NE of the least convincing things about the European Union’s energy and climate policy is the brazen catchiness of its slogan1: 20-20 -20. This refers to a 20% reduction in carbon-dioxide emissions and 20% share for renewable energy sources by 2020. The idea that rigorous analysis of the right policies happened to echo the target date seems, at best, trivially2 amdescending3. At least this week’s suggestion by the European Commission that the EU should consider unilaterally moving to a 30% cut in C02 has the merit of showing that something other than public relations and numerology is at work.
欧盟能源和气候政策中一个最缺乏说服力的条款就是那个响亮的口号： 20-20-20o它的含义是到202_实现二氧化碳减排20%,并且可再生能源的比例达 到20%。对适当的政策的全面分析，以回应达成目标的时间似乎充其量只是无关痛 痒的谦辞。至少欧盟委员会本周提出的单方面把二氧化碳减排目标提高到30%的 彭义就没有顾及公共关系和现状。
Yet for many that is the limit of its appeal. The French and German governments have already come out against the plan. The main business lobby group in Brussels is opposed as well. Their argument is that bigger cuts would burden business at a difficult time, both by increasing the cost of carbon for such large emitters4 as the steel and cement industries, and by raising the price of electricity for everyone else. The commission’s own analysis gives numbers for these. It puts the cost of achieving a 30% reduction (compared with 1990 emissions levels) in 2020 at 81 billion ($99 billion) a year, against only 48 billion to deliver the 20% target.
但对多人来说，那正是欧盟委员会提案的命门。法国和德国政府已经对这个 计划表示了反对。布鲁塞尔的主要游说集团也表示了反对。他们的观点就是过高的 减排会在困难时期增加公司的负担,不仅会增加钢铁、水泥等排放大户的开销，还 会造成电价上涨，给别人增加负担。欧盟委员会自己提供了这方面的分析数据。到2020年实现减排30%的目标(相对于1990年的排放水平)，每年的支出是810^欧元 (99(低美元),而减排20%的开支仅为每年480亿欧元。
That 48 billion is a lot less than the 70 billion cost estimated for the 20% target in 2008, mainly because the recession has already reduced emissions. Green enthusiasts have seized on this to argue that 30% could be had today for little more than 20% was had then. They also point to analysis by the European Climate Foundation, among others, which says that efficiency savings as a result of the 30% policy might save as much or more than its cost.
4800亿欧元的开支远低于2008年估计的700^欧元，其主要原因是经济衰退巳 经减少了排放量。绿色环保人士抓住了这一点，认为只需要比以往多付出一点努 力，就能使减排目标从20%上升到30%。他们还拿出了欧洲气象的分析数据，声称减 排30%带来的效率提升节省的开支甚至高于达成这一目标的支出。
These arguments are hardly compelling. If the existing policy becomes cheaper because of the recession, why not just pocket the difference and be thankful for small mercies? Even if the calculated gains from the proposal were real (and they may not be), championing diffuse5 benefitsover identifiable costs is always hard politics. A similar argument goes for claims that, by spurring more vibrant green technology, the 30% cut would create lots of jobs, exports and the like.
这些观点很难有说服力。如果说当前的政策因为经济衰退而变得更为便宜,那 么为什么不见好就收呢？即使上面的计算是真实的(其实有可能不是），分散的利益 和明确的支出也很难作为决策的依据。一个相类似的观点就是如果使用更多的绿 色科技，30%的减排将会增加大量的工作机会、出口等等。
The weightiest argument for looking at a 30% cut is that it is already EU policy in certain circumstances. At the Copenhagen climate negotiations last December, the EU tried to demonstrate leadership by repeating a 2007 pledge that it would increase its planned cuts to 30% if it judged the commitments by others to be suitably inspiring. They never were, so it never did. Were dramatic new pledges of cuts to be made by other countries in future, the 30% cut for the EU would quickly become an obligation. But after Copenhagen that seems highly unlikely.
要求减排30%的一个最重量级的理由就是它在某些情况下已经是欧盟的既成 政策。在去年12月的哥本哈根气候大会上，欧盟试图通过重复2007年的承诺展示自 己的领导地位，其承诺就是如果其他国家的目标非常宏大，那么欧盟就会把减排 目标提高到30%。这种情形没有发生,因此欧盟也没有这么做。如果在将来其他国 家的目标变得非常积极，那么30%减排很快就会成为欧盟的责任。但是自从哥本哈 根气候大会之后’这躲变得不可能了。
The commission would thus face an uphill task to win approval for a unilateral 30% target. Still, the underlying reasons for it have some cogency. The leadership role that Europe once played in climate politics is gone, and those who would regain it need to have something to offer. More fundamentally, Europe now has a large and costly carbon market that is meant to drive the economy towards low_ emission technologies. But the price it sets on emissions is too low. A 30% target would mean raising the cost of carbon in that market, although, since many industrial users get free allowances, the burden of paying this would still be spread unequally. There may be other ways to raise carbon costs that have more appeal: a rising EU-wide carbon tax, for example, that would be imposed in some form on imports too. But would this be any easier to deliver?
欧盟委员会争取30%的减排目标绝不会一帆风顺。欧盟委员会建议的背后还 有一些深层次的原因。欧洲在气候政策里曾经的领导地位已经消失，想重新获得这 种地位，就需要拿出一些措施。从更基本的原因上来说，欧洲现在二氧化碳排放的 市场很大，代价也很高，这意味着经济发展的趋势是低排放技术。但是现在排放的 代价太低了。30%的减排目标意味着提高排放的价格，但是，由于许多企业都有免 费的福利，因此各个企业的负担会变得不均衡。也许有其他的方式来提高二氧化碳 排放的价格，比如说在欧盟范围内提高二氧化碳税，这也会以某种方式影响进口。 但是这容易吗？