(单词翻译:单击)
From the mid-1990s onwards, as Metzgers ideas began to spread, the number of hate crimes committed by self-styled leaderless rightwing extremists rose.
从20世纪90年代中期开始，随着梅茨格的思想开始传播，自称无领导的右翼极端分子犯下的仇恨犯罪数量上升。
In 1998, the FBI launched Operation Lone Wolf against a small group of white supremacists on the US west coast.
1998年，联邦调查局对美国西海岸的一小群白人至上主义者发起了独狼行动。
A year later, Alex Curtis, a young, influential rightwing extremist and protege of Metzger, told his hundreds of followers in an email that lone wolves who are smart and commit to action in a cold-mannered way can accomplish virtually any task before them.
一年后，年轻的、有影响力的右翼极端分子、梅茨格的门徒亚历克斯-柯蒂斯（Alex Curtis）在一封电子邮件中告诉他的数百名追随者，聪明并以冷酷的方式致力于行动的独狼，几乎可以完成他们面前的任何任务。
We are already too far along to try to educate the white masses and we cannot worry about [their] reaction to lone wolf/small cell strikes.
我们已经走得太远了，无法试图教育白人群众，我们不能担心[他们]对独狼/小细胞袭击的反应。
The same year, the New York Times published a long article on the new threat headlined New Face of Terror Crimes: Lone Wolf Weaned on Hate.
同年，《纽约时报》发表了一篇关于新威胁的长文，标题为《恐怖犯罪的新面孔：在仇恨中长大的独狼》。
This seems to have been the moment when the idea of terrorist lone wolves began to migrate from rightwing extremist circles, and the law enforcement officials monitoring them, to the mainstream.
这似乎是恐怖分子独狼的想法开始从右翼极端主义圈子和监视他们的执法官员迁移到主流的时刻。
In court on charges of hate crimes in 2000, Curtis was described by prosecutors as an advocate of lone-wolf terrorism.
在2000年柯蒂斯在法庭上被指控犯有仇恨罪，被检察官描述为独狼恐怖主义的倡导者。
When, more than a decade later, the term finally became a part of the everyday vocabulary of millions of people, it was in a dramatically different context.
十多年后，当这个词终于成为数百万人日常词汇的一部分时，它的背景发生了巨大的变化。
After 9/11, lone-wolf terrorism suddenly seemed like a distraction from more serious threats.
9.11事件后，独狼式恐怖主义似乎突然转移了人们对更严重威胁的注意力。
The 19 men who carried out the attacks were jihadis who had been hand picked, trained, equipped and funded by Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaida, and a small group of close associates.
实施袭击的19人是由基地组织领导人乌萨马-本-拉登和一小群亲密伙伴亲自挑选、训练、装备和资助的圣战分子。
Although 9/11 was far from a typical terrorist attack, it quickly came to dominate thinking about the threat from Islamic militants.
尽管9-11事件远非典型的恐怖袭击，但它很快成为人们对伊斯兰武装分子威胁的主要思考对象。
Security services built up organograms of terrorist groups.
安全部门建立了恐怖团体的组织结构图。
Analysts focused on individual terrorists only insofar as they were connected to bigger entities.
分析师们只关注与大实体有联系的恐怖分子个人。
Personal relations C particularly friendships based on shared ambitions and battlefield experiences, as well as tribal or familial links C were mistaken for institutional ones, formally connecting individuals to organisations and placing them under a chain of command.
个人关系，特别是基于共同野心和战场经验的友谊，以及部落或家庭联系，被误认为是机构关系，将个人与组织正式联系起来，并将他们置于一个指挥系统之下。
This approach suited the institutions and individuals tasked with carrying out the war on terror.
这种方法适合负责执行反恐战争的机构和个人。
For prosecutors, who were working with outdated legislation, proving membership of a terrorist group was often the only way to secure convictions of individuals planning violence.
对检察官来说，他们使用的是过时的立法，证明自己是恐怖组织成员往往是对策划暴力的个人定罪的唯一途径。
