Beijing might seem the obvious choice. But given the political sensitivities surrounding the bank’s formation, it may seek to alleviate fears of Sinocentrism and opt for a neutral, regional destination. A similar calculation resulted in the decision by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) – in which Japan is the largest shareholder – to pitch its regional headquarters in Manila.
北京似乎是个显而易见的选择。但是，考虑到围绕该行成立的政治敏感性，亚投行也许会力图缓解外界对中国中心论(Sinocentrism)的恐惧而选择一个中立的地区性地点。亚洲开发银行(ADB)——日本是该行最大的出资国——决定将其地区总部设在马尼拉，就是出于类似的考虑。

Southeast Asia would appear logical in this regard, given both its strategic significance and its rapidly growing regional economies that remain simultaneously infrastructure deficient. In late 2014, senior members of the new Joko Widodo-led Indonesian government traveled to Beijing to lobby for the bank’s headquarters in Jakarta.
就这一点来看，并鉴于东南亚具有战略重要性、该地区经济体发展迅速而基础设施仍然不足，印度尼西亚呼吁亚投行将总部设在东南亚看上去合乎逻辑。2014年底，佐科•维多多(Joko Widodo)领导的新一届印尼政府的高级官员出访北京，就亚投行将总部设立在雅加达进行游说。
In some ways, Indonesia may seem a perfect choice. It is one of the region’s largest markets, has huge infrastructure requirements, and is geopolitically neutral, in relative terms. Indeed, at a time when Japan and US regional influence is increasing– Japan is soon set to sign a defense pact with Indonesia, while its conglomerates have been pumping investment into the economy –it is arguably in China’s interest to engage the de facto leader of the Asean grouping, particularly with growing calls within the region to adopt common policies towards China.
在某些方面，印尼或许看似一种完美的选择。印尼是东南亚最大的市场之一，拥有庞大的基础设施需求，在地缘政治上保持中立。事实上，在当下日本和美国在这个地区的影响力日益加大之际（日本很快将与印尼签署一项国防合作协议，同时日本财团正不断加大对印尼经济的投资），拉拢印尼这个东盟的实际领导国，可以说是符合中国利益的，特别是在东南亚采取共同对华政策的呼声日益高涨的情况下。
Chinese investment interest in Indonesian infrastructure is already well established and growing. Given the cheap price of coal and their existing cost advantages, Chinese companies are likely to win contracts in the country’s ambitious build-out of new power capacity, even despite the poor track record of previous Chinese participation in this space. The lower oil price environment also arguably benefits Chinese players in upstream extractive industries.
中国对投资印尼基础设施的兴趣早已产生并日渐浓厚。印尼正在雄心勃勃地增建新的发电厂，鉴于低廉的煤炭价格及它们当前的成本优势，即便中国参与该地区投资有着糟糕的过往，中国企业也很可能拿下合同。油价下滑对上游采掘业的中国企业也可以说是个利好因素。
Ports are another major potential investment sector. Unlike the island of Sri Lanka, where a major planned Chinese port investment was frozen following the change of president, Indonesia desperately needs greater investment to upgrade ports, to reduce logistics costs across a sprawling archipelago of over 17,000 islands. The government has a plan to build or upgrade 24 ports, particularly connecting eastern Indonesia, which might be beneficial for Chinese companies both from a commercial and strategic perspective (it arguably offers another route for international cargo to bypass the Straits of Malacca).
港口是另一个潜在的主要投资领域。与斯里兰卡岛不同（该国总统更迭后，中方一个规划中的大型港口投资项目被冻结），印尼是一片由逾1.7万座岛屿组成的广阔群岛，它亟需大规模投资来进行港口升级，以减少岛屿间的物流成本。印尼政府计划修建或升级24个港口，特别是连接印尼东部的港口，这从商业和战略角度或许都有利于中国企业（有可能会提供一条无须途径马六甲海峡的国际海运航线）。
Moreover, unlike Bangkok and Manila, which already have the United Nations and ADB, Jakarta does not currently host the regional office of any major multilateral institution. As one of the world’s largest cities (potentially the largest within a decade), it itself is a reflection of the significant long-term challenges of urbanisation in Asia.
此外，不同于分别作为联合国(UN)亚洲总部和亚开行总部地点的曼谷和马尼拉，雅加达目前不是任何大型多边机构的地区办事处所在地。作为世界上最大的城市之一（很可能在十年内成为最大城市），雅加达本身就反映了亚洲城市化进程面临的种种重大长期挑战。
Nonetheless, Jakarta’s chronic urban and transport congestion, and lack of available space in central areas are arguably a deterrent to an AIIB headquarters. Unlike the ADB, which was founded in Manila nearly 50 years ago, and the entire city of Ortigas in metro Manila developed around it – the hectic pace of urbanisation in Jakarta and notoriously difficult land acquisition procedures make a potential replication of the ADB model a challenge.
话虽如此，但雅加达的两大顽疾——交通拥堵以及市中心可用空间紧缺，可能会阻碍其成为亚投行总部所在地。亚开行近50年前成立于马尼拉，马尼拉大都会(Metro Manila)的Ortigas市整个城市都是围绕亚开行总部发展而来。与马尼拉不同，雅加达的城市化过程混乱，征地流程也出了名地费劲，使得其很难复制亚开行的模式。
Somewhere closer to home?
找个离本土更近的地方？
Arguably, three other potential candidates in the East Asian region include Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Hong Kong/Shenzhen. Bangkok is already a sizable regional hub in its own right, with a government that is friendly towards China, and which could serve as a springboard for major ongoing infrastructure investments in the greater Mekong region.
东亚地区潜在的候选城市可能还有三个：曼谷、吉隆坡以及香港（或深圳）。曼谷本身已经是具有相当规模的地区枢纽，且该国政府对华友好，这里也可以作为大湄公河流域正在进行的大规模基础设施投资的跳板。
The same is also true somewhat of Malaysia, which also has higher livability standards for staff – although Malaysia’s comparatively advanced economy itself is generally not in dire need of new infrastucture. Nevertheless, Malaysia also has a particularly high standard of English, which would enable AIIB and its participants to engage in bilingual or predominantly English-language medium, as in the ADB.
从某种程度而言，马来西亚的情况也一样，且对工作人员来说这里有着更适宜的生活条件，不过马来西亚经济相对发达，本身总体上对新基础设施没有迫切需求。尽管如此，马来西亚还具备极高的英语水平，这会使亚投行及其参与方可以使用双语或主要用英语来沟通，就像亚开行一样。
Closer to home, however, one less-considered option is Hong Kong and/or Shenzhen. Indeed, Hong Kong is also a global city with world-class infrastructure, and where the setup of AIIB would come with much fewer political undertones given that it is on home soil. It would also allow AIIB to appear both global and domestic at the same time.
离本土更近但较不被看好的一个选择是香港和（或）深圳。的确，香港也是一座拥有世界一流基础设施的全球化城市，而且鉴于香港就在中国，把亚投行总部设立在香港带来的政治暗流会少得多。这也会让亚投行同时具有全球化和本土化的形象。
It also potentially dovetails with the broader aim of local regional governments in the Pearl River Delta to expand Hong Kong’s “window to the world” status to other parts of Guangdong. The massive Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai bridge now well underway, while there are growing visa exemptions for foreign visitors to Shenzhen and Guangdong, and the Hong Kong government’s determination to expand its regional hub status exemplified by the controversial recent decision to build a third runway at Hong Kong International Airport.
这可能也与珠三角地方政府希望把香港的“世界之窗”地位扩大至广东其他地区的整体目标相契合。珠港澳大桥早已开工，同时与中国互免签证的国家日益增加使得越来越多的外国游客可以来到深圳和广东，而且香港政府最近做出兴建香港国际机场(Hong Kong International Airport)第三跑道的争议性决定，从中可见其扩大地区枢纽地位的决心。
Space and other constraints are also potential issues for Hong Kong too, however. Available land for a big headquarters in Hong Kong is limited, while the capacity of an already-stretched local economy to cater to such a project could potentially be questioned. The same would also be true of Singapore, were it ever to be considered.
不过，空间及其他限制条件也是香港面临的潜在问题。在香港建设一处大型总部的可用土地十分有限，同时香港经济已然不堪重负，其承载这样一个项目的能力可能会受到质疑。新加坡也是一样，尽管它并未在考虑之内。
Or somewhere way out west?
或者远赴西边某地？
Regional cities such as Delhi, Hanoi, Manila, Seoul are likely unpalatable political choices either for Beijing or for the host countries themselves. However, another potential option would be to consider a location in west or southwest Asia.
无论是对北京还是对东道国本身来说，诸如德里、河内、马尼拉和首尔之类的地区性城市很可能都是难以下咽的政治选择。然而，另一种潜在选项可能是考虑设在西亚或西南亚的某个地点。
This could potentially serve several purposes, commercial and strategic. It could consolidate AIIB’s status as a global player, as opposed to merely a regional one. In turn, it could also encourage greater financial commitments from European countries, who despite their relative absence in the ADB are increasingly keen to join. European companies and multilaterals such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also have greater experience implementing project finance in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA), relative to East Asia and the Pacific.
这种选择有可能会在商业和战略上满足一些目的。它可能会强化亚投行作为一个国际机构（而不仅仅是一个区域性机构）的地位，还可能反过来鼓励欧洲国家承担更大出资额，这些国家尽管在亚开行出资额相对较少，但现在愈发热衷于加入亚投行。相对于东亚和太平洋地区，欧洲的企业和多边机构（比如欧洲复兴开发银行(EBRD)）在欧洲、中东和非洲地区(EMEA)还拥有更丰富的项目融资实施经验。
Indeed, serving as a springboard for infrastructure developments in the Middle East and Africa could also be easier politically, where the relative competition from western and Japanese soft power is lower, and where infrastructure requirements also very high. It could help buoy growing enthusiasm for the concept of a “Eurasian economy”, connecting the Middle East with southwest and Central Asia, and with western China.
事实上，选择一个可以作为在中东和非洲发展基础设施跳板的地点，在政治上可能也更容易实现。西方和日本的软实力在这里的竞争相对缓和，而且这里的基础设施需求也非常高。这个选择可能有助于支撑起对“欧亚经济体(Eurasian economy)”概念日益高涨的热情，在中东与西南亚、中亚以及中国西部地区之间建立连接。
Of course, any future decision on the headquarters would also depend on the proportional financing commitments from other shareholders in AIIB, with China encouraging significant contributions from other potential member countries. It will also depend on the model through which Chinese companies/institutions and their foreign counterparts to implement project finance, and to what extent this model may differ from the current norm at institutions like ADB and the World Bank.
当然，未来对总部地点的决定也会取决于亚投行各股东国承担的出资比例，中国鼓励其他潜在的成员国多出资。这个决定还将取决于中国和外国的企业或机构实施项目融资的模式，以及这种模式可能在何种程度上异于亚开行和世界银行等机构目前的惯例。