In February 2013, my wife and I moved to Singapore.
2013年2月，我和妻子搬去了新加坡。
Exactly at the same time, Uber has announced it started operations in the country.
与此同时，优步宣布在新加坡开始运营。
Now, my wife and I agree on a lot of things, but using Uber was definitely not one of them.
我和我妻子在很多事情上都保持一致的态度，但使用优步绝不是其中之一。
While I was excited about the technology and how maybe we don't need to own cars anymore,
我对这项科技感到兴奋不已，认为它可能意味着我们以后再也不用养私家车了，
she felt that every Uber car is here to steal jobs from taxi drivers.
她却认为每一辆在这儿的优步都在从当地出租车司机手里抢工作。
And Sarah was not the only one.
莎拉（我妻子）并不是唯一一个这么想的人。
As the Ubers, Airbnbs and Amazons of the world -- what we call "online marketplaces", as they started expanding their presence,
当全世界的“在线市场”--优步，爱彼迎，亚马逊等开始拓展业务时，
we have heard, all of us, countless policymakers worried about
我们所有人也能听到无数的政策制定者都在担忧
how to deal with these new risks of job destruction, lower wages and tax leakage.
如何应对它们带来的新风险：对就业市场的打击，工资缩水和税收下降。
We've also heard company leaders worried about aggressive competition from global platforms eating up their local businesses.
我们也听说过公司领导人担心这些环球平台带来的激烈竞争会蚕食他们的当地企业。
And on the rational level, of course I understand. After all, this is basic supply and demand economics.
从理性的角度讲，我当然能理解。毕竟，这是经济学基本的供需关系模型。
If, in any market, you dramatically increase supply,
如果你在任何一个市场大幅增加供给量，
you should expect prices, profitability and growth to go down for existing players.
那么市场价格、收益率和经济增长对于现有参与者来说就会相应下降。
But in my personal experience, I've also seen the other side of the story.
但以我个人的经验来看，我也见过与之截然相反的情况。
Where online marketplaces, like Gojek in Indonesia or Jumia in Africa,
像印度尼西亚的Gojek，非洲的Jumia等在线市场，
have helped their business ecosystems and the communities around them.
实际上反而能帮助当地的商业生态系统和周围的社区。
The positive side I have seen demonstrated itself in a woman, a taxi driver in Egypt,
我所见到的积极一面在一位女士身上体现了出来，她是埃及的一位出租车司机，
that now had the opportunity to work without the harassment she faced in the taxi business.
她现在可以有机会在一个不会受到出租车行业那样骚扰的环境下工作。
It demonstrated itself through a village in Kenya that got an economic boost,
这种好的方面同时也在肯尼亚一个取得经济增长的村庄中得以体现，
because the nearby beautiful but completely unknown lake is now becoming a national ecotourism spot.
因为当地附近的一个美丽而又完全与世隔绝的湖泊现在已经成为了一个国家级生态旅游景点。
Online marketplaces will continue to grow.
在线市场未来还会持续发展。
And they will transform the way we shop, the way we travel and the way we transact with each other.
并且它们将会变革我们购物、旅行和与他人交往的模式。
So we really need to understand where is the truth between those two stories.
所以我们现在需要弄清楚，这两种故事，到底谁是真相。
Should we expect more of the bright side or more of the dark and worrying side?
我们应该期待好的一面会发生，还是觉得不好的、引人忧虑的一面会发生？
And is there a way to get the first without getting the second? I believe there is.
有没有可能只有好的一面会发生？我相信这种可能是存在的。
As a strategy consultant, I study businesses for a living.
作为一名战略顾问，我以研究商业模式谋生。
And as a mathematician at heart, I couldn't live with something and its opposite being equally true.
并且作为一名数学爱好者，我无法忍受两个完全相反的事物被认定为同样正确。
So, I went back to fundamentals, and I asked the question:
所以，我问了一个比较基本的问题：
What do online marketplaces really do? What do they do?
在线市场究竟在做什么？它们在做什么？
Well, at their core, they're doing something very simple.
它们的核心原理其实非常简单。
They match sellers and buyers. That's it.
就是将卖家与买家进行配对。就这么简单。
For drivers and passengers, you get Uber, Grab in Southeast Asia or DiDi in China.
对于配对司机和乘客，我们有优步、东南亚的Grab，还有中国的滴滴。
For matching merchants and consumers, you get Amazon, Alibaba or Jumia in Africa.
对于配对商家和消费者，我们有亚马逊，阿里巴巴和非洲的Jumia。
And for housing, you get Airbnb; for fundraising, you get Kickstarter -- the list goes on.
对于租房，我们有爱彼迎；对于筹款，我们有Kickstarter--诸如此类。
What all these examples have in common is that
而这些例子的共同点就是，
they transition this basic functionality of matching sellers and buyers from the physical world to the digital world.
他们将配对买卖双方的基本功能从实体世界转移到了电子世界。
And by doing so, they can find better matches, do it faster and ultimately, unlock more value for everyone.
通过这种方式，他们能更好、更快地配对买卖双方，并且最终能让每个人都得到更多价值。
In fact, online marketplaces' core benefit is that they get us more from the same amount of effort.
事实上，在线市场的核心价值就在于我们付出同等努力，能从中获得更多回报。
For example, if you're a taxi driver in San Francisco and you decide to work 10 hours per day,
比方说，如果你是旧金山的一名出租车司机，你打算每天工作十个小时，
then you're actually having a paying passenger in your car for four hours out of the 10.
那么你每天十个小时里将有四个小时在服务顾客。
If you take the same car and put it on a platform like Uber,
但如果你把同样的这辆车放到像优步这样的平台上，
you can have paying passengers for an additional one and a half hours.
那么你每天就可以有额外一个半小时在服务顾客。
This is the same car becoming 40 percent more productive.
同样一辆车就比以前多了40%的收益。
And the same has been proven true for other online marketplaces. By design, they create more value for the economy.
同样的道理在其他在线市场也适用。它们的设计就决定了能为经济发展创造更多价值。
Now, we need to figure out who gets this additional value.
我们现在需要弄清楚，究竟是谁得到了这些额外的价值。
You can give it to the drivers -- more passengers, more income.
你可以把这些多余的利润给司机，更多的乘客意味着更多的收入。
You can give it to consumers, if you reduce prices.
你也可以通过降低乘车价格，把这些利润分给乘客。
Or you can decide that the platform gets to keep all of it.
或者你也可以决定由平台保留全部利润。
What usually happens is that all three of them would somehow split it. But what about the rest of us?
通常的情况是这三方都会分得利润的一部分。但这对于其他人意味着什么？
We can also be impacted without being on either sides of this business.
尽管并不处于这种商业模式的任何一侧，我们也可能受到影响。
If my neighbor decides to rent his apartment on Airbnb, and we have more people coming in and out of the building,
如果我的邻居决定在爱彼迎上出租他的公寓，我们居住的这栋楼就会有更多人员出入，
more noise than usual, then I'm getting an unpleasant side effect of this productivity magic.
带来比以往更多的噪音，那么这种提高效率的商业魔法就会带来令我不快的副作用。
This is what economists would call a "negative externality."
经济学家通常将其称为“负面的外部效应”。
The negative externality of Uber cars becoming more productive
以纽约为例，优步车变得更有效率所带来的“负面的外部效应”，
is taxi drivers seeing the value of their licenses drop by as much as 30 percent in New York, for example.
是让出租车司机的牌照贬值高达百分之三十。
This is the dark side. And this is what sparks street demonstrations and sometimes, sometimes, even violence.
这就是其黑暗的一面。而这也是引起街头示威的导火索，有时甚至会导致暴力冲突。
I profoundly believe this is avoidable. And it became clearer to me the more I have spent time in emerging markets.
我深切地认为这是可避免的。我在新兴市场待的时间越长，就越觉得如此。

In fact, during my time in Singapore,
事实上，在新加坡的那段时间里，
I spent half of any given week traveling in the region, between Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia,
我每周都会花一半的时间在马来西亚、泰国、印度尼西亚之间往返，
and I became a user -- actually, more of a fan, of online marketplaces that were not that well-known back then.
于是我成为了一名使用当时还不太普及的在线市场的用户，更确切地说，是一名粉丝。
But some of them made interesting strategic trade-offs that dramatically reduced their side effects, their externalities.
其中一些在线市场做出了有趣的策略性取舍，从而大幅减轻了它们的副作用，也就是那些“外部影响”。
Take Gojek, for example. They're basically Uber for motor bikes.
以Gojek为例，他们本质上是摩托车界的优步。
They are one of the most liked online marketplaces in Indonesia,
也是印度尼西亚最受欢迎的在线市场之一，
and this has a lot to do with the role they chose to play.
而其中很大一部分原因在于他们选择扮演的角色。
Instead of picking a fight with every other transportation option out there,
他们并不是与其他交通方式进行竞争，
they choose to gradually integrate them within their own platform, so that without leaving the Gojek app,
而是选择将其他交通方式逐渐整合到自己的平台中，所以用户不需要切换出Gojek的应用，
you can check the public transportation schedule and choose to take a bus for a long distance.
就能查看公共交通时间表，选择公交车作为长途出行的工具。
Then, maybe, a motorbike or a traditional taxi that you can order and pay for from within the same app.
或者选择摩托车，传统的出租车，这些预约和付款都可以在同一个应用中进行操作。
If you look at Gojek today,
根据Gojek现在的数据，
nine out of 10 previous motor taxi drivers believe their quality of life has improved after joining the platform.
十个前摩的司机中就有九个认为在加入这个平台之后生活质量得到了改善。
And nine out of 10 consumers -- nine out of 10 -- believe that Gojek has a positive impact on society in general.
十个用户中有九个，90%的用户认为，总体而言，Gojek对社会产生了积极的影响。
Now, this level of trust is what allowed Gojek to grow into what is today a super online marketplace for everything
正是这种程度的信任使得Gojek成长为现在这样一个超级在线市场，
from food to grocery even massages and laundry pickups.
涵盖范围从食品杂货，甚至是按摩，洗衣店衣物提取等服务。
It all came from a deliberate trade-off to be an orchestrator of a bigger ecosystem where others also have their role to play,
而这一切都源于一个经过深思熟虑的取舍决定：成为更大的生态系统中的协调者，让其他人也能参与进来，
instead of a single winner, a hero, that takes for himself what would, at the end, be a smaller pie.
而不是成为单一的赢家，“英雄”，到最后只能分到一个更小的“蛋糕”（利润）。
Another interesting example is Jumia. Jumia is the equivalent of Amazon in Africa.
另一个有趣的例子是Jumia。Jumia相当于非洲的亚马逊。
But they don't generate the same level of fear in the small-business community.
但他们不会让小企业圈产生对亚马逊那种程度的担忧。
And one of the reasons for that is because they have decided to actively invest in African entrepreneurs, to grow them into the digital age.
其中的一个原因是它们决定积极投资非洲的创业者，帮助他们成长以融入到数字时代中。
Now keep in mind, Jumia is operating in countries with some of the lowest digital literacy and digital connectivity scores in the world.
请大家考虑到一点，Jumia是在世界上数字素养和数字连接得分最低的几个国家进行经营。
Now they could have dealt with that the usual way, through lobbying for reforms
他们可以通过使用传统方法--为普及计算机进行游说，
and they probably do that, but they have also built Jumia University,
他们可能也正在这么做，但同时他们还建造了Jumia大学，
an e-learning platform where merchants can come and learn basic digital and business skills.
这是一个在线学习平台，通过它，商家能学到基本的电子和商业知识。
We have studied online marketplaces in Africa last year.
去年，我们研究了非洲的在线市场。
And during that study, we have met one of Jumia's merchants. His name is Jomo.
在研究过程中，我们认识了一名使用Jumia的商户。他叫Jomo。
He was fired from his job in 2014, and at that time, he decided he wanted to become his own boss.
他在2014年被解雇，在那时，他决定要当自己的老板。
He wanted to be independent. He also wanted to never be fired again.
他想变得独立，再也不想被解雇了。
So at that time, Jomo had no clue what a business is.
但在那时，Jomo对做生意一窍不通。
So he needed to go through a series of trainings to learn how to select products,
他需要接受一系列培训，来学习该如何选择商品，
how to price them and how to promote them online. Today, Jomo has a 10-employee online business.
如何为它们定价，以及如何在网上推销这些产品。现在，Jomo的在线生意已经拥有了十名员工。
And as of a few months ago, he just opened his very first brick-and-mortar shop in the suburbs of Nairobi.
就在几个月之前，他刚在内罗毕郊区开了自己的第一家实体店。
Now, through its university, Jumia has the potential of helping a huge number of Jomos.
通过这所大学，Jumia将有潜力帮助到更多像Jomo一样的人。
And we have estimated that together with other online marketplaces on the continent,
根据我们的估计，Jumia和其他在非洲的在线市场一起，
they can generate three million additional jobs by 2025.
到2025年将能创造约三百万个额外的工作岗位。
And they would do that either directly, or through their impact on the wider community.
他们可以直接提供工作，或通过对更广大社区的影响，帮助就业。
And sometimes, taking that wider impact into consideration or forgetting about it can make or break a platform.
有时，是否有考虑到对更广大群体造成的影响将决定一个平台的成败。
To illustrate that, let's go back to Singapore.
为了说明这一点，让我们回到新加坡。
So, when we decided with my wife to leave the country last year, Uber decided to do the same.
去年，我和妻子决定离开新加坡，与此同时，优步也做出了同样的决定。
At the same time, again, we started to see that pattern, but maybe it's a coincidence.
在那时，我们又开始看到那个规律。但也许那只是一个巧合。
In reality, Uber lost the ride-hailing battle to a Malaysian-born start-up called Grab.
事实上，优步在即时用车领域输给了始创于马来西亚的初创公司Grab。
Now, interestingly, my wife didn't have the same level of concerns with Grab,
有趣的是，我妻子对Grab并没有和对优步同样程度的担忧，
because when Grab started, it had a different name.
因为Grab最开始有另一个名字。
It was called MyTeksi, and as the name suggests, it started as a platform for taxis.
它叫做MyTeksi，顾名思义，它刚开始是一个针对出租车的平台。
So when Grab started expanding the driver pool beyond taxis, it was seen as gradual and reasonable.
所以当Grab后来开始把业务拓展到其他出行工具时，大众都将其视为一个渐进而合理的过程。
They were also very careful while doing so.
他们在拓展业务的时候也非常小心谨慎。
They thought of what kind of social safety net they should bring to all drivers.
他们考虑到了该带给所有司机什么样的社会安全网络。
So they put in place special insurance packages and even financial education programs.
他们为司机落实了特殊的保险计划，甚至还有理财教育的项目。
Now, compare that with what happened in London, in New York, in Paris, where taxi drivers
与之相比，伦敦、纽约、巴黎的出租车司机们，
didn't feel that the platforms understood they had to pay 200,000 euros for their license -- and mostly in loans.
觉得那些平台并没有认识到他们还要为自己的牌照付二十万欧元，而且通常是以贷款的方式。
When you don't take that kind of social environmental information into account, you get strong reactions.
当你不考虑到这些社会环境信息时，你就会得到一些激烈的反应。
I'm not trying to argue that the trade-offs by either Grab or Jumia or Gojek are risk-free.
我并不是说Grab，Jumia，Gojek所采取的取舍就是无风险的。
Did they slow down growth at some point, temporarily? Maybe.
他们在某段时间有暂时减缓发展的步伐吗？也许有。
But look at them today. Gojek is worth 10 billion dollars.
但看看现在。Gojek现在价值一百亿美元。
Jumia is one of only three unicorns in the whole of Africa.
Jumia是整个非洲仅有的三家独角兽公司之一。
And Grab, well, they pushed out Uber out of the whole region of Southeast Asia.
Grab将优步挤出了整个东南亚地区。
And I also think these trade-offs have nothing specific to emerging markets.
我也认为这些取舍并不只适用于新兴市场。
Amazon or Uber or others can learn from them and adapt them to their own realities.
亚马逊，优步等大企业也可以从中学习，并运用到自己的实际情况中。
In the long run, this doesn't need to be a zero-sum game.
从长远的角度看，这不需要是一场零和博弈。
In the long run -- and this is maybe the Asian side of me speaking -- it pays to be patient.
从长远的角度看--这个观点可能是我的亚洲思维使然--耐心点是有好处的。
It pays to reconsider your goal and your priorities in the light of a much bigger equation
根据一个更大的等式来重新考虑你的目标和优先级是值得的，
that includes you and your users, of course, but also it includes regulators, policymakers, your communities.
这个等式包括你和你的用户，当然也包括监管者、政策制定者和社会共同体。
And I would argue, above all, it includes the very businesses you are meant to disrupt. Thank you.
而且我认为，这个等式首先应包括那些会被你（的平台）颠覆的企业。谢谢大家。