The San Francisco trial pitting Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, one of Silicon Valley’s oldest and most venerable venture capital firms, against Ellen Pao, a former junior partner who claims that she faced sexual harassment and discrimination, has forced an institution that prefers to remain private into the public gaze. Among other things, it has raised questions about how well John Doerr, its de facto leader, knows his own firm.
凯鹏华盈(Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers)是硅谷成立时间最长且最受尊敬的风险资本公司之一。该公司与其前初级合伙人鲍康如(Ellen Pao)在旧金山对薄公堂一案，让这家宁愿保持低调的机构受到公众的关注。鲍康如指控称，自己在凯鹏华盈曾遭到性骚扰和歧视（鲍康如案已于美国时间3月27日宣判，法庭裁定鲍控告凯鹏华盈性别歧视的说法不成立——编者注）。它引发的疑问是，凯鹏华盈事实上的领导人约翰•多尔(John Doerr)在多大程度上了解他自己的公司。

“It’s a partnership. Nobody really runs a partnership. We make decisions together,” Mr Doerr told the court last week. This is not how some of Kleiner Perkins’ women executives perceive it. It was “becoming more of a cult of personality, and each personality had its own brand”, one told Stephen Hirschfield, a lawyer that the firm hired in 2011 to investigate Ms Pao’s allegations.
多尔最近在法庭上表示：“这是一种合伙关系。没人真正按合伙关系办事。我们一起做决定。”凯鹏华盈的某些女性高管不这么认为。有人告诉律师史蒂芬•赫希菲尔德(Stephen Hirschfield)，它“越来越像是一种个人崇拜，每个人都有自己的品牌。”凯鹏华盈在2011年聘请赫希菲尔德调查鲍康如的指控。
If Kleiner Perkins crumbles because it cannot make a smooth transition to the next generation of partner-leaders, male and female, it will be a terrible waste. Ms Pao entered the witness box this week and the case has shown what the top venture firms clustered around Sand Hill Road in Silicon Valley need to worry about most.
如果凯鹏华盈因为不能顺利地转交给下一代合伙领导人（无论男女）而衰落，那将是一种可怕的浪费。不久前鲍康如进入了证人席，该案表明，集中在硅谷Sand Hill Road周围的顶级风投公司最需要担心什么。
An enduring partnership — what Kleiner Perkins called in a brief to the court “a family, with occasional disputes” — is of enormous value in venture capital. That is not just a useful marketing myth while rivalry flourishes behind closed doors. It has real, sometimes extraordinary, financial benefits.
一份持久的合作关系——凯鹏华盈在提交给法庭的辩护状中将这种关系称为“一个偶尔会争吵的家庭”——在风险资本中具有巨大的价值。它不仅仅是在营销时拿来用一用，结果却在私下里激烈争斗。它也会带来实实在在、有时异乎寻常的金融益处。
Venture capital as a whole, despite the urge among private equity firms, hedge funds and mutual funds to invest in technology, is a mediocre asset class. The money is locked up for a long time and returns have not been high enough to compensate. “Most venture firms are not very successful. The returns for the venture industry don’t even match passbook savings,” Mr Doerr said.
整体而言，风险资本是一个普通的资产类别，尽管私人股本公司、对冲基金和共同基金也有投资于技术的冲动。资金长期锁定，回报率也不足以让投资者获得补偿。多尔表示：“大多数风险资本公司不是非常成功。风险资本行业的回报率甚至比不上存折储蓄。”
But a few do very well, and carry on doing well across funds and generations. Newcomers such as Andreessen Horowitz sometimes break into the top tier, while others fade away — the fate that Kleiner Perkins has to avoid. But Sequoia Capital, Accel Partners, Benchmark and others keep on going.
但有些风投企业做得非常好，在不同基金和代际间仍然表现出色。Andreessen Horowitz等新入行者有时会挤入第一阵营，同时其他企业则会消失——凯鹏华盈必须避免这种命运。但红杉资本(Sequoia Capital)、阿塞尔伙伴公司(Accel Partners)、Benchmark以及其他风投企业则会继续存在。
The gilded elite achieve returns that are “not just average but spectacular. The kind that are impossible to get elsewhere unless you strike oil or have a natural monopoly,” as Saul Klein, an Index Ventures partner, describes it. Outside investors vie to put their money into the most exclusive funds.[what is the source for this quote pls? I can’t find it - ib].
正如Index Ventures合伙人萨尔•克莱因(Saul Klein)描述的那样，其中的佼佼者实现了“不只是普通、而是惊人的回报率。那种回报率你不可能在其他领域获得的，除非你发现了油矿或者垄断某种自然资源”。外部投资者竞相将他们的资金投入表现最出色的基金。
Their success is due in part to the investing instincts of figures such as Mr Doerr, whose reputation was dented by an unprofitable bet on green energy in the mid-2000s. (“A tech visionary, he is constantly hunting for ‘the next big thing’,” was how the firm billed him to investors in 2013.) Partly it is due to insight — the operating expertise their partners bring to boards of the portfolio companies in which they invest.
它们的成功部分归因于多尔等人的投资本能——多尔因2005年押注于绿色能源没有盈利而声名受损（公司在2013年向投资者推荐时宣称，他始终在追求“下一个重大事件”，在技术领域颇具远见）。部分归因于洞察力——他们的合伙人带给所投公司董事会的运营专长。
Much, however, is due to network effects that accumulate over time. Especially in Silicon Valley, source of many “unicorns” — tech start-ups valued at $1bn or more — these firms offer their imprimatur to in-demand start-ups that could easily raise money elsewhere. When Mr Doerr testified that Kleiner Perkins was “lucky” to “win 80 per cent of the time” when it competes to invest, he was being modest.
然而，它们成功的最主要原因是随着时间积累起来的网络效应。尤其是在诞生了许多“独角兽”（指价值10亿美元或者以上的技术初创企业）的硅谷，接受了这些风投公司投资的初创企业可以在其他地方轻易地筹集到资金。当多尔证实，凯鹏华盈“是幸运的”，“在竞争投资的时候80%会胜出”，他这是谦虚的说法。
Venture returns have risen in the past couple of years, helped by initial public offerings by Facebook and Twitter, and exits including the $3.2bn acquisition by Google of Nest, the smart thermostat company backed by Kleiner Perkins. The annualised 10-year return for US venture capital reached 10 per cent in the first quarter of last year, according to a Cambridge Associates index.
在过去两年里风投回报率有所上升，这得益于Facebook和Twitter的首次公开发行(IPO)，以及包括谷歌(Google)以32亿美元收购智能温控器公司Nest在内的退出——凯鹏华盈对Nest有投资。美国康桥咨询公司(Cambridge Associates)编制的指数显示，去年第一季度美国风投资本的十年年化回报率达到10%。
This still means investors received only a modest premium above the S&P 500’s 7.4 per cent annualised return over 10 years. That is not enough to compensate for illiquidity, according to Diane Mulcahy, director of private equity at the Kauffman Foundation.[was this in her 2012 report? if so think we should link to it] But plenty want to invest in Uber, or one of the other late-stage companies now raising hundreds of millions in capital.
然而这只不过意味着，投资者收到的回报率只比标普500指数十年间7.4%的年化回报率稍高一些。考夫曼基金会(Kauffman Foundation)私人股本主管黛安娜•马尔卡希(Diane Mulcahy)表示，这不足以补偿资金的流动性不足。但是许多人希望投资于Uber，或者其他现在筹集了数亿资本的晚期公司中的某一家。
The rush into what Bill Gurley, a partner of Benchmark, has called “the most crowded party that’s ever been thrown” further raises the value of partnerships that specialise in early stage investment — what venture capital is, or should be, about. There is no point in enlarging such funds, small investments are enough, and the leading firms have scaled recent funds back.
仓促进入Benchmark合伙人比尔•格利(Bill Gurley)所称的“有史以来人数最多的聚会”，进一步提升了致力于早期投资的合伙关系的价值——这种合伙关系与或者说应该与风投资本有关。扩大此类基金规模没有意义，小规模投资就足够了，主要公司已经削减了近期发行基金的规模。
This is a young industry. Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia were both founded in 1972 and are among the oldest of the leading firms. Combine that with the length it takes for early stage investments to reach maturity, often 10 to 15 years, and venture capital is barely into its third generation.
这是一个年轻的行业。凯鹏华盈和红杉资本(Sequoia)全都成立于1972年，就已经进入创立时间最长的风投公司之列。再加上早期投资的到期日通常为10到15年，风投资本很难传递至第三代。
So the capacity to bequeath a firm’s knowledge and brand value is highly valuable. Kleiner Perkins managed to pass its leadership from the original partners to Vinod Khosla and Mr Doerr (Mr Khosla later left in 2004). Soon enough, Mr Doerr will need to deliver his own succession.
因此传递一家公司的知识和品牌价值的能力非常重要。凯鹏华盈成功地将其领导权从最初的合伙人传递至维诺德•科斯拉(Vinod Khosla)和多尔（科斯拉后来在2004年离职）。多尔很快也需要宣布他自己的接班人。
The Pao case indicates what he is up against. Venture firms have to cultivate forceful individuals among their top partners — those who follow the crowd will be poor investors — yet remain a collective with a single, enduring name. The financial incentive to co-operate is very strong but it contends with rivalry, ruthlessness, and other misbehaviour.
鲍康如案表明他正面临困境。风投公司不得不在它们的高级合伙人当中培养具有独立主见的个人——那些随大流的人将是糟糕的投资者——然而风投依然是一个有着长期单一名称的集体。采取合伙制有着很强的财务动机，但合伙企业必须应对争斗、无情以及其他不当行为。