Unit 12 The Indispensable Opposition
不可缺少的反对派
Walter Lippmann
沃尔特·李普曼
Were they pressed hard enough, most men would probably confess that political freedom—that is to say, the right to speak freely and to act in opposition—is a noble ideal rather than a practical necessity. As the case for freedom is generally put today, the argument lends itself to this feeling. It is made to appear that, whereas each man claims his freedom as a matter of right, the freedom he accords to other men is a matter of toleration. Thus, the defense of freedom of opinion tends to rest not on its substantial, beneficial, and indispensable consequences, but on a somewhat eccentric, a rather vaguely benevolent, attachment to an abstraction.
倘若充分加以探究，大多数人可能都会承认，政治自由——自由说话和采取对立行动的权利——是崇高的理想，而非实际需要，因为现今人们一般是这样看待自由的，上述论点适合于这种想法。挑明了来看，尽管人人声称自由是权利问题，个人给予他人的那份自由却是宽容问题。因此，人们往往不是从言论自由那巨大、有益和不可或缺的结果来为它辩护，而是把它看成多少有些古怪、依稀让人觉得慷慨仁慈、和一种抽象概念联系在一起的东西。
It is all very well to say with Voltaire,"I wholly disapprove of what you say, but will defend to the death your right to say it," but as a matter of fact most men will not defend to the death the rights of other men: If they disapprove sufficiently of what other men say, they will somehow suppress those men if they can.
借用伏尔泰的话是十分恰当的：“我完全不赞成你所说的话，但是我愿至死捍卫你说话的权荆。”不过，事实上大多数人不会至死捍卫他人的权利：要是他们很不赞成他人的言论，只要可能他们就会设法去压制那些人。
So, if this is the best that can be said for liberty of opinion, that a man must tolerate his opponents because everyone has a "right" to say what he pleases, then we shall find that liberty of opinion is a luxury, safe only in pleasant times when men can be tolerant because they are not deeply and vitally concerned.
因此，如果主张舆论自由的最好的说法是：个人必须容忍他的反对者，因为人人都有“权别”畅所欲言，那么我们将会发现舆论自由是一种奢侈，只有在切身重要利益不受影响从而能够做到宽容的愉快情境下才能确保这份奢侈。
Yet actually, as a matter of historic fact, there is a much stronger foundation for the great constitutional right of freedom of speech, and as a matter of practical human experience there is a much more compelling reason for cultivating the habits of free men. We take, it seems to me, a naively self-righteous view when we argue as if the right of our opponents to speak were something that we protect because we are magnanimous, noble, and unselfish.
不过实际上，从历史事实来看，言论自由的伟大宪法权利有着坚固得多的基础，从人类实际经验来看，也有更加令人信服得多的理由去培养自由的人的习惯。在我看来，我们争论时采取了一种幼稚的自以为是的观点，好像我们保护对手的言论权利是由于我们的大度、高尚而且无私。