At heart it was the same problem of mind and matter that Eddington had tried to rescue for the side of the angels by invoking the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. But there was a difference.
Eddington had addressed himself to the determinism of physical law, in order to deal with the kind of Victorian scientific world-picture that Samuel Butler had parodied in Erewhon:
If it be urged that the action of the potato is chemical and mechanical only, and that it is due to the chemical and mechanical effects of light and heat, the answer would seem to lie in an enquiry whether every sensation is not chemical and mechanical in its operation?
...Whether there be not a molecular action of thought, whence a dynamical theory of the passions shall be deducible?
Whether strictly speaking we should not ask what kinds of levers a man is made of rather than what is his temperament?
How are they balanced? How much of such and such will it take to weigh them down so as to make him do so and so?
It was a picture drawn from nineteenth century physics, chemistry and biology.
But the Turing challenge was on a different level of deterministic description, that of the abstract logical machine, as he had defined it.
There was another difference. Victorians like Butler, Shaw and Carpenter had concerned themselves with identifying a soul, a spirit or life force.
Alan Turing was talking about 'intelligence'.