Will the asset quality review and stress tests conducted by the European Central Bank and the European Banking Authority mark a turning point in the eurozone’s crisis? Up to a point. They are an improvement on what has gone before. But they are not a complete fix for the banking sector, still less for the economy’s wider problems.

GD EXCISEDThe optimistic assessment is that the ECB has at least done enough to mend the banking system. There are two things to be said for this judgment: first, the ECB has taken a close look at the quality of assets in the system; and, second, the “stresses” imposed in the tests are tough. They seem comparable to those imposed by the Federal Reserve on US banks. The ECB concluded that 25 institutions, nine of them Italian, would need to add a total of 25bn in capital. This number has already fallen to 13bn because of capital-raising undertaken this year.

Perhaps the most important possibility omitted by this assessment is that of sovereign default. This bears on a fundamental concern: risk-weighted capital requirements, on which the analysis is based, involve making judgments about the safety of different types of assets. This is especially problematic in the eurozone, where the lack of a unified fiscal backstop for banks means that national governments are responsible for rescuing troubled institutions. Moreover, the solvency of the eurozone’s highly indebted members is more doubtful than that of countries with their own currencies. Since a banking crisis would be even harder to deal with in the eurozone than elsewhere, it would be wise for its banks to have bigger capital buffers that stand a better chance of preventing one. This is particularly important when actual leverage is so much higher than the risk-weighted capital ratios suggest. (See chart.)

Fortunately, banks with the smallest amount of equity relative to actual assets are located in relatively solvent countries, such as the Netherlands, France and Germany. Nonetheless, leverage is 20 to 1 in Spain and Italy; 25 to 1 in Germany and France; and 30 to 1 in the Netherlands. It is question­able whether this is enough loss-absorbing capital.

High leverage also impairs the ability of banks to finance growth. A responsibly managed yet highly leveraged institution would seek to make heavily collateralised loans, against property, for example; or to hold highly rated assets. This is likely to militate against the productive investment the eurozone needs.

欧洲央行(ECB)和欧洲银行业管理局(EBA)进行的资产质量评估(Asset Quality Review)和压力测试是否标志着欧元区危机的转折点？在某种程度上的确如此。它们是对过去发生的事情的改进。但它们并不能完全修正银行业，更不可能完全解决欧元区经济存在的更大的问题。

乐观的评价是，欧洲央行至少为修正银行体系做出了足够的努力。这个论断有两点值得强调：首先，欧洲央行仔细审查了银行体系中的资产质量；其次，测试施加的“压力”是强大的，似乎可以与美联储(Fed)在对美国银行进行压力测试时施加的压力条件相提并论。欧洲央行的结论是，25家银行（其中9家是意大利银行）需要填补总额为250亿欧元的资本缺口。由于相关银行今年进行了筹资，目前资本缺口数额已降至130亿欧元。

或许这个评价遗漏了一个最重要的可能性：主权债务违约。主权债务违约与一个令人忧虑的根本性问题相关，也就是风险加权资本要求，它涉及对不同类型资产的安全性做出判断，而分析也正是建立在此要求之上。在这方面，欧元区的问题尤其严重，由于银行业缺乏统一的财政保障体系，陷入困境的银行要由各个成员国的政府来纾困。而且，欧元区中债台高筑的成员国的偿付能力，比保留本国货币的国家更值得怀疑。既然在欧元区应对银行业危机比在任何其他地方都困难，欧元区银行应持有更充足的缓冲资本，从而提高防止危机发生的几率，这才是明智之举。而实际杠杆水平比风险加权资本比率体现的杠杆水平高得多（如图），使这一点变得格外重要。

幸运的是，股本与实际资产之比最低的银行都在相对有偿付能力的国家，比如荷兰、法国和德国。然而，西班牙和意大利的杠杆倍数是20倍，德国和法国是25倍，荷兰是30倍。它们是否拥有足够资本来吸纳亏损，还存在疑问。

高杠杆水平还损害了银行为经济增长提供资金的能力。管理上负责任但杠杆很高的银行，会在放贷时寻求高价值抵押品，比如要求以房产做抵押；或者持有高评级资产。这可能影响欧元区所需的生产性投资。

For these reasons, one must doubt whether the capital in eurozone banks is enough to drive the economy forward. But this is just one part of a still bigger problem: the dramatic weakness of aggregate demand and the slow slide into ultra-low inflation and, quite possibly, deflation. Sounder banks do not necessarily generate faster growth in demand. Indeed, causality goes far more in the opposite direction.
Two former ECB officials have expressed sharply different views about how policy makers should respond. Otmar Issing, the bank’s former chief economist, argues that monetary policy is already too loose from a German point of view and that it would be a mistake for Berlin to loosen fiscal policy, too. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, a former member of the executive board, argues that stronger demand is needed in Germany to prevent the European economy from falling into deflation. ISSING ETC EXCISEDThe vital point is that the eurozone has a single monetary authority, which should take a view of the entire eurozone economy.

Between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of this year, eurozone nominal demand rose by a mere 2.5 per cent (see chart). Nominal gross domestic product grew by 5 per cent over that period. Now assume trend real growth was a mere 1 per cent and inflation 2 per cent (in line with ECB targets). In that case, nominal GDP should have been growing at 3 per cent a year. By the second quarter of 2014, nominal GDP was 13 per cent below this objective. Under Mr Issing, the ECB looked at monetary aggregates as well. In the six years to September 30 2014, broad money (M3) increased by 9.6 per cent, a compound annual rate of 1.5 per cent. On both measures, the ECB has failed.

The same goes for inflation. Suppose the ECB intends to hit its inflation target of close to, but below, 2 per cent. When several important member countries need to improve their competitiveness, their inflation should be well below German levels. If that is to happen while the average remains close to 2 per cent, core inflation needs to exceed 3 per cent in Germany (and other surplus countries). In fact, it is just 1.2 per cent in Germany. This suggests domestic demand is far too weak in the eurozone as a whole, including in the surplus countries, the most important of which is of course Germany.

The question, however, is how to achieve higher demand growth in the eurozone and creditor countries. Experience in the US and UK suggests that unconventional monetary policy might work. But the ECB is hampered by the constraints (perceived and actual) on purchases of government debt. If Germany is opposed to such purchases, then its opposition to active fiscal policy as well, even when it is able to borrow at close to zero real interest rates over 30 years, ensures continued eurozone stagnation. That just cannot make sense.

It is essential not to make too much of the stress tests and asset quality review. Yes, they are real improvements. But they do not mean that eurozone banks will now drive growth. They still have too little capital for that. More important, the eurozone lacks a credible strategy for reigniting demand. If much of the German policy elite continues to deny this is even a problem, the crisis of the eurozone must remain unresolved. That is a disaster.

基于这些原因，人们不得不怀疑欧元区银行是否拥有足够的资本拉动经济增长。但这只是一个更大的问题的一部分：欧元区的总需求极度疲弱，正在缓慢滑入极低的通胀水平，且很有可能出现通缩。更健康的银行并不一定会加快需求的增长。实际上，因果关系在很大程度上与此相反。

关于政策制定者应该如何应对这些问题，两位欧洲央行前官员给出了截然不同的观点。欧洲央行前首席经济学家奥特马尔•伊辛(Otmar Issing)认为，从德国的角度来看，货币政策已经太宽松了，再放松财政政策对德国来说将是错误的选择。而欧洲央行执委会委员洛伦佐•比尼•斯马吉(Lorenzo Bini Smaghi)则认为，德国需要更强劲的需求，来防止欧洲经济滑入通缩。关键在于欧元区拥有单一的货币当局，而这个货币当局应该纵览欧元区经济的全局。

从2008年第1季度到今年第2季度，欧元区的名义需求仅增长了2.5%（如图）。同期名义国内生产总值(GDP)增长了5%。现在，假定趋势实际增长率仅为1%，通胀率为2%（与欧洲央行的目标一致），在这种情况下，名义GDP的年增长率应该达到3%。

截至2014年第2季度，实际上的名义GDP离这个目标还差13%。伊辛任职期间，欧洲央行还关注货币总量的情况。在截至今年9月30日的6年间，广义货币(M3)增加了9.6%，复合年增长率为1.5%。从这两个衡量指标来看，欧洲央行都失败了。

通胀方面也是如此。假设欧洲央行希望实现接近2%、但仍在2%以下的通胀率目标。如果几个重要的成员国需要改善它们的竞争力，它们的通胀率就应该远低于德国的通胀水平。如果这些条件要成立，又要保证平均通胀率接近2%，德国（和其他盈余国家）的核心通胀率需要超过3%。而事实上，德国的核心通胀率仅为1.2%。这表明，包括盈余国家（其中最重要的国家当然是德国）在内，整个欧元区的内部需求太过疲弱。

然而，问题在于如何提高欧元区和债权国的需求增长率。美国和英国的经验表明，非常规的货币政策或许能奏效。但欧洲央行在购买国债方面受到（认知和实际上的）约束的阻碍。如果德国反对欧洲央行购买国债，那么它对积极财政政策的同样反对（即使它能以接近于零的实际利率在30年期限上借款），必将使欧元区持续陷入停滞。这是毫无道理的。

重要的是，我们不应太高估压力测试和资产质量评估的作用。是的，它们是实实在在的进步。但它们的结果并不意味着欧元区的银行将拉动增长。银行拥有的资本还是太少，以至于它们无法做到这一点。最重要的是，欧元区缺少一种提振需求的可信策略。如果德国政策精英中的不少人继续否认这的确是个问题，欧元区的危机必然无法解决。那将是一场灾难。