Alan next turned a little aside from this central idea in order to consider the objection to the idea of machine 'intelligence' that was raised by the existence of problems insoluble by a mechanical process—by the discovery of Computable Numbers, in fact.
接下来，图灵从他的核心问题上移开，考虑了一个反对机器智能的理由。根据《可计算数》得到的结论，一定存在某些问题，是机械过程无法解决的。
In the 'ordinal logics' he had invested the business of seeing the truth of an unprovable assertion, with the psychological significance of 'intuition'.
在序数逻辑学中，图灵已经看到了不可证明的命题，也认识到了直觉的重要性。
But this was not the view that he put forward now.
但这并不是他现在要说的。
Indeed, his comments verged on saying that such problems were irrelevant to the question of 'intelligence'.
实际上，他的观点倾向于，这样的问题与"智能"无关。
He did not probe far into the significance of Godel's theorem and his own result, but instead cut the Gordian knot:
图灵并没有深入考虑哥德尔定理和他自己的结论，他快刀斩乱麻地给出了一个解释：
I would say that fair play must be given to the machine.
我们必须公平地对待机器。
Instead of it sometimes giving no answer we could arrange that it gives occasional wrong answers.
如果机器遇到无法解决的问题，我们完全可以让它给出一个错误答案。
But the human mathematician would likewise make blunders when trying out new techniques.
人类数学家在研究新问题的时候也会出错，显然我们并没在乎，反而会继续给他机会。
It is easy for us to regard these blunders as not counting and give him another chance, but the machine would probably be allowed no mercy.
但是，机器却没有得到这样的宽容，人们不允许机器出错。
In other words then, if a machine is expected to be infallible, it cannot also be intelligent.
然而，如果我们要求机器是绝对正确的，那么它就不可能是智能的，
There are several theorems which say almost exactly that.
有很多理论可以支持这一点。
But these theorems say nothing about how much intelligence may be displayed if a machine makes no pretence at infallibility.
但是这些理论没有说明，如果机器不故意掩饰其正确性，那么到底可以表现出何等程度的智能。