China’s new charm offensive in Asia – using infrastructure development to garner soft power at the expense of rivals US and Japan – has reached new heights in recent weeks. Multi-billion US dollar deals with strategic partners such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan aside, even countries with reservations about China’s rise have begun taking a more pragmatic view toward using China’s huge foreign exchange reserves to their benefit.
中国在亚洲展开的新魅力攻势——利用基础设施开发来积累软实力，从而打击其竞争对手美国和日本——在最近几周达到新的高点。除了与斯里兰卡、巴基斯坦等战略合作伙伴签署数十亿美元的协议以外，即便对中国崛起持保留态度的国家也开始采取更为务实的态度，乐意利用前者的巨额外汇储备来造福本国。

Earlier this month, Indonesian leaders travelled to Beijing seeking to tap financing for power and transport projects, notwithstanding the new administration’s strong emphasis on both national and maritime security. Chinese companies are challenging Japanese bids for high speed rail contracts in Malaysia and Thailand. This week, a team from Indian Railways flew to Beijing to discuss a potential Delhi-Chennai high speed rail link.
不久前，印尼领导人来到北京寻求获取电力和交通项目的融资，虽然新政府大力强调国家和海洋安全。中国公司正在与日本竞争马来西亚和泰国的高铁合同。上周，一个来自印度铁路公司(Indian Railways)的团队飞到北京，讨论修建德里至钦奈高铁的可能性。
Yet in spite of the huge stashes of money available in Beijing, Chinese financing for existing energy projects in Vietnam – an economy with high dependency on China – has been all but frozen as a result of bilateral tensions over the South China Sea, according to research by Asean Confidential, a research service at the Financial Times.
然而，英国《金融时报》旗下研究服务机构《东盟投资参考》(Asean Confidential)的研究表明，尽管北京方面有巨额资金储备可以使用，但由于中越两国围绕南中国海的紧张局势，中国为越南现有能源项目提供的融资几乎都处于停滞状态。越南在经济上严重依赖中国。
Power grip
电力控制
Outwardly, tensions have been temporarily patched up. Government officials on both sides have agreed to paper over mutual differences. Official bilateral trade has grown 15 per cent year on year, and in late September a new Asia Development Bank-funded expressway connecting Hanoi, Vietnam’s capital, with the Chinese border at Lao Cai was formerly inaugurated.
表面看来，紧张局势暂时得到了修补。两国政府官员同意暂时搁置分歧。两国正式的双边贸易额同比增长15%。今年9月末，由亚洲开发银行(ADB)出资、从越南首都河内至与中国边境接壤的老街的高速公路正式举行了通车典礼。
But since May’s anti-China riots, Chinese lenders have effectively frozen credit lines to many Vietnamese engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracts, leaving a number of projects in limbo and having forced some into restructuring. Unless this changes, Vietnam will have to rely heavily on South Korean and Japanese financing and subcontracting to fill the void.
但自今年5月越南国内爆发反华骚乱以来，中国的各家银行事实上冻结了对许多越南工程、采购和建设(EPC)合同的信贷额度，导致大量项目陷入瘫痪，并迫使一些项目重组。除非形势发生变化，否则越南将极其依赖韩国和日本的融资和分包来填补空缺。
What remains unclear, however, is whether South Korea and Japan are either willing or able to finance a planned 55 GW build-out between 2014 and 2030, with 29.5 GW of coal-fired generation targeted by 2020 alone (see map). The exposure of both countries to Vietnam is already high, potentially making them wary of further ratcheting up involvement.
然而，目前尚不清楚的是，韩国和日本是否愿意或是否有能力为2014年到2030年的5500万千瓦电厂建设计划提供融资，而仅仅到2020年的目标就要建成2950万千瓦的火力发电厂（见图表）。这两个国家对越南的投资敞口已经很高了，很可能不愿意进一步加大投资。
Many of these projects are already into their first phase of development, and are heavily invested by Japanese and Korean companies – which account for roughly 60 per cent of cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) stock, with companies such as Marubeni, Sojitz, Kepco, Daelim, and Hyundai Heavy Industries taking the lead backed by Japanese official development assistance.
其中许多项目已经进入第一期开发阶段，主要由日本和韩国公司投资——这些投资占到该国累计外国直接投资存量的约60%，丸红(Marubeni)、双日株式会社(Sojitz)、关西电力(Kepco)、大林(Daelim)和现代重工业株式会社(Hyundai Heavy Industries)等公司在日本官方发展援助的支持下扮演着主要角色。
The problem, however, is that the EPC contracts for many of these projects have been sub-contracted to state-owned Chinese consortiums, with sometimes up to 95 per cent of the total EPC value going to Chinese firms. These sub-contractors are in turn financed by export credits and concessional loans from Chinese policy lenders such as the China Ex-Im Bank – thus creating the vulnerability to a freeze in Chinese finance.
然而，问题在于，其中许多项目的EPC合约被分包给了中国国有财团，有时这一分包比例达到EPC合同价值的95%。这些分包商的融资又来自中国进出口银行(China Ex-Im Bank)等中资政策银行提供的出口信贷和优惠贷款，从而很容易受到中国融资冻结的影响。
How far can diversification go?
多样化的空间
In the meantime Vietnam is seeking to rapidly diversify both its investment partners and its energy mix. Recently concluded or announced power deals include participation by not only Japanese and Korean companies, but also those from Thailand, Malaysia, India and Russia.
与此同时，越南正寻求迅速多样化其投资合作伙伴和能源组合。最近缔结或宣布的电力协议不仅包括日本和韩国公司的参与，而且还有来自泰国、马来西亚、印度和俄罗斯的公司。
Perhaps of even greater significance – although still inconclusive – is the revived momentum in negotiations with ExxonMobil over a long-delayed $10bn gas extraction deal, which would include onshore gas-fired power plants. With Asia’s fourth largest reserves of natural gas, independent estimates suggest that gas fields in undisputed waters off south Vietnam alone could generate an additional 20GW in coming decades.
或许更加重要的（不过仍然不是决定性的）是，与埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)关于拖延已久的100亿美元天然气开采协议的谈判恢复了动力——该协议将包括建设陆地天然气发电厂。越南拥有亚洲第四大天然气储藏，独立机构进行的评估表明，仅仅是越南南部无争议海域中的天然气田就可能在未来几十年额外带来2000万千瓦的电力。
This dovetails with the government’s push to reduce its dependency on refined fuel imports, resulting in a recent foreign investment boom in new refineries (on paper, a minimum $12bn in new investments through 2020), driving the share prices of PetroVietnam Gas – which accounts for almost 20 per cent of the Vietnamese stock market capitalization – to astronomical heights this year. Nuclear plants are also envisioned in the much longer term, attracting interest from Western, Japanese and Korean industry participants.
这符合越南政府降低对精炼燃料进口依赖的努力，这一努力导致最近针对新炼油厂的外国投资大幅增长（从账面来看，在2020年前最少有120亿美元的新投资），这推动越南国家石油公司(Petrovietnam)旗下天然气公司——Petrovietnam Gas的股价今年上涨至令人不可思议的高点——该公司市值占到越南股市的近20%。越南还有意在更长时期内建设核电站，吸引了来自西方、日本和韩国公司的兴趣。
Nevertheless, while Vietnam could manage to diversify its key investment relationships, it may not be able to substitute for its northern neighbour entirely. As Vietnam gears towards the upcoming Congress of the Communist Party in 2016 – requiring incumbent Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to step down – the issue of how to manage the China relationship and Chinese financing of Vietnam’s infrastructure development, will become a paramount issue within Vietnam’s political circles.
然而，尽管越南可能会成功地多样化其关键的投资关系，这也不能完全取代其与北方邻国的关系。随着越南着手准备于2016年召开越共全国代表大会——要求现任越南总理阮晋勇(Nguyen Tan Dung)下台——如何管理中越关系以及中国对越基础设施开发融资将成为越南政界的头等大事。
Similar, different risks in the Philippines
菲律宾与越南处境类似，却也有不同的风险
Like Vietnam, the Philippines – which also disputes China’s claims in the South China Sea – has largely been left behind by China’s international largesse.
与越南一样，菲律宾基本上被排除在中国海外投资的范围之外——菲中在南中国海上也有领土纠纷。
Itself witnessing a boom in power generation (an expected power deficit next year notwithstanding), the country has however traditionally been less reliant on Chinese financing, in part due to the lack of government support for infrastructure projects. Its macro economy likewise is less China-centric, and has suffered only marginally as a result of a recent slump in Chinese packaged tours to the island resort of Boracay and imports of key products such as timber and fruit.
菲律宾自身的发电量大幅增长（虽然预计明年将出现电力供应缺口），该国传统上对中国资金的依赖程度较低，这在一定程度上归因于缺乏政府对基础设施项目的支持。该国宏观经济同样不是以中国为中心，只是因最近前往长滩岛的中国旅游团数量锐减以及木材和水果等关键产品对华出口大幅下降而受到轻微的影响。
Nevertheless, China’s State Grid Corp has a 40 per cent equity stake in, and provides technical support and equipment to the Philippines’ National Grid Corp (NGCP), the country’s sole power grid operator. There are concerns in Manila that a Chinese stake in the country’s grid constitutes a risk to its operations and management.
然而，中国国家电网公司(State Grid Corp)在菲律宾国家电网公司(NGCP)拥有40%的股权，并向后者提供技术支持和设备——菲律宾国家电网公司是该国唯一一家电网运营商。马尼拉有人担心，中国公司在该国电网中的持股可能对其运营和管理造成威胁。
NGCP’s cooperation is urgently needed at a time when growing power integration will require greater levels of interconnection across the country’s sprawling archipelago, including between Visayas and Mindanao, between Negros Island and Batangas, and an upgrade of the existing Luzon – Visayas grid. Elsewhere, a Chinese quasi-government wealth fund owns a controlling stake in 2GO Group, which operates nationwide ferry services, an expansive network of warehouses, and as a result manages roughly 50 per cent of domestic Philippine freight.
菲律宾要加强电网整合，将需要该国杂乱无序的群岛之间加大互联水平——包括维萨亚斯群岛(Visayas)和棉兰老岛(Mindanao)之间、内格罗斯岛(Negros Island)和八打雁(Batangas)之间——并对现有的吕宋岛-维萨亚斯电网进行升级改造，在此之际菲律宾国家电网公司亟需合作。在其他领域，中国一家准政府财富基金持有2GO Group的控股权——2GO Group运营着菲律宾全国范围内的摆渡服务，以及一个庞大的仓库网络，从而管理着国内大约50%的货运。
Of course, both are single equity investments by technocratic, commercially driven companies, and have been highly profitable in both cases due to their effective monopolies in respective sectors. In that sense, the levels of attached political risk may to some extent be overblown.
当然，这两个案例都是由技术型商业公司做出的单一股权投资，并且都因为在各自领域占据实际垄断地位而获得丰厚利润。从这个意义上来说，其中的政治风险可能在某种程度上被夸大了。
Nevertheless, the Philippines, like Vietnam, is likely to turn towards its other investment partners at a time when Beijing is shunning the two countries in favour of other infrastructure-deficient countries in the region. Indeed, the scale of China’s largesse everywhere else in the region serves in part as a subtle reminder that both countries have much to lose by refusing to accept China’s new role in regional order.
然而，与越南一样，在北京方面避开这两个国家，支持该地区其他基础设施不足的国家之际，菲律宾也可能转向其他投资伙伴。实际上，中国在亚洲其他所有地区大举投资一定程度上也隐晦地表明，这两个国家拒绝接受中国在地区秩序中的新角色会失去很多东西。