They had learnt, but it was a painful way to learn.
虽然很痛苦，但他们得到了教训。
Fifty thousand Allied seamen died in the course of the war, trying to mind their own business in the most gruelling conditions of the western war; 360 in the March 1943 convoy battle alone.
五万名盟军海员在战斗中牺牲了，在西线的艰难战斗中，他们能够依靠的只有自己。1943年3月，有360艘护航舰在独自挣扎，
Nor were their trials then over; the Merchant Navy cipher system continued to be breakable for the rest of 1943, long after the Navy was protected by the introduction of its new system on 10 June.
而他们的试炼并未结束，商船密码系统一直能够被德军破译，很久以后，直到6月10日，才有了新的通信系统来保护海军。
Peculiarly vulnerable, and given the lowest priority, the merchant shipping ran a danger of which few knew, and whose enormity even fewer could appreciate.
高度脆弱，低级优先，几乎没有人意识到，商船队冒着何等的危险，更没有人意识到，这种危险有多么可怕。
In retrospect the failure of Allied naval communications vindicated the policy urged before the war by Mountbatten, and rejected by the Admiralty, that cipher machines should be employed.
盟军海军通信的失败证明，蒙巴顿在战前建议使用机械密码设备是正确的，但当时却被海军拒绝了。
After 1943 the Navy joined the other services in an increasing use both of the Typex and of the equivalent American machine.
1943年后，海军和其它部门一样，添置了泰普克斯机和美国的类似设备。
Against these the B. Dienst made no headway.
德国密码部门在这方面没有任何进展。
And yet the modernists such as Mountbatten might have been right for the wrong reason.
蒙巴顿的想法是正确的，却被别人用错误的理由反驳掉了，
Machine ciphers were not inherently secure, as the Enigma proved.
他们说机器密码并非天生就一定安全，谜机已经证明了这一点。
The Foreign Office continued to use a hand system based on books; it remained unbroken.
外交部仍然使用基于手册的手动系统，它一直没有被破解。
Bletchley deciphered the Italians' naval machine system; but was increasingly powerless against their book ciphers.
布莱切利能够破译意大利海军的谜机系统，但却对他们的密码手册系统无能为力。