As GM GM -0.32% recalls millions of faulty vehicles, it’s hard not to wonder if the outcome would have been different if its product design team tasked to design ignition switches had involved more non-engineers in the early 2000s? Might they have been able to better predict the social impact and reputational risks associated with technological risks? Is it possible that a different risk group – inspired by broad-minded generalists – could have prevented the recall of more than 28 million vehicles over the last six months at a cost in excess of $1.7 billion?
通用汽车（GM）召回了上千万辆有缺陷汽车，这很难不让人们去想，如果在本世纪初负责设计点火开关的设计团队中有更多的非工程师人员参与，情况是否会有所不同呢？他们是否能更好地预见到和科技风险有关的社会影响以及声誉风险呢？一个不同的风险评估团队，或者说一个由更多思路开阔的多面手赋予其灵感的团队，能否让通用汽车避免在过去六个月付出超过17亿美元的代价召回 2,800多万辆汽车的厄运呢？
More broadly, who is best positioned to assess a company’s risks? Is it critical for a retailer to predict the likelihood of a cyber attack on its payment processing system? Should those in the tobacco industry care about the accuracy of their e-cigarette adoption projections, or the regulatory response to such developments? What about the future price of carbon and the impact it might have on the coal and power production industries?
更宽泛地说，就评估公司风险而言，谁处于最有利的位置？预测自己的支付处理系统遭到网络攻击的可能性对一家零售企业来说是个关键问题吗？烟草行业从业者是否应该关注电子烟预测普及率的准确性或者监管部门对人们使用电子烟的反应呢？今后的碳排放交易价格走势如何？它可能会对煤炭和电力行业产生什么样的影响？
Increasingly, boardrooms around the world have focused on risk – a task that is essentially one of predicting possible deviations from expectations, but who is really best positioned to make predictions about the future and why? There’s been meaningful research conducted on this topic, but I don’t believe the findings have affected how organizations think about developing their current and future leaders.
全世界的公司董事会都越来越关注风险——这项工作本质上就是预测实际情况和预期之间可能出现的偏差，但在预测未来方面谁处于最佳位置呢？原因是什么呢？对于这个问题，人们已经进行了有针对性的研究，但我认为这些研究成果并未对公司培养现任和未来负责人的思路产生影响。
In a quite counter-intuitive finding, convincing academic work suggests that specialized experts may in fact be less accurate in their predictions of developments within their field than non-experts; the more focused the predictor, the less accurate the prediction. One reason this may be the case is that we humans become wedded to our areas of focus. We effectively acquire hammers…and not surprisingly, then find nails everywhere we look.
有说服力的学术研究表明，专家对自身专业领域发展态势的预测实际上还没有非专家准确，这和人们的直觉相去甚远。预测者越专业，所做预期的准确程度就越低。出现这种情况的一个可能原因是我们会拘泥于自己所专注的领域。这就好像我们手里拿着锤子，然后无论看向哪里都会发现钉子——这种情况并不让人感到意外。
The history of predictions made by experts is littered with failures. Let’s consider the market for computers and predictions made about them by leading specialists within the computer industry. Thomas Watson, the esteemed chairman of IBM IBM -0.72% , proclaimed in 1943 that he believed there to be “a world market for maybe five computers.” Later in 1977, the president, chairman, and founder of Digital Equipment Corporation Ken Olsen stated, “There is no reason anyone would want a computer in their home.”
专家们的预测史充斥着失败。让我们看看计算机市场以及计算机行业中处于领军位置的专家所做的预测吧。1943年，备受尊重的IBM董事长托马斯o沃森表示，他相信会出现一个“差不多由五台计算机构成的全球市场。”1977年，数字设备公司（Digital Equipment Corporation）创始人、总裁兼董事长肯o奥尔森称：“人们没有理由产生在家里摆一台计算机的想法。”
Today, the worldwide market for computers and tablets exceeds several hundred million units per year. Watson and Olsen were true pioneers and believed by many to be industry-leading experts and visionaries, but their predictions were way off the mark.
今天，全球计算机和平板电脑市场每年的规模已经超过数亿台。沃森和奥尔森绝对都是行业先行者，许多人都认为他们是计算机领域的顶尖专家和预言者，但他们的预测和实际情况有着天壤之别。
Experts in communications have not proven any more accurate. Consider that McKinsey’s experts in market sizing projected for AT&T T 1.06% in 1980 that the worldwide market for mobile phones would fail to exceed 1 million subscribers by the year 2000. The actual number proved to be well north of 100 million subscribers. Consider also when tech specialist and then Microsoft MSFT 0.74% CEO Steve Ballmerbluntly made his prediction for the Apple iPhone in 2007: “There’s no chance that the iPhone is going to get any significant market share. No chance.” As it turns out, the device had an approximately 41% market share in April this year, according to market research firm comScore. I’ll leave it you to decide if that share is significant.
实践表明，通信领域专家的预测也准确不到哪儿去。1980年，麦肯锡（McKinsey）的市场规模专家曾针对美国电话电报公司（AT&T）预计，到2000年全球手机市场中的用户人数不会超过100万人。而实际情况是，这个数字远高于1亿人。科技行业专家、时任微软（Microsoft）首席执行官的史蒂夫o鲍尔默2007年曾直率地对苹果公司（Apple）的iPhone做出这样的预测：“iPhone绝不会获得多少市场份额，绝对不会。”结果呢，市场研究机构comScore的数据表明，今年4月份iPhone的市场份额约为41%。请大家来判断一下这样的市场份额算不算大。
These stories illustrate a major downside of specialization. I don’t mean to suggest that specialization unto itself is bad; in many functions and domains (surgery, scientific research, etc …), it is essential to success. But when it comes to navigating uncertainty and contemplating probabilistic scenarios, I’d rather have a generalist in charge—someone who has a breadth of experience diverse enough to mitigate the problematic hammer-carrying default setting.
这些事例体现了专业化的一大缺陷。我并不是说专业化本身有问题。在许多工作和领域中（外科、科学研究等），专业化是成功的关键。但在应对不确定性和预测可能出现的情况方面，我更愿意让多面手来负责——这类人的经验多种多样，足以缓解上文中提到的“自认为手拿锤子”所引发的问题。
One obvious implication for managers at all levels of an organization is to respect and value seemingly unrelated experiences. Don’t dismiss the marketing executive applying for a finance position or the retail leader who thinks she can run a construction firm. And in grooming future leaders, current leaders should encourage a diversity of experience rather than narrow specialization.
对企业中各个层次的管理者来说，以上事例的一个明确含义就是要尊重和珍视那些看似不相关的经验。不要把应聘财务职位的营销事务管理人员拒之门外，也不要认为零售公司负责人不能经营建筑公司。培养未来负责人时，现任领导应当鼓励他们拥有多种多样的经验，而不是局限于某个专业领域。
Vikram Mansharamani, PhD, is a lecturer at Yale University in the Program on Ethics, Politics, & Economics, a Senior Fellow at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, and the author of Boombustology: Spotting Financial Bubbles Before They Burst.
本文作者维克拉姆o曼沙拉马尼博士在耶鲁大学（Yale University）教授伦理、政治和经济课，他是哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院（Harvard Kennedy School）穆萨瓦-拉赫玛尼（Mossavar-Rahmani）商业与政府中心高级研究员，著有《盛衰学：在金融泡沫破裂前发现它们》（Boombustology: Spotting Financial Bubbles Before They Burst）一书。