Many observers assume that China is on apath to become the next Japan -- a major economy mired in a multiyeardeflationary funk that deflates its global clout. And it's certainly true thatthe way that Beijing has been downplaying its debt problems is eerily reminiscentof Tokyo's public relations strategy from the 1990s.
很多观察家认为中国正在成为下一个日本——一个陷入多年通货紧缩泥塘的经济大国，从而削弱其全球影响力。而且中国对自己的债务进行轻描淡写的方式确实让人们想起了1990年代日本的公共关系策略。
But take a closer look at China'ssituation, and you'll realize a better analogy is South Korea. China.se xpanding effort to pile debt risks on individual investors is straight out of Seoul's playbook.
但是在对中国进行仔细观察后,你会发现中国似乎更像韩国。中国不断的为私人投资者增加债务风险的努力和韩国的如出一辙。

South Korea's economy crashed in 1997 underthe weight of debts compiled by the country's family-owned nglomerates. The government's strategy for dealing with the fallout consisted of shifting the debt burden toconsumers. With a blizzard of tax incentives and savvy PR, Korea shrouded theidea of amassing household debt to boost growth in patriotic terms.
韩国经济在1997年的时候在家族企业债务的重压之下开始崩溃。政府的应对方法中就包括了将债务负担转移给消费者。 在税收优惠和关公的作用下，韩国成功通过家庭债务的方式来促进经济增长。
That push still haunts Korea. Today, the country's household debt as a ratio of gross domestic product is 81 percent.That far exceeds the ratios in U.S., Germany and, at least for the moment,China. As a result, Korea has been particularly susceptible to downturns in theglobal economy, which is why the country is now veering toward deflation.
这种方式依然困扰着韩国。今天，韩国的家庭债务占据了GDP的81%。这远远超越了美国，德国以及目前的中国。所以，韩国对全球经济的衰退特别敏感，所以韩国现在开始转向通货紧缩。
Is China repeating Korea's mistakes?Granted, the specific of Beijing's economic strategy vary greatly and China's $9.2 trillion economy is seven times bigger thanKorea's. But the Chinese government's efforts to prod households to buy stocksand assume greater financial risks are highly reminiscent of Korean policy.
中国在重蹈韩国覆辙吗？显然，中国经济战略在细节上是多样化的，而且中国的9.2万亿经济规模是韩国的七倍。但是中国政府促使家庭购买股票和承担更多金融风险的努力让人想起了韩国的政策。
Beijing has been encouraging everyone inthe country, from the richest princelings to the poorest of peas ants, to buystocks. And China's markets have been booming as a result: Over the past 12months, the Shan ai exchange is up 141 percent, and the Shenzhen exchange isup 188 percent. Margin trading, which has fuel ed these rallies, seems to havejumped another 45 percent in May, to a total of $484 billion.
北京鼓励自己的人民购买股票,包括最富有的太子党到最贫穷的农民。所以中国市场开始繁荣起来：过去12个月以来, 上海证交所增长了 141% ,深圳证交所増长了188%。保证金交易在5月份似乎又增长了45% ,达到了4840亿美元。
Chinese companies have been the greatestbeneficiaries of these stock rallies. The higher equities are dr iven up, theeasier it is for companies and banks to issue shares and improve their debt situation. Compani es have raised $42 billion from share sales in 2015, on pacefor the busiest year ever.
中国企业成为了股票大涨的最大受益者。股票越是高涨，企业和银行就越是容易发行股票和提升自己的债务情况。2015 年企业已经从股票销售中获得了420亿美元,这是最繁忙一年的表现之一。
But who will suffer when stocks inevitablyswoon? Beijing is making a risky bet, by assuming Chinese savers will be capableof dealing with the burden of a stock market downturn. This strategy is morallyquestionable -- it's another instance of Chinese savers being set up to takethe fall for government policy, as they were during the hyperinflation of the1940s, and in modern times, when they faced strict limits on deposit rates.
但是股票低迷时谁将成为受害者？北京正在进行危险的打赌，认为中国人民能够应付股票市场的衰退。这个策略在道德上是值得质疑的——中国人民再次成为政府政策的替罪羊，正如1940年代的恶性通货膨胀那样，当时人们面临存款利率的严格限制，当然这种事情也发生在现代。
Moreover, it would be far easier forBeijing to bail out a handful banks and dispose of bad loans that areconcentrated at a few dozen companies, than deal with debts that aredistributed to households across the country. Increasingly, there are signs thata reckoning will soon be in the offing. On May 28 alone, Shanghai lost $550billion in market value -- a reminder stocks can't surge 10 percent a weekforever, not even in China. Why would the government want to risk thepossibility hundreds of millions of aggrieved daytraders heading onto the streets with protest banners?
此外，比起应对全国家庭所面临的债务，中国政府能更容易的救出一些银行以及处理掉主要集中在几十家大企业里的坏账。渐渐的，有迹象表明清算即将发生。单单5月28号这天，上海的市值就损失了5500亿美元——这表明股票不可能每周都上涨10%，即使是在中国也无法实现这一点。那政府为什么要冒当日交易者拿着抗议横幅走上街头的风险呢？
Korea isn't a perfect comparison forChina's present situation. Its household debt bubble was arguably an unintendedconsequence of a larger economic strategy; China's, by contrast, seems morepurely cynical. But in some ways, Korea can now be a rolemodel for Beijing. Seoul quickly acknowledged the severity of itstroubles in 1997, and it started letting some dodgy companies fail, increasingcorporate transparency and liberalizing its economy. China should emulate thatstrategy now.
对于中国目前的情况来说，韩国并非完美的比较对象。韩国的家庭债务泡沫是经济策略所导致的一个意外结果；相比之下，中国则更加愤世嫉俗的。但在某种程度上，韩国可以成为北京的榜样。1997年的时候韩国快速承认了自己所面对问题的严重性，随后韩国允许一些有问题的企业破产，提升企业透明度，并自由化经济。中国现在就应该实行这样的策略。
Unfortunately, Beijing's ongoing attempt toswap one debt trap for another speaks to a worrisome lack of political will.Rather than forcing inefficient companies to trim excesses, Xi is letting themescape the consequences of their actions. One year ago, Xi claimed "marketforces" would play a "decisive" during his tenure. For the sakeof normal Chinese savers, he should stick by those words and reverse hispresent policies.
不幸的是，北京不断的用一个债务陷阱替换另一个债务陷阱的努力说明了其缺乏政治意愿。习不仅没有强迫低效能的公司进行改革，反而让这些公司逃脱了自己行为的后果。一年前，习说"市场力量"在他的任期内将扮演"决定性"的角色。为了普通的中国股民，他应该信守承诺，并反转他目前的政策。