How many revolutions in history have been “successful”? How many have delivered lasting and stable political change? These are interesting intellectual questions, which are provoking new debate inside America's security and foreign policy apparatus, particularly when looking at the Middle East.
历史上有多少革命是“成功的”？有多少场革命带来了长久而稳定的政治新格局？这两个有趣的学术问题，正在美国国防与外交部门内引发新的辩论，尤其是就中东问题而言。
Two years ago, when tumultuous change swept across the region, it was common to refer to events as the “Arab spring”. The sight of young crowds congregating in the streets of Cairo or Tunis seemed inspiring. It was easy for us all to cheer or at least post a message of support on Twitter or Facebook.
两年前，剧变席卷中东时，人们通常称其为“阿拉伯之春”。当时，在开罗或突尼斯，一群群年轻人走上街头，那情景看上去激动人心。那时，我们大家很容易欢呼事件的发生，或至少在Twitter或Facebook上发条信息、以示支持。
These days, some key US leaders have quietly made a subtle linguistic shift. Instead of talking about the “Arab spring”, they are discussing the “Arab revolution(s)”. And while that “r” word might sound hopeful too, there is a crucial catch. “If you look at revolutions in history - say, the American, Russian, French, Chinese or Cuban - there is perhaps only one that turned out well: America,” a Washington grandee declared to a high-powered group of business leaders and policy officials earlier this month in Aspen. Thus, if the “normal” course of history plays out, he added, then “we had better be planning for a generation of turmoil and unrest”. Far from being an aberration, in other words, the current mess in Egypt or Syria will come to seem like the tragic norm - or so this new “revolution” argument goes.
如今，美国一些关键领导人物悄悄地改了口。他们不再说“阿拉伯之春”，而开始说“阿拉伯革命”。虽然“革命”一词听起来也充满希望，但有一个重大隐患。上月初在阿斯彭(Aspen)，华盛顿一名显要人物面对一群位高权重的商界领袖和政策官员宣称：“如果你回顾一下史上历次革命，比如，美国、俄罗斯、法国、中国和古巴的革命，你会发现结局不错的或许只有一场，那就是美国革命。”因此，他补充道，如果情况按照“正常”的历史进程发展，那么“我们最好计划一下如何应对未来一代人时间里的混乱和动荡”。换句话说，埃及或叙利亚当前的混乱远非异常现象，而似乎是一种悲哀的正常现象。至少，这种新的“革命”论是这样认为的。
Some non-Americans might find this vision of history objectionably slanted. For one thing, America's “revolution” did not immediately produce an entirely stable and peaceful democracy. Instead, it eventually delivered a very violent civil war. And some revolutions beyond US soil have produced much better outcomes than the cynics expected, if not always entirely peacefully. The collapse of the Berlin Wall did not deliver mass bloodshed in eastern Europe. The Baltic states broke free from Russia without too much dramatic upheaval (a development I remember only too well, since I started my career as a journalist writing about those Baltic revolutions and found the lack of cataclysmic drama frustrating). And if you want another reminder that history can sometimes deliver pleasant surprises, take a look at the brilliant new biopic of Nelson Mandela being released in the UK in January: as it shows, the “revolution” that took place in South Africa was almost as extraordinary as anything that occurred inAmerica.
在美国以外其他国家的人看来，这种历史观或许有失偏颇、令人反感。一方面，美国“革命”并未马上产生一个完全稳定、和平的民主制国家。相反，美国革命后来带来了一场极其暴力的内战。而美国之外的某些革命，即便过程不总是完全和平，其结果也大大好于怀疑者的预期。柏林墙(Berlin Wall)的倒塌并未导致东欧发生大规模流血冲突。波罗的海国家脱离俄罗斯，也没有引发太剧烈的动荡（我清楚地记得这件事，因为我的记者生涯就始于报道波罗的海革命，而革命过程的平淡无奇让我很郁闷）。如果你还不相信历史有时会产生让人惊喜的结果，那你可以看看英国今年1月新推出的一部关于纳尔逊?曼德拉(Nelson Mandela)的精彩纪录片。影片表明，南非的“革命”跟美国革命一样了不起。
But irrespective of what you think about individual revolutions, it is crystal clear that the new “r” word poses big problems for America's establishment, particularly in the Middle East. What has been overlooked during the recent drama over the debt ceiling is that fiscal policy is not the only question splitting the nation: the political world is now also deeply divided about what it should do about foreign policy - and those revolutions-cum-springs.
但不管你怎么看待个别革命，新的“革命”一词明显对美国当局构成了重大问题，尤其是在中东地区。在最近的美国债务上限风波中，人们忽视了这样一个问题：财政政策不是唯一分裂美国的问题。在如何处理外交政策、以及阿拉伯革命（或曰阿拉伯之春）的问题上，美国政界如今也存在严重分歧。
The debate at Aspen, which featured numerous former and present foreign policy players, illustrated this split. One chunk of the establishment feels strongly that America needs to intervene more forcefully in the Middle East, not just for humanitarian reasons but also to protect the aspirations of people wanting a “revolution” against despotic regimes - and to prevent extreme versions of Islam gaining ground. But other parts of the establishment feel equally strongly that it would be madness to get involved - that this would probably make things worse, particularly given the sorry, messy history of revolutions. “The American public is overwhelmed with globalisation, they are war weary,” complained one former military leader.
在阿斯彭，无数昔日和当今外交政策决策者的辩论凸显出这种分歧。当权者中有一派非常肯定地认为，美国必须加大对中东地区的干预力度，不仅仅是出于人道主义，还是为了保护人们想要揭竿而起、推翻暴政的愿望，以及为了防止伊斯兰极端势力得势。但当权者中另一派则同样肯定地认为，疯子才会去掺和中东问题——干预只会让局势变得更糟，尤其是有鉴于革命往往难逃悲剧和一团糟的结局。一名前军方领袖不满地说：“美国公众已经被全球化搞得焦头烂额，他们对战争感到厌烦。”
Indeed, the only thing upon which everyone agrees is that the current fiscal fights make the policy options far worse by undercutting US economic power, military muscle and credibility. Or as one policy grandee thundered: “The biggest threat to national security today is not what is happening elsewhere [say, the Middle East] but in the two square miles in Washington.”
确实，唯一得到每个人认同的一点是，当前围绕财政预算的争斗削弱了美国经济和军事实力、损害了美国的信誉，从而导致美国面临的政策选择形势大大恶化。或如一位政界大佬怒吼的那样：“眼下美国国家安全面临的最大威胁，不是正在别处发生的事情，而是正在华盛顿的两平方英里内发生的事情。”
Such battles are not entirely new. In the 18th century, founding fathers such as Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson argued bitterly about whether to support the French revolution. But when Jefferson was worrying about Paris, America was a minor player on the world stage. Today, it is not. Either way, the key point is this: the next time an American politician talks or tweets about the Middle East, watch if that “s” word - “spring” - crops up or if the controversial “r” word appears instead. Subtle semantic shifts can matter deeply - particularly when they are barely noticed at all.
这样的争斗并不新鲜。18世纪，亚历山大?汉密尔顿(Alexander Hamilton)和托马斯?杰斐逊(Thomas Jefferson)等美国的开国之父，曾就是否应支持法国大革命展开激辩。但在杰斐逊操心巴黎的事情时，美国还只是世界舞台上的小角色。如今的美国，与那时大不相同。无论如何，问题的关键在于：下一次哪位美国政界人士谈论中东（或在Twitter上发有关中东的消息）时，留心观察他用的是阿拉伯之“春”、还是有争议性的“革命”一词。微妙的用词变化可能具有深远意义，尤其是在这种变化几乎完全无人注意到的时候。