastly but divorce is scary.
希腊将会发生什么？没有人知道，不过这并不意味着没人关心。相反，有着直接利害冲突的两方都非常关注希腊，而两方都坚决不妥协。这种僵局充分展示了，在缺乏共同政治体制、强烈情感纽带或者高度经济相似性的主权国家中创建一个货币联盟是多么愚蠢。合则不快，分又可怕。
Greece is now on the brink of default. It owes 1.5bn to the International Monetary Fund this month; another 452m to the IMF and 3.5bn to the European Central Bank next month; and a further 176m to the IMF and 3.2bn to the ECB in August. Without a deal with the rest of the eurozone to release 7.2bn in the remaining funds from its bailout agreement, Athens will be forced to default. It has no other source of money. Its access to markets is closed. (See chart.)
希腊现在处于违约的边缘。希腊本月应还国际货币基金组织(IMF)15亿欧元，下月要还国际货币基金组织4.52亿欧元、还欧洲央行(ECB)35亿欧元，今年8月还要还国际货币基金组织1.76亿欧元、欧洲央行32亿欧元。如果无法与其他欧元区国家就纾困协议中72亿欧元剩余纾困资金的发放达成协议，希腊政府将被迫违约。它没有其他资金来源，而且也无法进入市场融资。

If a deal with the eurozone is not reached, Greece will default. The ECB would then reconsider the acceptability of claims on the government (be they direct liabilities or guarantees) as collateral for its lending to banks. Haircuts would certainly be raised sharply. The ECB would find it particularly hard to lend against collateral supplied by a government that has defaulted to itself. The knowledge that default is imminent has already accelerated a run on the Greek banks. Without a deal, therefore, banks will soon be forced to halt withdrawals.
如果无法与欧元区达成协议，希腊将会违约。届时欧洲央行将会重新考虑是否接受对希腊政府的索偿权（无论是政府的直接债务还是担保），作为向银行提供贷款的担保品。减记幅度肯定会大大提高。欧洲央行将会发现，很难接受一个对欧洲央行本身违约的政府提供的担保品，来发放贷款。人们明白希腊即将违约，这已经加快了对希腊银行的挤提。因此，如果没有达成协议，银行将很快被迫暂停提款。
The mood music coming from those engaged in these discussions is highly discordant. Alexis Tsipras, Greek prime minister, has accused bailout monitors of making “absurd” demands. On the other side are those equally determined not to grant concessions, foremost among them governments of member countries that have stuck to harsh commitments or are poorer than Greece. Meanwhile on the sidelines Jack Lew, US Treasury secretary, is reduced to pleading for flexibility, terrified of the consequences of another upset.
参与谈判人士发出的声音分歧极大。希腊总理亚历克西斯•齐普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)指责纾困监督人提出了“荒谬的”要求。另一边同样决定毫不妥协，尤其是那些坚持严苛承诺或者比希腊更为贫穷的欧元区成员国政府。与此同时，由于担心又一次谈判失败的后果，一旁旁观的美国财政部长杰克•卢(Jack Lew)不得不恳请双方拿出灵活态度。
It is not hard to see why it has proved so hard to reach a deal. As Goldman Sachs notes[no LINK available], the European authorities are negotiating on the basis of three principles: first, staying in the euro requires further economic adjustment by Greece; second, additional support must be conditional; third, external oversight is required to ensure compliance with those conditions. Yet the Greek government was elected on a promise to stay in the eurozone but without austerity, adjustment or external oversight. These positions are irreconcilable. Either one side gives in or Greece defaults. If Greece defaults, it will have a second round of decisions to make: namely whether to try to remain inside the eurozone, even without normally functioning banks.
不难理解为何达成协议如此艰难。正如高盛(Goldman Sachs)指出的那样，欧洲有关当局基于3项原则进行谈判：第一，要留在欧元区，希腊就得进一步实施经济改革；第二，额外支持必须附加条件；第三，必须实施外部监督来确保希腊遵守这些条件。然而，这届希腊政府之所以当选，是因为它承诺留在欧元区，但不会实施紧缩和调整措施或者接受外部监督。这些立场是不可调和的。要么有一方让步，要么希腊违约。如果希腊违约，它将需要做出第二轮决定，即是否还要努力留在欧元区内，即便没有正常运营的银行。
Reaching a deal is not in principle inconceivable. While the eurozone will insist on monitored conditions, it has some flexibility on which conditions to insist upon. But Greece is viewed as a serial backslider. Some — the government of Spain, for example — are terrified that concessions would strengthen the credibility of domestic radicals. Thus, trust and tolerance are both exhausted. Meanwhile, the present Greek government might have to collapse and another one be formed before the country can make concessions.
原则上来说，达成协议并非不可想象。尽管欧元区将会坚持对希腊遵守条件的情况加以监督，但对于坚持哪些条件它也有一定的灵活度。但人们认为希腊积习难改。有些国家（比如西班牙政府）担心，如果做出让步，将会增强希腊国内激进人士的可信度。因此，信任和忍耐都已消耗殆尽。与此同时，要想让希腊做出让步，恐怕得现任希腊政府下台，换一届政府才行。
So what might happen next? On the assumption that a deal cannot be agreed before midnight, so to speak, the Greek government will default, at least technically, and so the liquidity squeeze on the economy (and the recession) will intensify. The fiscal situation — already weakened by spending commitments, falling revenue and a weakening economy — would deteriorate further. This year, the primary fiscal balance (before interest) might be a deficit of about 1 per cent of gross domestic product, worse than the IMF forecast in April[NO LINK AVAILABLE].
那么接下来会发生什么？可以这么说，假如在午夜前无法达成协议，至少从技术角度而言，希腊政府将会违约，从而加剧该国经济的流动性紧张（以及衰退）。已经由于支出承诺、收入下降和经济疲弱而被削弱的希腊财政状况，将会进一步恶化。今年，希腊基本财政赤字（不计利息支出）可能为国内生产总值(GDP)的1%左右，比IMF今年4月预期的还要糟糕。
An important question is how to sustain the economy until either new agreements are reached or the Greeks abandon the euro. Adam Lerrick of the American Enterprise Institute suggests how liquidity might be sustained even if the banks were closed. Under his scheme, people would be able to use claims on deposits, to be called “deposit receipts”, in place of the euro notes and coins they would no longer be able to obtain from their bank. This would sustain spending in such a cash-dependent economy. These depositary receipts would be established as legal tender. Within Greece, therefore, these depositary receipts would be money.
一个重要的问题是，如何维持经济直至达成新的协议，或者直至希腊抛弃欧元。美国企业研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的亚当•莱里克(Adam Lerrick)提出了即便银行关门也能维持流动性的办法。按照他的计划，人们将能够使用被称为“存款凭证”的票据来取代他们不再能够从银行获得的欧元纸币和硬币。这将在一个极度依赖现金的经济中维持支出。这些存款凭证将被确定为法定货币，因此在希腊内部，这些存款凭证就是钱。
Under this proposal there would be a limit on issuance, since receipts would be backed by existing deposits, one for one. Greeks would still have to make external payments in euros. The value of depositary receipts — a sort of Greek euro — would float against the euro as the demand for the latter rose and fell.
按照这种提议，发行存款凭证将会存在限制，因为这些凭证将由现有存款一对一地支持。希腊仍将必须使用欧元进行外部支付。存款凭证（算是某种希腊欧元）兑欧元的价值将随着欧元需求的升降而浮动。
Such a scheme could cushion the Greek economy against a total collapse. It could also be a precursor to full exit, should a workable deal not be reached. Given the current political impasse, such an expedient may soon be needed.
此类计划可能让希腊经济免于全面崩溃。如果未能达成一项可行协议，该计划也可以为希腊全面退出欧元区做好准备。鉴于当前的政治僵局，希腊可能很快需要此类权宜之计。
It has long been my view that if a deal can be reached at all, it will take time. It will also require big concessions on both sides. But I believe that a deal should in principle be possible. It is also hard to exaggerate the significance of an exit — even of a country as small and annoying as Greece — for the euro project (however misguided) and so post-second world-war European integration. Once the euro is seen to be reversible, the economic forces driving integration reverse. Every crisis will become potentially lethal. The efforts of the ECB to eliminate exit risk will have been almost for nought.
我一直认为，如果真的能达成协议的话，也将需要时间。它还需要双方都做出重大让步。但我认为，原则上讲达成协议应该还是有可能的。即便是像希腊这样令人恼火的小国家，它的退出对欧元计划（无论它多么错误）的影响也很难夸大，二战后的欧洲一体化计划同样如此。一旦欧元被视为是可逆的，推动欧洲一体化的经济力量就会逆转。每一场危机都可能是致命的。欧洲央行消除退出风险的努力将几乎是竹篮打水。
This must be seen as a long game. All involved made mountainous mistakes in the run-up to the Greek crisis and again since then. To fail now would be to pile a new mountain of error on the old ones. They need instead to recognise and learn from those past blunders.
人们必须认识到这是一场持久战。所有相关方都在希腊危机前夕犯了大错，而且自那以来继续犯错。现在无法达成协议将是错上加错。他们有必要认识到过去的错误并从中汲取教训。