Might the policies of the eurozone result in a robust recovery? My answer is: no. Since the eurozone generated 17 per cent of world output in 2013 (at market prices), that answer has global significance.
欧元区的政策会不会促成强劲复苏？我认为答案是否定的。鉴于2013年欧元区产出占世界总产出的17%（以市场价计算），这个否定答案对全世界都有意义。

It is Germany that set the economic strategy of the eurozone. It consists of three elements: structural reform; fiscal discipline; and monetary accommodation. So far, this set of policies has failed to generate adequate demand: in the second quarter of 2014, real demand in the eurozone was 5 per cent smaller than it was in the first quarter of 2008.
制定欧元区经济策略的是德国。这一策略包含三个部分：结构改革、财政纪律、宽松货币政策。迄今为止，这一套政策一直未能创造足够的需求：2014年第二季度，欧元区实际需求比2008年第一季度少5%。
Both France and Italy are being encouraged to accelerate “structural reforms” as a way to reignite growth in their own economies and so, given their importance, also in the eurozone. These two countries generate 38 per cent of eurozone gross domestic product, against 28 per cent for Germany alone. In both economies, the recommended programmes involve liberalising the labour market. They are both being encouraged to follow Germany’s “Hartz reforms”, introduced between 2003 and 2005, to which the country’s relatively good recent labour market performance is often attributed.
法国和意大利都受到鼓励要加快“结构改革”，以重启本国经济增长，鉴于这两国的重要性，这也就相当于重启欧元区经济增长。这两个国家的国内生产总值(GDP)之和占欧元区的38%，而德国一个国家占28%。在法意两国，被鼓励实施的改革计划都包括放开劳动力市场。法意两国都被鼓励效仿德国在2003年至2005年之间推出的“哈尔茨改革”(Hartz reforms)，人们往往将德国近期相对不错的劳动力市场表现归功于该项改革。
Yet the one thing those reforms did not do is create dynamic aggregate demand. Between the second quarter of 2004 and the second quarter of 2014, Germany’s real domestic demand grew 11.2 per cent, a compound annual rate of 1 per cent. It could have been worse. But this is hardly the performance of a “locomotive” (see chart).
然而，哈尔茨改革没有实现的一点是创造活跃的总需求。从2004年第二季度到2014年第二季度，德国实际内需增长了11.2%，相当于1%的复合年化增长率。情况原本还可能更糟。这很难算是“经济火车头”应有的表现。
Examination of Germany’s sectoral financial balances – the differences between income and spending of the government, private sector and foreigners – strengthens this point. The response of the German private sector to the reforms of the early 2000s was to increase financial surpluses massively: that is, to spend far less than their incomes. Since the fiscal deficit also shrank, the capital outflow soared. This is striking and significant. In brief, the response of the private sector to the labour market reforms and fiscal tightening was to become increasingly frugal and so accumulate large quantities of (often poor-quality) foreign assets.
查看德国各部门的收支平衡情况，即政府、私人部门和外资的收支差距，就能更明显地看出这一点。德国私人部门对本世纪头几年哈尔茨改革的反应是，大幅增加财务盈余，即支出大大少于收入。由于政府财政赤字也缩水了，资本外流飙升。这是显著和突出的。简而言之，私人部门对劳动力市场改革和财政紧缩的反应是变得越来越节约，从而积攒下数量巨大（但往往质量低下）的海外资产。
In terms of raising private domestic demand, reforms achieved little. On the contrary, Germany became heavily dependent on foreign demand. Similarly, fiscal tightening did not unleash stronger private spending. Expecting similar labour-market reforms to promote demand in France and Italy is likely to prove highly over-optimistic.
在提高私人部门内需方面，改革收效甚微。相反，德国变得严重依赖外需。类似的，财政紧缩未能让私人支出变得更强劲。指望类似的劳动力市场改革能在法国和意大利提升需求，很可能将被证明是过于乐观。
This does not mean reforms achieved nothing. Germany has low unemployment despite quite weak growth. The UK also has relatively low unemployment despite still weaker post-crisis economic growth. In both cases, the labour reforms encouraged the sharing of a large negative shock across the population via stagnant or even falling real earnings. A symptom of this form of an adjustment is weak productivity. In German industry, productivity has not risen since 2007. Productivity performance has also been poor in the UK. But German unemployment was 4.9 per cent in July and the UK’s only 6 per cent against 10.4 per cent in France.
这不是说哈尔茨改革没有取得任何成果。尽管增长非常疲弱，但德国实现了低失业率。英国尽管在金融危机后经济增长仍然疲弱，但失业率也较低。在这两个例子里，劳动力市场改革都通过实际收入的停滞甚至下降，将大规模的负面冲击分散至整个人口。这种调整的特征之一就是低生产率。在德国工业中，生产率自2007年起就没有再提高过。英国的生产率表现也一直不理想。但德国7月失业率为4.9%，英国仅6%，而法国为10.4%。
The upshot is that labour market reforms do little if anything to promote demand; in Germany’s case, much of the demand has come from abroad. What might this mean for the eurozone as a whole? A theoretical possibility is that the eurozone would seek to generate a current account surplus that is as big relative to GDP as Germany’s. This would mean a surplus not of $300bn, as in 2013, but of $900bn.
结果是，劳动力市场改革对促进需求毫无作用、或作用很小。在德国的例子中，很大一部分需求来自国外。这对整个欧元区意味着什么？在理论上，一个可能性是欧元区将寻求创造与德国一样高的经常账户盈余与GDP比率。这意味着欧元区的经常账户盈余必须从2013年的3000亿美元增至9000亿美元。
This could never be sustained: the rest of the world would not absorb it and an appreciation of the euro is likely to defeat it. The proper complement to structural reform is additional demand inside the eurozone. That is needed, in any case, to eliminate the difficulties being created by ultra-low inflation and the possibility of deflation. German core inflation of only 1.2 per cent is too low to let adjustment work satisfactorily.
这种状况绝不可能持续：世界其余地区无法吸收欧元区这样大的经常账户盈余，欧元的升值也很可能使之挫败。能够对结构改革形成合理补充的措施是，在欧元区内部创造额外需求。无论如何，这样的措施对克服超低通胀以及通缩可能性造成的困难都是必需的。德国仅1.2%的核心通胀率太低，无法让调整产生令人满意的效果。
With conventional monetary policy at its limits, the choices are between unconventional monetary policy or expansionary fiscal policy. Germany is extremely uncomfortable with both.
鉴于常规货币政策已到达极限，我们只能选择非常规货币政策或扩张性财政政策——这两种政策在德国看来都是下策。
Yet, partly because of its haven status, Germany is also able to borrow at extraordinarily favourable interest rates. The 30-year Bund is now yielding 1.8 per cent. If one assumes the European Central Bank will meet its inflation target, this means a long-term real interest rate of zero. Such negligible costs of borrowing must transform views of the costs of fiscal deficits. Germany should both refinance its debt at such rates and borrow to finance additional public investment. Focusing on deficits and debts, without noticing the interest rate, makes no sense. In the same way, the focus on whether the French deficit breaks the rules is absurd. Even French 10-year bonds are yielding 1.1 per cent. The markets are screaming: borrow.
然而，部分缘于其避险地的地位，德国还能够以极为优惠的利率借款。30年期德国国债眼下的收益率为1.8%。如果假设欧洲央行(ECB)能够实现其通胀目标，这意味着长期实际利率为零。借款成本低得可忽略不计，必然会改变人们对财政赤字成本的看法。德国应该以这样的利率对其债务进行再融资，并增加借债为额外的公共投资提供资金。抛开利率关注赤字和债务是不合理的。同样，关注法国的赤字水平是否超标也是荒谬的。就连法国的10年期债券收益率都为1.1%。各个市场都在尖叫：多借钱！
The big challenge for the eurozone is not to create institutions, but to promote adjustment and restore growth. The people of the eurozone cannot be expected to remain patient forever. Indeed, the dangers of continuing economic stagnation are obvious.
欧元区面临的巨大难题不在于创造制度，而在于促进调整、恢复增长。我们不能期望欧元区人民能永远保持耐心。事实上，经济停滞持续下去会带来哪些风险是显而易见的。
Germany is right that euro states need much long-term reform. But Germany is wrong to believe that this might, on its own, generate strong growth. The evidence from its experience with reforms is decisive on this point: it will not do so.
德国称欧元区国家必须进行大量长期改革，这话没错。但德国认为改革本身就能创造强劲的增长，这是错误的。在这一点上，德国本身在改革方面的经验就能一举证明：改革本身无法做到这一点。
Nor does it make sense to rely on ever-greater external surpluses, instead. A policy that may work for Germany alone (a debatable proposition) cannot work for an economy more than three times as big as Germany’s.
另外，依赖于越来越大的顺差也是不合理的。能够在德国一个国家身上起作用（是否起了作用还有争议）的政策，无法在一个逾三倍于德国的经济体身上起作用。
The eurozone needs to reach a bargain between more reform and extra demand. In doing so, it must recognise that persistent stagnation is a big threat to stability. The eurozone should risk expansion. That is now the safer course.
欧元区必须在加大改革和增加需求之间实现平衡。在这个过程中，它必须认识到持续的停滞对稳定是个巨大的威胁。欧元区应该冒险采取扩张政策。眼下扩张是条更安全的道路。