Maximum austerity and minimum reform have been the outcome of the Greek crisis so far. The fiscal and external adjustments have been painful. But the changes to a polity and economy riddled with clientelism and corruption have been modest. This is the worst of both worlds. The Greek people have suffered, but in vain. They are poorer than they thought they were. But a more productive Greece has failed to emerge. Now, after the election of the Syriza government, a forced Greek exit from the eurozone seems more likely than a productive new deal. But it is not too late. Everybody needs to take a deep breath.
迄今为止，希腊危机只带来了最大程度的紧缩和最小程度的改革。财政调整和外部调整令人痛苦。然而对充斥着裙带关系和腐败的政治体制和经济的改革却不痛不痒。两方面都落得了最糟糕的结果。希腊人民深受其苦，却徒劳无益。现在他们比他们过去认为的更贫穷。希腊却并未变得更有效率。现在，在希腊激进左翼联盟(Syriza)政府上台之后，希腊被迫退出欧元区似乎比达成富有成效的新协议更有可能发生。但现在还不晚。每个人都需要深吸一口气。

The beginning of the new government has been predictably bumpy. Many of its domestic announcements indicate backsliding on reforms, notably over labour market reform and public-sector employment. Alexis Tsipras, the prime minister, and Yanis Varoufakis, the finance minister, have ruffled feathers in the way they have made their case for a new approach. Telling their partners that they would no longer deal with the “troika” — the group representing the European Commission, the European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund — caused offence. It is also puzzling that the finance minister thought it wise to announce ideas for debt restructuring in London, the capital of a nation of bystanders.
可以预见，希腊新一届政府的开端将是坎坷的。政府对内宣布的许多事项，表明希腊的改革即将倒退，尤其是针对劳动力市场和公共部门就业的改革。希腊总理亚历克西斯•齐普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)和财长亚尼斯•瓦鲁法基斯(Yanis Varoufakis)对新策略的阐述已经引起了外界的愤怒。原因是，他们告诉伙伴国，希腊将不再与“三驾马车”——欧盟委员会(European Commission)、欧洲央行(ECB)和国际货币基金组织(IMF)——协商。希腊财长认为在惯于置身事外的英国的首都——伦敦宣布债务重组方案是明智之举，这也令人不解。
More significant, however, is whether Greece will run out of money soon. Most observers believe that Greece could find the 4.3bn it needs to pay the IMF next month even if the current programme were to lapse at the end of February. A more plausible danger is that Greek banks, vulnerable to runs by nervous depositors, would be deprived of access to funds from the European Central Bank. If that were to happen, the country would have to choose between constraining depositors’ access to their money and creating a new currency.
然而，更重要的是，希腊是否很快就会资金告罄。大多数观察人士都相信，即使当前纾困计划将在2月底到期，希腊下个月仍有能力拿出43亿欧元偿还给IMF。更有可能发生的危险是，希腊的银行将被剥夺从欧洲央行获取资金的资格，而它们很可能遭受不安储户的挤兑。如果真的发生这样的事情，希腊只有两个选择，要么是限制储户提款的权利，要么是发行一种新的货币。
As Karl Whelan, Irish economist, notes, the ECB is not obliged to cut off the Greek banks. It has vast discretion over whether and how to offer support. The fundamental issue, he adds, is not whether Greek government securities are judged in default, since Greek banks do not rely heavily upon them.
正如爱尔兰经济学家卡尔•惠兰(Karl Whelan)指出的，欧洲央行并非必须切断希腊银行的流动性。在是否援助和以何种方式援助方面，欧洲央行有极大的自由裁量权。他补充道，根本性问题不是希腊国债在违约时是否会受到审视，因为希腊银行对国债的依赖程度并不大。
Far more important are bonds the banks themselves issue, which are guaranteed by the Greek government. The ECB has stated it will no longer accept such bonds after the end of February, the date of expiry of the IMF programme. If the ECB were to stick to this, it would put pressure on the Greek government to sign a new deal. But this government might well refuse. In that case the ECB might cut off the Greek banks.
远比上述问题更重要的是希腊的银行发行的债券，这些债券由希腊政府担保。欧洲央行已经声明，2月底以后，也就是IMF纾困计划到期以后，将不再接受这种债券。如果欧洲央行坚持这一立场，将向希腊政府施压，迫使其签订一项新纾困协议。但这一届政府可能加以拒绝。在这种情况下，欧洲央行可能切断希腊银行的流动性。
This game of chicken could drive the eurozone into an unnecessary crisis and Greece into meltdown before serious consideration of the alternatives. The government deserves the time to present its ideas for what it calls a new “contract” with its partners. Its partners surely despise and fear what Mr Tsipras stands for. But the EU is supposed to be a union of democracies, not an empire. The eurozone should negotiate in good faith.
在替代方案得到认真考虑之前，这场“懦夫博弈”就可能把欧元区拖入一场没有必要的危机，并让希腊陷入全面崩溃。应该给予希腊政府时间，让其阐明关于与伙伴国签订新协议的想法。毫无疑问，希腊的伙伴国对齐普拉斯代表的理念心存轻蔑和恐惧。但欧盟(EU)应该是一个民主国家的联盟，而不是一个帝国。欧元区应该诚心诚意地协商。
Moreover, the ideas presented on the debt are worth considering. Mr Varoufakis recognises that partner countries will not write down the face value of the debt owed to them, however absurd the pretence may be. So he proposes swaps, instead. A growth-linked bond (more precisely, one linked to nominal gross domestic product) would replace loans from the eurozone, while a perpetual loan would replace the ECB’s holdings of Greek bonds. One assumes the ECB would not accept the latter. But it might accept still longer-term bonds instead. GDP-linked bonds are an excellent idea, because they offer risk-sharing. A currency union that lacks a fiscal transfer mechanism needs a risk-sharing financial system. GDP-linked bonds would be a good step in that direction.
此外，希腊提出的债务解决方案值得考虑。瓦鲁法基斯承认，伙伴国将不会减记希腊欠他们的债务的面值，不论借口多么不合理。所以，他转而提出债务置换。一种与经济增长挂钩（更准确地说，是与名义国内生产总值(GDP)挂钩）的债券将取代来自欧元区的贷款，同时，一种永久债券将取代欧洲央行持有的希腊债券。人们认为欧洲央行不会接受后者。但它可能会接受长期债券。与GDP挂钩的债券是一个极好的主意，因为它们提供了风险共担。缺乏财政转移机制的货币联盟需要一个风险共担的金融体系。与GDP挂钩的债券将是朝这个方向迈出的令人满意的一步。
Many governments would oppose anything that looks like a sellout to extremists. The Spanish government is strongly opposed to legitimising the campaign of its new opposition party, Podemos, against austerity. Nevertheless, Greece and Spain are very different. Spain is not on a programme and owes much of its debt to its own people. It can justify much of its policy mix in its own terms, without having to oppose a new agreement for Greece.
许多政府会反对任何看起来像是在向极端分子屈服的事。西班牙政府强烈反对将该国新的反对党——社会民主力量党(Podemos)的反紧缩运动合法化。然而，希腊和西班牙有很大区别。西班牙现在并没有接受纾困，而且其多数债务都是欠本国国民的。它可以证明其政策组合对于自身的合理性，而不必反对一项希腊的新协议。
Two crucial issues remain. The first is the size of the primary fiscal surplus, now supposed to be 4.5 per cent of GDP. The government proposes 1.0 to 1.5 per cent, instead. Given the depressed state of the Greek economy, this makes sense. But it also means Greece would pay trivial amounts of interest in the near term.
两个至关重要的问题仍在存在。第一个是基本财政盈余的规模，现在普遍认为应该是GDP的4.5%。而希腊政府提出的是GDP的1.0%至1.5%。考虑到希腊经济的低迷状态，这有合理之处。但这也意味着希腊短期内只会支付极少数额的利息。
The second issue is structural reform. The IMF notes that the past government failed to deliver on 13 of the 14 reforms to which it was supposedly committed. Yet the need for radical reform of the state and private sector no doubt exists.
第二个问题是结构性改革。IMF指出，希腊上届政府未能兑现其本已承诺的14项改革中的13项。然而，毫无疑问，希腊依然需要对国有以及私营部门进行彻底的改革。
One indication of the abiding economic inefficiency is the failure of exports to grow in real terms, despite the depression.
经济效率持续低下的一个体现是，尽管经济不景气，实际出口仍未实现增长。
Indeed, Greece faces far more than a challenge to reform. It has to achieve law-governed modernity. It is on these issues that negotiations must focus.
实际上，希腊改革还面临更多的挑战。它必须实现实行法治的现代化。与希腊的谈判必须聚焦这些问题。
So this must be the deal: deep and radical reform in return for an escape from debt-bondage.
所以这场交易应该是这样的：希腊用深层次、彻底的改革换取债务束缚的解除。
This new deal does not need to be reached this month. The Greeks are right to ask for time. But, in the end, they need to convince their partners they are serious about reforms.
这份新协议不需要在本月达成。希腊人要求更多的时间是正确的。但最终，他们需要让伙伴国相信他们对待改革是认真的。
What if it becomes obvious that they cannot or will not do so? The currency union is a partnership of states, not a federal union. Such a partnership can only work if it is a community of values. If Greece wants to be something quite different, that is its right. But it should leave. Yes, the damage would be considerable and the result undesirable. But an open sore would be worse.
但如果他们不能或不愿这样做，而且这种迹象变得越来越明显，那该怎么办？货币联盟是一种国家间的伙伴关系，而非一个联邦同盟。这种伙伴关系只有在其自身是一个价值观共同体时才会发挥作用。如果希腊想成为一个另类，这是它的权利，但它应该离开。当然，破坏将会非常巨大，结果也不是人们想要的。但开放的伤口会更糟糕。
So calm down and talk. Let us all then see whether the talk can become action.
所以，大家冷静下来，好好谈一谈。至于谈判能否变成行动，让我们拭目以待。