Limited-liability, privately owned joint-stock companies are the core institutions of modern capitalism. These entities are largely responsible for organising the production and distribution of goods and services across the globe. Their role is both cause and consequence of the revolution in the scale and diversity of economic activity that has taken place over the past two centuries.
有限责任、私人所有的股份公司是现代资本主义的核心机构。这些实体在很大程度上承担起组织全球范围内商品和服务的生产和分配职责。它们的角色既是过去两个世纪发生的经济活动在规模和多元性方面革命的原因，也是其结果。

Almost nothing in economics is more important than thinking through how companies should be managed and for what ends. Unfortunately, we have made a mess of this. That mess has a name: it is “shareholder value maximisation”. Operating companies in line with this belief not only leads to misbehaviour but may also militate against their true social aim, which is to generate greater prosperity.
在经济学中，几乎没有比思考明白该如何、以及出于何种目的管理公司更重要的了。遗憾的是，我们搞砸了这种思考，得出了糟糕的结论，那就是“股东价值最大化”。按照这种理念经营公司不仅会导致不当行为，而且还会妨碍它们实现真正的社会目标，即创造更大的繁荣。
I am not the first person to worry about the joint-stock company. Adam Smith, founder of modern economics, argued: “Negligence and profusion . . . must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.” His concern is over what we call the “agency problem” – the difficulty of monitoring management. Others complain that companies behave like psychopaths: a company aiming at maximising shareholder value might conclude it would be profitable – and so perhaps even its duty – to pollute the air and water if allowed to do so. It might also use its resources to obstruct an appropriate regulatory response to such (mis) behaviour.
我并非是第一个对股份公司感到忧虑的。现代经济学创始人亚当•斯密(Adam Smith)指出：“玩忽职守和挥霍浪费……或多或少总是会在这类公司的管理过程中盛行。”他担心的是我们所称的“代理人问题”，即监督管理层的困难。另一些人抱怨称，公司的行为就像精神病患者：一家旨在实现股东价值最大化的公司可能认为，如果允许的话，污染空气和水将是合算的，或许这还是它的职责。它还可能利用自己的资源来阻碍监管机构对此类（不当）行为作出适当回应。
The economic argument for shareholder value maximisation and control is that, while all other stakeholders are protected by contract, shareholders are not. They therefore bear the residual risk. This being so, they need to control the company in order to align the interests of management with their own. Only then would they be prepared to make risky investments.
股东价值最大化和股东控制的经济理由是，其他所有利益相关者都受到合同的保护，但股东们没有。他们因此承担了“剩余风险”。有鉴于此，他们需要控制公司以便让管理层利益与他们自己的利益相一致。只有这样，他们才愿意进行高风险的投资。
Yet, while shareholders do indeed bear risks in their role as the insurers of solvency, they are not the only stakeholders to do so. A host of others are also exposed to risks against which they cannot be fully protected by contract: long-term workers; long-term suppliers; and, not least, the jurisdictions in which companies operate. Moreover, shareholders, unlike others, and particularly employees, can hedge their risks by diversifying their portfolios. A worker cannot normally work for many companies at the same time and nobody can hedge employee income by owning shares in other people, except via taxation.
然而，尽管股东的确因“偿付承保人”的角色而承担了风险，但他们并非是承担风险的唯一利益相关者。其他许多人也暴露在无法得到合同充分保护的风险之下：长期员工，长期供应商，以及更为重要的，公司经营地所属的司法管辖地。此外，与其他人（尤其是员工）不同，股东可以通过多元化投资组合来对冲他们的风险。员工通常无法同时为许多公司工作，也没有人可以通过拥有其他人的股份来对冲薪资收入，除了通过税收以外。
The doctrine of shareholder value maximisation has allowed us to believe that the existence of these long-lived, hierarchical and powerful entities has not changed the market economy fundamentally. But, as Colin Mayer of Oxford’s Saïd Business School argues in his splendid book, Firm Commitment, this approach also misses the true purpose of the company.
股东价值最大化的信条让我们相信，这些长期存续、等级分明的强大实体的存在，没有从根本上改变市场经济。但正如牛津大学(Oxford)赛德商学院(Saïd Business School)的科林•迈耶(Colin Mayer)在其精彩著作《坚定承诺》(Firm Commitment)中论述的那样，这种看法也忽视了公司的真正目的。
Companies, argues Professor Mayer, are a mechanism for sustaining long-term commitments. But such commitments will only work if it is costly for the parties to act opportunistically. Moreover, it is often in the interests of all parties to bind themselves not to behave in such a way. But, with an active market in corporate control, such commitments cannot be made. Those who make the promises may disappear before they can deliver.
迈耶表示，公司是一种维持长期承诺的机制。但此类承诺只有在相关方采取机会主义行动代价高昂的时候才会有效。此外，约束自己不采取机会主义行动通常也符合所有人的利益。但由于公司控制权市场非常活跃，相关方不可能做出此类承诺。那些做出承诺的，可能在履行承诺之前就会消失。
These commitments take the form of implicit – or not fully specified – contracts. Why do we have to rely on implicit contracts? Long-term commitments could in theory be managed instead by trying to specify every eventuality. About a second’s thought makes it clear that this is impossible. It would not just be inconceivably complex and costly. It would come up against the deeper problem of uncertainty. We have little idea of what might happen in the next few months, let alone the next few decades. If people are to make long-term commitments, trust is the only alternative. But a company whose goal is whatever seems profitable today can be trusted only to renege on implicit contracts. It is sure to act opportunistically. If its managers did not want to do so, they would be replaced. This is because, as Prof Mayer argues: “The corporation is a rent extraction vehicle for the shortest-term shareholders.” Aligning managerial rewards to shareholder returns reinforces the opportunism.
这些承诺以隐性（或不完全明确的）合同形式存在。我们为何不得不依赖隐性合同？就理论而言，我们可以通过努力明确所有可能性来管理长期承诺。但稍微想一下就知道这是不可能的。不仅其复杂性和成本会高到难以想象，而且还会遇到不确定性的更深层次问题。我们连今后几个月将会发生什么事都不知道，更别说今后几十年了。而如果人们要做出长期承诺，信任是唯一的选择。但对于一家今天只以不择手段盈利为目标的公司，人们只能相信它必将背弃隐性合同。它肯定会采取机会主义的行为。如果它的经理们不想这么做，他们就会被替换掉。正如迈耶指出的那样，这是因为：“对最短期的股东来说，企业是一个抽租工具。”将管理层奖励与股东回报挂钩强化了这种机会主义。
In practice, many capitalist economies do mitigate the risks of shareholder value maximisation and the market in corporate control. This is true of continental Europe, notably German companies. But it is also, notes Prof Mayer, true in the US, where the idea that management should be protected against shareholders is widely accepted in practice, if not so much in theory. The country that has taken the idea furthest is the UK.
在实践中，许多资本主义经济体的确减轻了股东价值最大化和公司控制权市场的风险。欧洲大陆就是如此，尤其是德国公司。但迈耶指出，美国同样如此——在美国，人们普遍在实践中认可应防止管理层遭受股东侵害的观点（理论上则接受程度较低）。最大程度接受这种观点的国家是英国。
Prof Mayer argues rightly: “The defect of existing economic models of the corporation is in not recognising its distinguishing feature – the fact that it is a separate legal entity. The significance of this stems from the fact that it is thereby capable of sustaining arrangements that are distinct from those that its owners, its shareholders, are able to achieve.” It is, in other words, in the shareholders’ interests not to control companies completely. They need to be able to tie their hands.
迈耶正确地指出：“企业现有经济模式的缺陷在于没有认识到其独特的特征，即它是一个单独法律实体的事实。该特征之所以重要，源于公司因此能够维持与其所有者和股东能够实现的安排不同的安排。”换言之，不完全控制公司符合股东的利益。他们需要能够管住自己的手。
Prof Mayer’s suggested solution is what he calls a “trust company”, one with explicit values and a board designed to oversee them. He justifies such a radical switch with his scepticism about the feasibility and effectiveness of regulation. Less radical would be to encourage companies to consider divergent structures of control. One might be to vest voting rights in shares whose ownership can be transferred only after a holding period of years, not hours. In that way, control would be married to commitment. One could also vest limited control rights in some groups of workers. Yet this is not to argue that committed long-term ownership is always preferable. Family control, for example, has both weaknesses and strengths.
迈耶提议的解决方案被他称作“信托公司”，这种公司有明确的价值标准，以及对之进行监督的董事会。他怀疑监管的可行性和有效性，因此认为如此激进的方案是合理的。较不激进的方案是鼓励公司考虑采用分散的控制结构。比如，授予人们带有投票权的股份，而这些股份只有在持有几年、而非几小时之后才可以转让，通过这种方式将控制与承诺绑在一起。还可以将有限控制权授予某些员工群体。然而，这并不是说，有承诺的长期所有权总是可取的。例如，家族控制就有利也有弊。
The right way to approach governance is to recognise the big trade-offs in managing and governing these complex, vital and long-lived institutions. We should let 100 governance flowers bloom. But the canonical academic model of the past few decades will rarely be the best.
对待治理问题的正确方式是，认识到管理和治理这些复杂、重要、长期存续的机构时要面对的巨大权衡。我们应该让治理百花齐放。但过去几十年的正统学术模式不太可能是最佳答案。