New book argues Chinese firms'presence in Latin America focuses on the most environmentally-damaging sector
新书谈论了拉丁美洲存在的中国公司，而这些公司主要集中在对环境造成最严重破坏的部门
Question: when did contemporary political and media debate start on China's "entry" into the Western hemisphere?

问题：当代政治和新闻媒体从何时开始辩论中国“进入”西半球？
Answer: January 1997, when Panama awarded concessions to a Chinese company to operate port facilities on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts at both ends of the Panama Canal, just after having obtained control of it from the US.
回答：是1997年1月，当时巴拿马把巴拿马运河在太平洋和大西洋两端的港口设施交给一家中国公司运营，那时巴拿马刚刚从美国那里获得巴拿马运河的控制权。

Question: when did Latin America and the Caribbean wake up to its dramatically expanding new relationship with China?

问题：拉丁美洲和加勒比海岸何时开始认识到要和中国大力的发展新关系？
Answer: November 2004, when the then Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba and apparently spoke of the possibility of investing US$100 billion in the region – although the Chinese government later claimed it had been mistranslated and the US$100 billion referred to bilateral trade.
回答：2004年11月，当中国国家主席胡锦涛访问阿根廷、巴西、智利和古巴时，似乎讨论了在这一地区投资1000亿美元的可能性——尽管中国政府后来指出这是翻译失误，这1000亿美元指的是双边贸易额。
That, at least, is what Evan Ellis, a researcher at the U.S. Army War College and considered by some to be a leading expert on China-Latin America relations, states in his new book China on the Ground in Latin America: Challenges for the Chinese and Impacts on the Region. Ellis's main argument is that in the last few years the Chinese have started to establish a new, "significant" physical presence in Latin America and the Caribbean – following trade deals, acquisitions, loans and loan-backed construction projects, among other things. As a result, Ellis argues that China now finds itself, for the first time in its 5,000 year history, connected to however many million non-Chinese people in other countries and dependent on the "success and well-being of its commercial representatives in distant parts of the world."
While the focus of his book is Chinese acquisitions, loans, other commercial dealings and the challenges these pose for the Chinese government, companies and Chinese people living in Latin America, Ellis has various things to say about the environment. Here are 10 – some of which you may agree with, others you may not – I picked out: Evan Ellis,
美国陆军学院研究员，是研究中国-拉美关系的知名专家。情况至少像这位专家在它的新书《中国在拉美大陆：中国的挑战和对拉美的影响》里说的大抵相同。他的主要观点是，最近几年，伴随着中国在这个区域的一系列的贸易，兼并，贷款和承揽基于贷款的建设工程，中国已经开始在拉美和加勒比地区建立新的“令人瞩目”的实际存在，另外还有其他的影响。因此，Ellis认为中国现在已经意识到，她在5000年的历史中从未与其他国家的如此众多非华裔群体产生过这么紧密的联系，而且依赖于这些遥远地方的商业代表们的成功和幸福。 虽然这本书的重点是阐述中国在拉美的兼并，贷款和其他商业贸易活动，以及国政府，企业和在拉美生活的中国人面临的挑战。但是Ellis对环境问题也谈了不少看法。我从中挑出来10条，让大家可以根据自己的理解去判断。
1. Chinese companies have focused on developing their physical presence in Latin America in the sectors that are most likely to generate environmental impacts and concerns: petroleum, mining and agriculture. The Chinese presence in petroleum is most significant in Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina, and in mining in Ecuador and Peru.
1.中国企业只专于发展他们在拉美的实际存在，他们关注的领域大部分都可能产生让人担忧的环境问题，比如石油，采矿和农业。中国在拉美的石油产业主要分布在委内瑞拉，厄瓜多尔和阿根廷，而采矿业的重点分布在厄瓜多尔和秘鲁。
2. Resistance from "environmentalists and local communities" is one of the major challenges facing Chinese companies trying to make acquisitions and win contracts in Latin America. To date, projects involving Chinese investors have "often" been "opposed on environmental grounds, or because of their impact on local communities and indigenous groups," writes Ellis, citing the Chone dam project and Mirador mine in Ecuador, the Belo Monte dam in Brazil, the Rio Blanco mine in Peru, the Lupe mine in Mexico, a soy processing facility in Rio Negro in Argentina, the Agua Zarca dam project in Honduras, and the River Magdalena in Colombia as examples.
2.来自环保人士和当地社区的抗议是中国企业在拉美开展并购和承揽项目时，面临的最大挑战。迄今为止，涉及中国资本的项目经常遭遇搁浅，要么因为环境原因遭到反对，要么由于对当地社区和土著群体产生了不利影响。Ellis在书中援引了下面的几个项目：厄瓜多尔的Chone水坝工程和米拉多尔采矿工程，巴西的贝洛蒙特水坝工程，秘鲁的里约布兰科采矿工程，墨西哥的卢佩采矿工程，阿根廷的尼格罗大豆加工厂工程，洪都拉斯Agua Zarca水坝工程以及哥伦比亚的马格达莱纳河工程。
3. Opposition to Chinese projects on environmental grounds is "likely to expand in the future because of the number of potential projects. . . that involve environmentally sensitive areas." These include plans to develop Goat Island, Jamaica, into an "international shipping hub" and the exploitation of the Ishpingo, Tambococha and Tiputini (ITT) oil fields in the far east of the Yasuní National Park in Ecuador where Ellis says the “Chinese corporations who have already done the exploratory drilling are the leading contenders" to win contracts. Indeed, Ellis states that although "no official link” exists between ITT and the construction of a new refinery on Ecuador's Pacific coast, "a senior Ecuadorian source speaking off-the-record suggested that the granting of the rights for ITT may be a condition pursued by the Chinese for the funding of the Refinery. . . which would be fed by the petroleum extracted there."
3.涉及自然保护区的潜在项目有很多，因而中国承揽的项目因为环境原因遭到反对的情况很在未来会越来越普遍。潜在的项目包括牙买加公羊岛国际航运中心项目和厄瓜多尔亚苏尼国家公园远东ITT（Ishpingo, Tambococha and Tiputini ）油田项目。关于后者，Ellis提到，一家中国企业已经实施可行性钻探，并且是项目的主要竞争者。事实上，Ellis说，尽管ITT 和在厄瓜多尔海岸新建炼油厂之间不存在官方联系，但是一位厄瓜多尔高层人士曾非正式表示，中国可能会根据ITT油田项目的中标情况来决定是否给这个炼油厂出资，而在将来这个炼油厂的用油将会来自ITT油田。
4. Environmental concerns are a major challenge for Chinese companies not because they are "inherently less respectful of the environment" than others, but "because of a confluence of factors" including the high environmental impacts of the sectors they are focusing on, a "cultural distance" between Chinese and Latin American people, and Chinese companies' lack of experience in the region. One example: “Chinese executives and managers often presume that local authorities will be able to force local residents to comply with decisions to relocate their homes. . . and may mistakenly presume that, as long as they have reached an agreement with the appropriate government authorities, the local communities and other actors will comply with the decisions."
4.环境问题成为中国企业的最大挑战并不是因为中国“一贯忽视环境保护”而是由于一系列其它因素共同决定的，比如，这些项目本身就是高污染产业，中国人和拉美人之间存在文化差异，以及中国公司在本地的经验不足。举个例子：中国企业的高管经常认为，官方能强制让当地人搬迁，并且错误的认为摆平了政府官员，当地的社区和其它人士就会乖乖就范。
5. "Environmental complaints" have already been made about various ongoing Chinese projects. These include the Marcona mine in Peru run by the company Shougang, the Cerro Maimon mine in the Dominican Republic, and the Sierra Grande mine in Argentina.
5.各种各样的中国在建项目都会遭到环保方面的投诉，比如首钢在秘鲁马尔科纳的采矿项目，多明尼亚的Cerro Maimon采矿项目以及阿根廷的赛拉格兰德采矿项目。
6. Chinese companies "have made efforts to improve their environmental practices where they have felt it necessary to do so, in order to avoid problems with governments and communities." Ellis cites new technology by company Bosai to address dust problems caused by bauxite mining in Guyana as one example, and ten "environmental protection projects oriented toward wastewater, dust and air pollution" at the Marcona mine in Peru as another.
6.中国公司不想和当地政府和社区产生纠葛，开始意识到有必要做出改变，他们已经正在环境保护方面进行努力。Ellis举了2个例子，中国的博赛公司就采用了一项新的技术来控制圭亚那一家铝土矿场产生的灰尘污染。而在秘鲁马尔康那矿厂，针对其产生的废水，尘土和空气污染，兴建了10个环保项目。
7. Offshore drilling by Chinese companies in Latin America and the Caribbean is particularly risky in terms of environmental impacts because “they are relatively new to producing and using deepwater drilling technology." Ellis argues that Chinese operations are "arguably even more vulnerable to such risks" than was BP before the Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico blowout in 2010.
7.中国企业在拉美和加勒比地区的近海钻探队环境带来的影响更令人担心，Ellis说，因为他们还是最近才开始使用这样的深水钻探技术，英国石油公司承接的墨西哥湾深水地平线工程在2010年出现大面积泄露，而中国企业的操作事实上比之前英国石油公司的做法更加冒险。
8. Although "many [Chinese companies in Latin America] do behave badly" – either "due to a combination of willful imposition of Chinese norms and practices that do not function well in the new context, or accidentally, due to a lack of knowledge regarding local norms" – they "do not inherently behave worse than their Western counterparts" (Ellis's italics).
8.尽管许多中国的企业在拉美的表现差强人意，或是因为中国这种任性专横的观念和做法在新的大陆水土不服，或是偶尔地对当地的法律法规不甚了解，但是他们本质并不比西方同行的公司做得差。
9. A "significant portion" of the new Chinese presence in Latin America is in the renewable energy sector where companies "have been a key force in the “green revolution" transforming the energy generation mix" and "slowly moving the electricity infrastructure of the region away from fossil fuels." Ellis states that "of the many projects and acquisitions by Chinese firms in the electricity generation sector. . . only a very small number have involved traditional fossil fuel power generation facilities", with a focus instead on hydroelectric and what Ellis calls a "wave of new solar and wind power projects" across Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico.
9.很大一部分中国企业在拉美从事可再生能源领域的项目，这些企业是本地开展“绿色改革”的关键力量，他们在此发展混合能源发电，使本区域内电力基础设施逐步摆脱对化石能源的依赖，Ellis说，在中国企业在电力领域的许多项目和并购中更加专注于建设水电，以及他口中所说的一系列新型太阳能和风能发电项目，只有很小一部分涉及传统化石燃料发电。新的能源项目广泛分布在阿根廷，巴西，智利，哥斯达黎加，厄瓜多尔和墨西哥。
10. What better way to end than with one particularly emblematic example and startling claim? Despite a January 2014 announcement that work would begin on a canal through Nicaragua by the end of this year or early 2015, "as this book went to press, a public announcement regarding the route to be taken by the canal had not been made, nor had any information been made public regarding environmental impact" (my italics, this time). Indeed, a report published in September by the Alexander von Humboldt Studies Centre in Nicaragua states that "technical information of environmental character generated during the design, construction and operation of the Great Canal and associated projects will remain confidential,” under the terms of the concession agreement. Von Humboldt calls the canal – due to be built by the Hong Kong-based HK Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Company – and associated infrastructure the biggest environmental threat to the country in its history.
10.那么什么样的极具代表的例子或者发人深省的陈词可以作为结束语呢？恐怕只有这个2014年1月发布公告了，其中声明尼加拉瓜运河将要在本年末或是2015年初开工。直到我的新书发往出版社时，有关运河路线以及环境影响评估的官方声明还没出炉。事实上，亚历山大•冯•洪堡研究中心已经在9月公布了一个报告。报告称，大运河和附属工程在设计，施工和运营过程中会对环境特征产生影响，而这些技术信息在特许协议的约束下将会处于保密状态。洪堡研究中心称，这条由香港尼加拉瓜运河发展投资公司承建的大运河以及运河相关基础设施将会对尼加拉瓜的环境产生前所未有的巨大威胁。